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This thesis empirically examined the link between credit booms and bank fragility in 
South Africa. Fundamentally, the thesis looked at how the current developments in the 
domestic credit market affect the banking system, and in particular financial system 
stability in South Africa. The past two or three decades have seen an unprecedented 
increase in the level of domestic credit to the private sector. We have used mostly 
South African Reserve Bank and World Bank time series data for the three empirical 
studies. The thesis applied the robust autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) 
approach by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) and the nonlinear autoregressive 
distributed lags (NARDL) methodology of Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2014). 
The thesis contains three empirical studies.  
 
The first empirical study investigated the aggregate drivers of credit booms in South 
Africa using the causality tests based on the ARDL and Error Correction Model (ECM). 
Credit growth was analysed in relation to economic growth, types of loans, 
composition of credit by economic sector, debt-to-income ratio and the business cycle 
phases. Statistical evidence showed that South Africa has had a strong persistent 
growth in domestic credit over the past three decades with evidence of procyclical 
credit provision. 
  
The ARDL and ECM results showed that foreign capital inflows, mortgage loans, real 
interest rates and GDP per capita were important drivers of credit booms in South 
Africa. The second empirical study investigated whether excessive credit growth 
signalled future vulnerabilities in the South African banking sector. The main objective 
was to examine the growth-risk nexus in bank lending, given the credit booms currently 
experienced in South Africa. The business cycle was included in the model to reinforce 
the growth-risk nexus by allowing the study to develop a tri-variate model. The study 
found that credit risk management was still backward-looking and procyclical even 
though there were strong moves towards countercyclical models as suggested by the 





The ARDL model revealed the presence of a long-run relationship between credit risk, 
credit booms and the business cycle while the NARDL model established the presence 
of an asymmetric cointegration between the three variables. Negative shocks on the 
business cycle have a higher and more pronounced effect on credit risk than positive 
shocks while positive shocks to credit have a negative effect on credit risk in South 
Africa.  
 
The third empirical paper explored the relationship between credit booms, banking 
sector finance sources and its implications for financial stability in South Africa. It was 
noted that it was important for the study to identify the sensitivity of the banking sector 
to funding sources in South Africa. It was established that, like all other banking 
systems around the world, South African banks also tapped into wholesale funds to 
satisfy growing local demand for credit.  
 
The empirical results revealed a strong presence of an asymmetric relationship 
between credit booms and banking sector funding sources. Specifically, the study 
revealed that in the long run, positive developments in the wholesale funds market 
had a positive effect on the ability of the banking sector to satisfy credit demand; 
however, statistical evidence revealed that wholesale funds were highly volatile and 
susceptible to negative public signals. On the other hand, the study established that 
in the long run, positive developments in the domestic deposit market had positive 
effects on credit booms, while in the short run positive developments also had a 
positive effect on credit booms. Finally, negative shocks in domestic deposits in 
previous years had negative effects on credit booms.  
 
Based on the above, the study believes that credit booms are too risky to be left alone, 
and that appropriate monetary policy is a major instrument that is capable of curbing 
credit booms and limiting over-indebtedness in South Africa. The increase in the level 
of indebtedness beyond sustainable levels is a potential trigger of financial fragility in 
the economy. Strong fiscal policy capable of stimulating the finance and the real sector 




discipline is required during the upswing since credit booms do not only flatter the 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The notion that financial crises are credit booms gone wrong is not new in literature 
(Borio & Lowe, 2002; Enoch & Ötker-Robe, 2007; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009a; Borio & 
Disyatat, 2010; Schularick & Taylor, 2012; Borio, 2014; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2017; 
Jeanne & Korinek, 2018; Mian & Sufi, 2018). Over the past three decades, several 
developed and emerging economies have seen rapid credit growth to the private 
sector, for example, several Asian, Latin American and transition countries1. In the 
literature, credit booms occur when credit provided to the private sector expands by 
more than that extended during a cyclical expansion (Mendoza & Terrones, 2012). 
According to Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (2001), credit booms are defined 
as a period when the ratio of private credit to gross domestic product (GDP) deviates 
from its historical trend. Several studies established that credit booms are generally 
more associated with banking crises around the world (see, for example, Enoch & 
Ötker-Robe, 2007; Davis & Karim, 2008; Elekdag & Wu, 2011; Claessens & Kose, 
2013; Dell’Ariccia, Igan, Laeven & Tong, 2014; Boissay, Collard & Smets, 2016). 
 
There is a growing list of studies that strongly suggest that credit booms are a 
manifestation of financial development (finance-growth nexus) in both developed and 
emerging economies but also warns against a potential lending bubble that could burst 
in an environment of high financial volatility (Minsky, 1977; Kindleberger, 1978; 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998), increasing fragility in banking (Hilbers, Ötker-
Robe, Pazarbasioglu & Johnsen, 2005), and worsening macroeconomic imbalances 
(Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Gourinchas et al., 2001; Kiss, Nagy & Vonnák, 2006; 
Aizenman, Jinjarak & Park, 2015). It is important to note that credit booms were also 
put forward as causes of the Great Depression and the recent global financial crisis of 
2007-2009 (Eichengreen & Arteta, 2002; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009b; Demyanyk, 
                                                           




Koijen, & Van Hemert, 2011; Festić, Kavkler & Repina, 2011; Soedarmono, Sitorus & 
Tarazi, 2017). Another issue of concern is that banking crisis episodes have more than 
tripled in the post-liberalisation period of the 1980s and 1990s (Davis & Karim, 2008). 
 
Therefore, credit booms have emerged as a leading indicator of bank fragility2 and 
financial instability in several developed and emerging countries. However, another 
strand of literature argues that credit booms do not necessarily cause damage to the 
economy3 (Gourinchas et al., 2001; Borio & Lowe, 2002; Enoch & Ötker-Robe, 2007; 
Gorton & Ordonez, 2016). These studies argue that not all credit booms are bad 
booms, as some do not end in a bust. 
 
Given this, sustained credit growth poses a dilemma to policymakers and researchers 
around the world when designing financial development strategies (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Ghosh, 2010). An increase in credit 
means more finance that stimulates investment and supports economic growth 
(Arestis & Demetriades, 1997; Levine, 2002; Levine 2005; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a; 
Abedifar, Hasan & Tarazi, 2016; Seven & Yetkiner, 2016). Other benefits include 
helping channel savings to firms and households and facilitating financial development 
(Ghosh, 2010). However, some studies indicate that, if the increase is rapid, such 
credit may lead to vulnerabilities in the banking sector through looser lending 
standards (Foos, Norden & Weber, 2010; Festić et al., 2011), a decline in the quality 
of projects funded (Dell’Ariccia, Igan, Laeven, Tong, Bakker & Vandenbussche, 2012), 
excessive leverage and asset price bubbles (Demyanyk & van Hemert, 2009; 
Soedarmono, Sitorus & Tarazi, 2017). Credit booms in some transition economies 
have been significant enough to raise concerns about whether this trend is simply a 
manifestation of convergence to the average levels in developed countries, or whether 
                                                           
2 Banks face shocks both on their asset and liability side. A shock that initially affects one 
financial institution can become systemic and affect the entire economy. 
3 Only a few lending bubbles have ended in bank fragility and crisis (Gourinchas et al., 2001; 




it is a case of rapid growth posing a risk to macroeconomic and financial stability (Gersl 
& Seidler, 2010).  
 
The South African financial system is one of the most developed and advanced on the 
African continent with the highest levels of credit growth provided through formal 
channels. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in South Africa is one of the 
oldest and largest stock exchanges in Africa and ranked amongst the top 20 in the 
world in terms of capitalisation. The JSE is followed by the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
(Egypt), the Casablanca Stock Exchange (Morocco), the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(Nigeria) and the Namibian Stock Exchange (Namibia). While there are signs of 
financial deepening in the rest of the African continent, the financial systems remain 
relatively shallow and underdeveloped compared to other regions (Odhiambo, 2009). 
The banking sector still dominates the financial system in most African countries and 
accounts for the biggest proportion of assets (International Monetary Fund, 2016). 
 
The enactment of various financial services legislation and policy reforms has 
accelerated financial development and financial inclusion in South Africa. The main 
objective of these changes is to enhance inclusive growth and reduce the problems of 
unemployment, poverty and inequality. The data shows that there has been a 
noticeable increase in financial inclusion from 61 per cent in 2004 to 89 per cent in 
2016 (World Bank, 2017), while the government plans to increase financial inclusion 
to 90 per cent by 2030 (Banking Association of South Africa, 2015a). New products 
such as the mandatory mzansi4 accounts and South African Social Services Agency 
(SASSA) bank cards have drawn the previously excluded into mainstream banking, 
and this has contributed to high demand for credit. According to the World Bank (2017) 
report, 54 per cent of adults in South Africa had access to banks, credit unions, 
cooperatives, post office and microfinance institutions in 2011, while the number had 
increased to 69 per cent by 2017. 
 
                                                           
4 The mzansi account is an initiative of South Africa’s Financial Services Charter and is a low 




Statistical evidence shows that the domestic credit to GDP ratio which is often referred 
to as an important informative signal of financial fragility in the economy (see, for 
example, Barajas, Chami & Yousefi, 2013 and Davis et al. 2016), has accelerated 
rapidly over the past three decades in South Africa. Figure 1.1 shows the credit-to-GDP 
ratio in South Africa from 1970 at different time periods. Prior to the global financial 
crisis of 2007-09, domestic credit accelerated to 192 per cent of GDP in 2007, up from 
76 per cent in 1980 and 91 per cent in 1991. The 192 per cent recorded in 2007 is the 
highest ratio in South Africa over the past four decades. However, since 2008 there 
has been a gradual decline in domestic credit in South Africa owing to the knock-on 
effects of the financial crisis and banks’ unwillingness to commit to more credit in an 
environment of low investor confidence and poor economic growth. During the 2008-
2013 period, the credit ratio averaged 178.2 per cent, while there was a further decline 
from 2014 to 2017. The decline in credit provision indicates that financial institutions 
are increasingly worried about the rate at which they are providing credit to the private 
sector.  
 
Importantly, unsecured5 loans to the private sector have also accelerated over the past 
20 years in South Africa. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2014), 
unsecured loans increased by 47 per cent between 2010 and 2012, reaching 11.7 per 
cent of total bank loans in 2013. These are the same unsecured loans that caused the 
partial collapse of the micro-lender African Bank. The collapse of the bank created a 
high level of speculation in the money market funds (MMFs) that had committed major 
investments to the bank. Although small, the partial collapse of this bank led to the 
downgrading of the top four commercial banks by rating agencies, while another 
micro-lender, Capitec, saw a slight decline in the value of its shares.  
                                                           
5 Unsecured credit is not collateralised by any assets to which the creditor can have recourse 
in case of failure by the debtor to meet the credit obligations. The South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB) views credit cards, overdrafts, personal loans and financing small medium enterprises 







Figure 1.1: Credit-to-GDP ratio in South Africa between 1970 and 2016 
Source: World Bank data 
It is important to note that the credit-to-GDP ratio in South Africa is substantially higher 
than the average of Upper Middle Income countries6, Sub-Saharan African countries, 
and the World average (see Figure 1.2). In 2016, the World average stood at 128 per 
cent while South Africa’s ratio was 176.7 per cent. Interestingly, Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
ratio has remained below 60 per cent since the 1970s. This indicates that credit to the 
private sector has remained very low over the past three to four decades.   
 
                                                           
6 The World Bank classification of upper middle income countries are those in which 2017 GNI 
per capita was between $3,896 and $12,055. The World Bank classifies South Africa as an 


































































Figure 1.2: Credit-to-GDP ratio in South Africa, World, Upper Middle Income, and Sub-
Saharan Africa 
Source: World Bank data 
 
In Figure 1.3, we also provide a summary of a comparative analysis amongst the 
members of the BRICS7 trade bloc and again statistics show that between 1970 and 
2014 South Africa has had the highest credit-to-GDP ratio, closely followed by China, 
with Brazil third, while the remaining BRICS nations had a ratio below 70 per cent. 
Interestingly, since 2015, China’s credit ratio has now surpassed that of South Africa 
with 195 per cent in 2015 and 216 per cent in 2016. Figure 1.3 shows that China’s 
credit is now twice the size of its GDP. However, if one compares the ratio of credit in 
South Africa and China, one will notice that China’s GDP growth has been above 6.9 
per cent since 1998, peaking at 14.2 per cent in 2007. It is therefore, not surprising 
that credit growth has also accelerated during that period; the intuition could be that 
credit is funding growth in China. However, if one looks at South Africa, credit growth 
has not resulted in significant economic growth when compared to China.  
                                                           

















Figure 1.3: Credit-to-GDP ratio in BRICS countries 
Source: World Bank data 
 
Episodes of credit booms have also been linked with an accelerated increase in private 
sector indebtedness, especially at the household level. Household debt in South Africa 
peaked at 85.7 per cent of disposable income in 2008, up from 52.4 per cent in 2002, 
representing a 33.3 per cent increase (see Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4). As of 2017, 
household debt stands at 71.9 per cent of disposable income. Van den Heever (2007) 
highlights that banks contribute 90 per cent of the total household debt in South Africa. 
During the 2000s, total debt far exceeded disposable income in South Africa, raising 
serious concerns with regard to the sustainability of debt and financial system stability 
(Van Den Heever, 2007). Linked to rising debt, there is the probability of greater loan 
defaults in loan repayments i.e. an increase in nonperforming loans (NPLs). Figure 1.4 
shows the behaviour of NPLs to changes in macroeconomic factors in South Africa. It 
can be seen that during the 2000s, there was a gradual decline in NPLs from 5 per 
cent in 1999 to a record low of 1.1 per cent in 2006. However, from 2007 there was a 
steep increase in NPLs to a record 6 per cent in 2009. An analysis of the relationship 
between NPLs and economic growth shows that during economic downturns, NPLs 
increase, while they decrease during the upswing years. We can trace the relationship 
















issued on flexible interest rates (e.g. mortgage loans), as lending rates increase, so 
does the rate of loan defaults. 
  
Figure 1.4: Nonperforming loans, lending rate and GDP growth in South Africa 
Source: World Bank data  
 
Figure 1.5 depicts the other relationship that explains lending growth in South Africa. 
In some years, credit seems to grow more than the rate of economic growth. 
Interestingly, Wolf (2009) analysed the performance of the financial sector during the 
financial crisis of 2007-09 compared to the rate of GDP growth in the U.S. Wolf (2009) 
opined that the financial sector had grown rapidly compared to the growth of nominal 
GDP, and concluded that “instead of being a servant, finance had become the 
economy’s master” (Wolf, 2009, p. 2). In other words, episodes of rapid credit growth 
not driven by economic fundamentals pose a threat to the country’s financial system. 
It can be seen in Figure 1.5 that credit grew much faster than the rate of economic 
growth in the period 1970 to 2014. For example, in 1980 GDP grew by 6.6 per cent 
while credit grew by 26 per cent, and in 1990 GDP fell by 0.31 per cent while credit 




























Figure 1.5: Credit and GDP growth in South Africa (1970-2014) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (SARB) 
 
Figure 1.6 depicts the interest rate spread in South Africa i.e. the difference between 
lending and deposit rates. Figure 1.6 shows that there has been a decline in the 
interest rate spread, from 6.3 per cent in 1982 to 5.7 per cent in 1999 to 3.3 per cent 
in 2014. The decline in the interest rate spread signifies a decline in the financial 
intermediation costs in South Africa. According to Folawewo and Tennant (2008), a 
higher interest rate spread signifies inefficiencies in the banking system. Based on this 

































Figure 1.6: Interest rate spread, deposit and lending rate in South Africa (1977-2014) 
Source: World Bank data 
 
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The 21st century has witnessed exponential growth. To promote accelerated growth 
and development, the South African government has introduced a number of financial 
reforms since 2004. These reforms are envisaged to better align the economic 
incentives for participants in the financial system with the goal of financial stability. In 
particular, these reforms seek to broaden financial services and address market 
failures in the credit markets in order to promote fair and non-discriminatory access to 
consumer credit, prohibit unfair credit practices, promote responsible credit granting 
and prohibit reckless credit granting. To this end, the government introduced the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act of 2002, the Financial Sector Charter of 2004, and the National Credit 
Act of 2005. These initiatives demonstrate the recognition by the government that 
access to credit is one of the fundamental issues that will promote commercial activity 
and stimulate economic growth in the country. 
  
Specifically, the government’s broader financial inclusion drive seeks to improve the 

















previously unserved, under-served and financially excluded. The principal objective of 
government here is to improve access, affordability, appropriateness, usage, quality, 
consumer financial education, innovation, diversification, and simplicity of financial 
services and products in South Africa (Banking Association of South Africa, 2015b). 
There is also an active commitment by all financial institutions and other market 
participants to promote access to financial services. According to the Banking 
Association of South Africa (2015b), financial service providers commit to: “actively 
promoting a transformed, vibrant, and globally competitive financial sector that reflects 
the demographics of South Africa, and contributing to the establishment of an 
equitable society by effectively providing accessible financial services to black people 
and by directing investment into targeted sectors of the economy”. The financial 
inclusion drive initially set out a 5-year target in 2005 with the following key focus 
areas: access to mortgage finance, agriculture finance, small and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) finance, ‘mzansi’ accounts and transformational infrastructure. In 
2010, the government envisaged about 67-70 per cent of all adults in South Africa 
having access to financial services by the end of 2015. Meanwhile, the National 
Development Plan (NDP)8 set a target of 90 per cent by the year 2030. 
 
Unfortunately, the current developments in the domestic credit market raise serious 
concerns regarding the possible risk to local banks and in particular financial stability 
in South Africa. The above-mentioned efforts to broaden access to regular (formal) 
credit channels, poor bank lending practices and over-reliance on bank credit9 have 
accelerated domestic credit growth in South Africa. The past two to three decades 
have seen an unprecedented increase in domestic credit to the private sector. In fact, 
previous studies on South Africa such as Booms and Are (2004), Mendoza and 
Terrones (2008); Mendoza and Terrones (2012), Gozgor (2014) and Arena, Bouza, 
Dabla-Norris, Gerling and Njie (2015) highlight that this trend exhibits the 
characteristics of credit booms. During the past decade, the credit-to-GDP ratio has 
                                                           
8 The NDP is a government blueprint plan that seeks to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality 
in the country by year 2030. This has become the strategic framework for detailed government 
planning. 




remained above the 150 per cent mark, peaking at 192 per cent in 2007. The ratio of 
192 per cent in 2007 surpassed the world highest average of 160 per cent recorded in 
the same year. According to the World Bank data, the credit-to-GDP ratio has 
remained below 65 per cent in the sub-Saharan Africa region over the past 20 years, 
peaking at 73 per cent in 1994. The World Bank data also reveals that credit to the 
private sector in South Africa has been growing much more rapidly than the economy.  
 
Part of this increase emanates from an increase in the popularity of unsecured lending 
and mortgage loans provided by local banks to households and firms. Unfortunately, 
the accelerated increase in unsecured credit is an offshoot of the relaxed lending 
environment that currently exists in South Africa. According to the SARB, total gross 
unsecured credit exposure by the top six commercial banks10 increased by 2.6 per 
cent to R505.4 billion in 2014. The increase was influenced by a R12.16 billion (4.7 
per cent) increase in credit cards and other revolving unsecured loan facilities. This, 
accompanied by an increase in NPL provisions, high default ratios and 
macroeconomic factors, is expected to increase the vulnerability of the banking sector. 
Therefore, it is important to understand that the current credit trends potentially expose 
the entire banking system to systemic risk, unless efforts are made to correct this 
imbalance. This threatens one of the core functions of the SARB: that of ensuring 
financial stability.  
 
One common concern in the literature is that rapid credit growth threatens financial 
and macroeconomic stability as witnessed during the global financial crisis of 2007-
09. Financial crisis literature shows that rapid credit growth increases the moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems that undermine the stability of the banking system, 
thus increasing the chances of a banking crisis. It is further noted in the literature that 
rapid credit growth is a leading indicator of financial instability in the economy 
(Kaminsky, Lizondo & Reinhart, 1998; Borio & Lowe, 2002; Jordà, Schularick & Taylor, 
2011; Kraft & Jankov, 2005; Borio & Drehmann, 2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009b; Gersl 
& Seidler, 2010; Koong, Law & Ibrahim, 2017). The aftermath of the global financial 
                                                           




crisis confirms the importance of understanding, measuring and predicting future 
banking sector disruptions. The stress emanating from financial system fragility can 
be fed through to macroeconomic instabilities and lead to severe deterioration of the 
soundness of the financial system. The costs and disruptions may be greater than the 
benefits of credit provision in the economy. Therefore, it is beneficial to examine how 
credit booms contribute to financial instability and crises, especially in a developing 
country context such as South Africa. 
  
At a global level, studies of this nature have been carried out (King & Levine, 1993; 
Levine & Zervos, 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Gourinchas et al., 2001; Borio & 
Lowe, 2002; Favara, 2003; Enoch & Ötker-Robe, 2007; Mendoza & Terrones, 2008; 
Barajas, Dell’Ariccia & Levchenko, 2007; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009a; Jordà et al., 2011; 
Claessens, Kose & Terrones, 2012; Arena et al., 2015; Cerutti, Dagher, & Dell’Ariccia, 
2017). However, we note that even though such studies have been done, crisis after 
crisis keeps occurring: the 1987 U.S. stock market crash, the 1994 Mexican currency 
crisis, the 1997 and 1998 Asian and Russian crises, the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009 that started in the United States, the 2011 sovereign debt crisis and, most 
recently, the Greek debt crisis. These crises have been spectacular and cost countries 
dearly.  
 
Given the above background, South Africa is an interesting case to explore the link 
between credit booms and bank fragility for five reasons. First, South Africa has had 
a rapid acceleration in credit over the past few years and the credit-to-GDP ratio has 
remained above the average of other comparable regions i.e. Upper Middle-Income 
countries, Sub-Saharan countries, BRICS countries and the World average. Existing 
literature shows that the credit-to-GDP ratio provides an informative signal of banking 
system fragility and that it requires close monitoring (see, for example, Schularick & 
Taylor, 2012; Koong, Law & Ibrahim, 2017 among others). 
 
Second, the costs associated with bank or financial system failures would be 
catastrophic for a country such as South Africa with severe fiscal constraints 




Therefore, ongoing studies of this nature are required to determine measures to 
prevent such failures in the future. 
 
Third, the level of indebtedness in South Africa has peaked over the past 10-12 years 
as a result of rapid credit growth. At a household level, this is driven by rapid increase 
in unsecured credit which has left the majority of citizens in a debt trap. The rapid 
increase in unsecured credit is an offshoot of the relaxed lending environment that 
currently exist in the country. Reckless lending has become almost systemic in the in 
the industry with a rising number of reckless lending cases before the regulatory 
authorities. The theoretical framework of Minsky (1982) suggests that the debt-income 
relationships are important in explaining the development of financial fragility. The 
rising debt levels beyond sustainable levels threatens financial system stability in 
South Africa. 
 
Fourth, the banking sector accounts for more than 20 per cent of GDP and is ranked 
as the third biggest employer in South Africa accounting for more than 10 per cent of 
total employment (Ifeacho & Ngalawa, 2014). Therefore, it is important to note that the 
failure of the banking sector will have far-reaching consequences in as far as 
government’s effort to grow the economy, and reduce unemployment and poverty, is 
concerned. It is important that we understand the significance of the South African 
banking system stability, given its important role in financial and economic 
development. 
 
Finally, the SARB, which guides monetary policy and ensures financial stability in the 
country, has not done any research of this nature. Even in its 2017 Bank Supervision 
Department Annual Report, the SARB highlighted that it cannot guarantee the public 
that a bank will not fail “since banking would become entirely non-competitive and too 
expensive if prudential ratios and supervisory measures were designed in a way that 
would prevent the possibility of failure” (SARB, 2017, p. 2). The SARB highlights that 
there should be freedom of entry and exit in the banking sector. The argument is that, 
in the interest of the South African depositors, studies of this nature are important in 




since 1990 (Blackbeard, 2014), and some of these failures have been rather 
spectacular, for example, BoE Bank (2002), African Bank (2014), African Merchant 
Bank (2003), Saambou Bank (2002) and Unifer (2002), among others. Importantly, 
government and the South African Reserve Bank now recognise the economic and 
social costs associated with bank failures and there is now a proposal to establish the 
deposit insurance scheme.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In light of the above background and context, this study sought to answer the following 
key questions: 
1.3.1  What are the current domestic credit trends in South Africa? 
1.3.2  What are the fundamental aggregate drivers of credit booms in South Africa? 
1.3.3  Do credit booms signal future vulnerabilities in the banking system in South 
Africa?  
1.3.4 What is the relationship between credit booms, banking sector finance sources 
and its implications for financial stability in South Africa? 
1.3.5 What are the ideal policy propositions to achieve non-destabilising booms in 
South Africa? 
 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The general aim of this study is to examine the relationship between credit booms in 
South Africa. The specific objectives will be to: 
1.4.1  Examine current credit trends in South Africa; 
1.4.2  Identify the aggregate drivers of credit booms in South Africa;  
1.4.3  Investigate whether excessive credit growth leads to vulnerabilities in the 




1.4.4  Examine the link between credit booms and banking sector funding sources 
and its implications for financial stability in South Africa; and  
1.4.5  Propose policy suggestions for achieving non-destabilising credit booms in 
South Africa. 
 
1.5 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
The general contribution of this study is as follows;   
1.5.1 First, this study makes an important contribution to the discussion on credit 
booms and their implications for bank fragility in the South African context. 
1.5.2 Most of the studies on credit booms in South Africa (Booms & Are, 2004; 
Mendoza & Terrones, 2008; 2012; Gozgor, 2014; Arena et al., 2015) were 
mainly on establishing the existence of credit booms without necessary 
identifying the triggers and the associated risk. Hence, this study will be a major 
contribution to the quantitative literature on credit booms in South Africa. 
1.5.3 This study is the first that contributes to defining and measuring credit risk in 
the context of credit booms in South Africa using latest methodologies.  
1.5.4 While most studies use the credit ratio as an informative signal for financial 
fragility, this study contributes to this debate by proposing the use of non-core 
liabilities of the South African banking sector as a complementary measure to 
establish the stage of the financial cycle and the possible build-up of financial 
system risk in South Africa. 
1.5.5 Apart from contributing to policy, this study is a timely addition to the existing 
country-specific literature on credit booms and burst.    
 
1.6 ORGANISATION AND FORMAT OF THE STUDY 
This study contains six chapters as follows: Chapter One provides the background of 
the study, problem statement, significance of the study and research questions, while 




rationing, financial fragility and instability theories. Chapter Three discusses drivers of 
credit booms in South Africa, followed by Chapter Four that looks at the relationship 
between credit risk and credit booms. Chapter Five explores the relationship between 
banking sector finance sources, credit booms and implications for financial stability, 
while Chapter Six provides policy recommendations and concludes the study. It is 
important to note that this is a PhD thesis written in the form of publishable articles. 
Therefore, the empirical Chapters Three, Four and Five contain their own study 
background, literature review, research methodology, research findings and policy 
recommendations. It can, therefore, be expected that certain aspects in this thesis 
might be reflected in more than one empirical chapter since each of these three 







2.1  INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we present general theoretical literature that is relevant to this study. 
Specific theoretical literature is examined in different empirical studies in subsequent 
chapters. Therefore, the chapter presents past and present theoretical11 perspectives 
on business cycles, the role of banks, and the developments that threaten the efficient 
functioning of banks. The role of financial intermediation in credit creation and quality 
has become an important topic in contemporary macroeconomic analysis. In theory, 
deposit-taking institutions have an important role to play in the economy because 
financial markets are imperfect. Scholtens and van Wensveen (2000) agree that banks 
exist only because of market frictions and that banks will continue to exist as long as 
market imperfections continue to exist. However, their role will be limited as soon as 
market imperfections are reduced or eliminated (Scholtens & van Wensveen, 2000). 
Banks will lose their functions if savers and borrowers have perfect information about 
each other directly, without any hiccups, and at reduced costs.  
 
2.2  THEORY OF BANKING  
The theory of banking has undergone a number of reconfigurations in the past 3-4 
decades owing to a plethora of innovations in banking systems, the occurrence of 
banking crises, and advances in information economics. This has advanced the 
understanding of banking, why banks fail, and the costs associated with such failures.  
It is well documented in the financial intermediation literature that one of the biggest 
impediments facing intermediaries is information asymmetries, which have a direct 
effect on transaction costs. Various models present insights into the effect of imperfect 
information on both buyers and sellers in financial markets (see, for example, Akerlof, 
1970; Spence, 1973; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976; Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). The 
                                                           




consensus among these models is that such impediments distort prices in the financial 
market. Overcoming the problem of imperfect information is important for the efficient 
functioning of any market, including financial markets (Akerlof, 1970).  
 
In financial transactions, information asymmetry arises when one part of a financial 
transaction knows more about an investment project than the other does. Studies 
show that borrowers often know more about their investment projects than lenders do. 
Therefore, financial intermediaries play an important role in ameliorating information 
asymmetries through a number of strategies such as specialised information 
gathering/collection, a thorough evaluation of projects, ex-post monitoring of 
borrowers’ performance, et cetera.  
 
The provision of liquidity and asset transformation have been emphasised in the 
literature as the two most important functions of banks (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). 
In these roles, financial intermediaries enhance efficient resource allocation by 
reducing the transaction and information costs of channelling funds from savers to 
borrowers. 
 
In the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, banks play an important role in transforming 
illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. The model highlights that bank investors (traditional 
depositors) are normally at risk and are uncertain about their future consumption. In 
the absence of intermediation, these investors would find themselves locked into 
illiquid long-term investments that pay high interest only to those that consume late, 
while those that recall their investment prematurely miss out on high returns. 
According to this model, banks provide an efficient risk-sharing mechanism of returns 
between long-term and short-term investors. Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model 
emphasises that the role played by banks, in this case, makes it possible for both types 
of investors to share risk and maximise welfare (Claus & Grimes, 2003). 
 
Another important contribution of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model relates to the 




the insurance contract of a demand deposit has an ‘undesirable equilibrium’ where 
panicking depositors can suddenly recall their deposits, leading to a bank run. The 
sudden recall eventually spills over to other depositors who were initially not 
concerned about the safety of their deposits. According to the model, the shift in 
expectations by depositors is the main cause of bank runs. In cases where withdrawal 
volumes are not stochastic (random), “suspension of convertibility of deposits will allow 
banks both to prevent bank runs and to provide optimal risk-sharing by converting 
illiquid assets into liquid liabilities” (Claus & Grimes, 2003, p. 10). Stochastic 
withdrawals are avoided in cases where mandatory deposit insurance exists without 
affecting intermediaries’ ability to transform assets. The empirical literature also 
supports the idea that bank runs often lead to bank panics that result in the recall of 
loans and cancellation of productive investments in key economic sectors. In 
summary, the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model details the main reasons for the 
establishment of financial intermediaries and why they are susceptible to runs.  
 
Another important function of financial intermediaries relates to their ability to 
transform the risk characteristics of investments (assets) emanating from market 
imperfections. This transformation is done through the elimination of information 
asymmetry problems. Information asymmetry can occur either ex-ante or ex-post. Ex-
ante information asymmetry arises when a lender cannot differentiate between good 
and bad borrowers and projects, leading to adverse selection. Adverse selection, in 
this case, arises when interest rates rise to leave a risky pool of borrowers in the 
market for credit. Financial intermediaries run the risk of lending to high-risk borrowers 
because those with good projects are not willing to borrow at a higher premium. Bank 
theory predicts that borrowers who are willing to pay high-interest rates are on average 
riskier than the others. On the other hand, ex-post information asymmetry arises when 
borrowers can observe the actual returns after the project has been completed, 
leading to the moral hazard problem which occurs when borrowers engage in activities 
most likely to reduce their likelihood to repay the borrowed funds. 
 
In this regard, the importance of financial intermediaries lies in their ability to eliminate 




lower costs compared to other economic agents. This is possible since they eliminate 
duplication of already existing information (increasing returns to the scale of financial 
intermediation). Financial intermediaries invest in developing specialised underwriting 
skills for projects and evaluating potential borrowers. They also take advantage of 
cross-sectional information and re-use information repeatedly. Intermediaries can 
communicate information about potential borrowers to investors at lower costs than 
individual borrowers can (Leland & Pyle, 1977). According to Leland and Pyle (1977), 
the ability of intermediaries to strictly monitor firms’ activities helps solve the moral 
hazard problem.  
 
Diamond (1984) also predicts that the ability of financial intermediaries to diversify 
project portfolios (low and high risk) is a compelling factor for their existence. 
Diversification of the portfolio, in this case, reduces the probability of incurring high 
costs. Diamond’s (1984) assertion is that intermediaries have the costly task of 
monitoring loan agreements. With a reasonable incentive accrued, intermediaries are 
able to continuously collect information, monitor agreements and make payments to 
depositors for funds received. Importantly, Diamond believes that financial 
intermediaries are asset transformers since they provide depositors with riskless 
claims while lending to risky borrowers.  
 
In the Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) model, financial intermediaries provide 
brokerage and qualitative asset transformation (QAT). Financial intermediaries often 
specialise in one or more of these functions. The benefit of the brokerage function is 
a result of cost advantage in information gathering that normally comes from two 
sources: (i) long-term experience in interpreting delicate signals, and (ii), as Chan, 
Siegel and Thakor (1990) suggest, brokers take advantage of the cross-sectional 
customer and temporal re-usable data. Qualitative asset transformation is concerned 
with term to maturity12, divisibility, liquidity and credit risk. Table 2.1 below provides an 
insight into the Bhattacharya and Thakor model of financial intermediation. According 
                                                           




to the model, banks’ maturity transformation function lies in their ability to provide 
liquidity to the economy. 
 
Table 2.1: The Bhattacharya and Thakor model of financial intermediation 
 
Source: Bhattacharya & Thakor (1993) 
 
Looking at the theory of banking in the South African context, we notice that the South 
African banking system has also undergone a number of changes and adjustments in 
terms of the regulatory mechanisms. The regulatory authorities seem to understand 
that constant changes in the regulatory frameworks are necessary to keep abreast of 
the dynamic nature of the financial sector. The changes include the introduction of the 
twin-peak regulatory framework (fully introduced in 2018) which caters for innovation 
and advancements introduced by the financial sector players and measures to prevent 
a similar crisis in the future (i.e. the global financial crisis of 2007-09).  
 
As predicted by the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, the banking sector in South 
Africa plays an important role in the economy since banks mostly play the role of 
Financial Intermediary 
Brokerage Qualitative Asset Transformation 
 Transaction services (e.g. 
Cheque-writing, buying/selling 
securities and safe keeping). 
 Financial advice (e.g. advise on 
where to invest, portfolio 
management) 
 Screening and certification (e.g. 
bond ratings). 
 Origination (e.g. banking 
initiating a loan to a borrower) 
 Issuance (e.g. taking security 
offering to market). 
 Miscellaneous (e.g. trust 
activities). 
 
 Term to maturity (e.g. bank 
financing assets with longer 
maturity than liabilities). 
 Divisibility (e.g. mutual fund 
holding assets with larger unit size 
than its liabilities). 
 Liquidity (e.g. a bank funding 
illiquid loans with liquid liabilities). 
 Credit risk(e.g. a bank monitoring a 





transforming illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. It is important to note that, in South 
Africa, bank credit is still the most dominant source of credit funds for households and 
enterprises. Therefore, the South African authorities understand the role played by 
banks (diversify project portfolios, brokerage, qualitative asset transformation, 
collecting information, et cetera) and that the failure of one or more banks has a 
significant effect on the overall health of the financial sector and its performance.   
 
2.3 CREDIT RATIONING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The theoretical literature on credit rationing dates as far back as Dwight M. Jaffee and 
Franco Modigliani’s theory and test of credit rationing in 1969. Credit rationing refers 
to a situation in which interest rates do not play their market-clearing role in the 
financial markets (Semerák, 2001). In other words, it is the denial of credit at any 
price13. Banks would generally ration credit when faced by rigidities: for example, when 
the interest rates on loans impede the Walrasian market clearing (Jaffee & Modigliani, 
1929; Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). Two credit rationing channels are identified in 
the literature, as follows: 
i. Banks group potential borrowers according to their projects’ expected returns. 
Among loan applicants, some borrowers receive loans, while others are rejected 
even when they are willing to pay higher interest rates.  
ii. According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), “there are identifiable groups of individuals 
in the population who, with a given supply of credit, are unable to obtain loans at 
any interest rate, even though with a larger supply of credit, they would” (Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981, p. 395).  
 
The pioneering Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model explained credit rationing in the 
context of markets with imperfect information i.e. adverse selection and moral hazard. 
The model predicted that even in equilibrium, markets may be characterised by credit 
rationing. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argued that the main concerns of banks are the 
                                                           




interest rates received from borrowers and the credit default risk14. However, the 
interest charged on loans may potentially affect loan risk in two possible ways: either 
(i) sorting potential borrowers (adverse selection effect) or (ii) affecting borrowers’ 
action (moral hazard effect). In this case, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) note that, if interest 
rates charged on loans affect the nature of transactions, then the credit market may 
not reach market equilibrium.  
 
According to the Stiglitz and Weiss model, interest rates play a major role in screening 
‘safe’ and ‘risky’ borrowers in the credit market. This model predicted that, when 
perfect and costless information assumptions hold, banks would accurately determine 
borrowers’ actions, which might affect loan returns. However, in practice, banks are 
unable to exert direct control; instead, they formulate loan contracts that induce 
borrowers to take actions in favour of the bank and in the process to attract low-risk 
borrowers. The argument is that there is a certain interest rate that maximises the 
banks’ expected returns. Beyond this level, banks would be unwilling to advance credit 
to households and firms. This scenario is depicted by a forward bending loan supply 
curve in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the banks’ optimum interest rates that maximise expected bank 
returns. It depicts that the supply of bank loans is a function of the optimal rate (r*). 
Banks will not give loans to a borrower who offers to pay above the optimal rate (r*). 
Banks assume that such loans are likely to be riskier than an average loan (at r*). The 
bank believes that the expected returns on such loans will be lower than returns on 
current loans made by the bank. Simply put, according to banks, high-interest loans 
increase the probability of credit default, which could potentially reduce banks’ 
expected returns.  
 
                                                           
14 Credit default risk still remains the biggest risk facing the efficient operations of banks around 
the world (Chatterjee, 2015; Pool, De Haan, & Jacobs, 2015). See Chapter 4 for a detailed 




According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the bank will not give credit to rationed 
borrowers even at a higher rate in instances where the bank wants to increase 
expected returns. In the absence of competitive forces to correct for equilibrium, credit 
rationing often continues. In addition, credit rationing will occur if banks cannot 
observationally distinguish between those receiving loans (i.e. ‘safe’ and ‘risky’). This 
model predicted that credit rationing will remain a major feature of credit markets in 












Figure 2.1: The Stiglitz and Weiss bank optimum interest rate 
Source: Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) 
 
In summary, the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model pertains to the issue of credit 
rationing and risk management by banks. In a country like South Africa, with high 
levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, there is a high incidence of lenders 
refusing to issue loan contracts to every willing borrower.  As suggested by the Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) model, the so-called top four banks in South Africa view information 
asymmetry problems of moral hazard and adverse selection as serious threats to their 
viability. The majority of the poor households in South Africa have limited access to 
formal credit (formal and semi-formal credit markets). According to Okurut (2006), the 






















informal. The poor and rural dwellers in South Africa are mostly refused formal credit 
while semi-formal credit accommodates them to a certain extent.   
 
Mutezo (2013) singled out small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in South Africa and 
pointed out that a number of enterprises are often unable to get credit from the 
commercial banks due to lack of collateral and their credit history. According to 
Nieman and Nieuwenhuizen (2009), SMEs account for 97.5 per cent of business 
enterprises in South Africa and contribute approximately 35 per cent of the country’s 
GDP. Mutezo (2013) also agreed with the credit rationing theory and highlighted that 
the objective of minimising risk by South African banks influences the decision to 
reduce credit to SMEs in the country. 
 
The credit rationing model demonstrates that in instances where banks cannot 
distinguish between ‘bad’ and/or ‘good’ borrowers’ projects, banks would deploy 
various methods to minimise credit risk in their loan portfolios. Part of the strategy 
employed by banks is rationing of credit, especially to SMEs and households without 
collateral, and especially in a developing country like South Africa. It should be noted 
that, since credit risk remains the greatest risk faced by banks, credit rationing will 
remain an important part of bank credit risk management around the world, and South 
Africa is no exception.  
 
2.4  THE CREDIT CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY 
Existing literature on the credit channel analyses information asymmetry and other 
credit market imperfections on expenditure and economic activity and its implications 
for monetary policy. In the literature, the credit channel refers to a situation where 
changes in monetary policy alter either the efficiency of the bank credit allocation 
function or the extent to which borrowers face credit rationing (Claus & Grimes, 2003). 
It also applies when bank credit and other sources of finance are imperfect substitutes 




sources15 does not make the credit channel irrelevant, as long as borrowers view 
alternative sources as expensive or less convenient (Bernanke, 1993).  
 
The credit channel model by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) is decomposed into two 
sub-channels, as follows: 
i. the bank-lending channel of monetary policy; and  
ii. the balance sheet (or financial accelerator) channel.  
The bank-lending channel is concerned with the decline in the aggregate level of 
intermediated credit in response to monetary policy tightening (Roosa, 1951; Kashyap, 
Stein & Wilcox, 1993; Bernanke, 1993; Bernanke & Blinder,1992). On the other hand, 
the balance sheet channel predicts a disruption in bank credit because of procyclical 
movements in the borrower’s financial position caused by monetary tightening 
(Kandrac, 2012). Kandrac (2012, p. 741) argued: “with imperfect information and 
heterogeneous borrowers, models of the credit channel predict tighter credit standards 
that lower the share of loans extended to less credit-worthy firms”. 
 
It is also established in the literature that adjustments in monetary policy affect credit 
extension, especially in countries where banks dominate the supply of credit funds. 
According to Saidenberg and Strahan (1999), in these countries, banks are a critical 
source of liquidity for firms and households in financial distress. Since bank liabilities 
are short-term in nature, while bank assets16 are a combination of short- and long-term 
loans, adjustments in monetary policy have a direct impact on the banks’ balance 
sheet due to a mismatch between assets and liabilities. Monetary policy tightening 
affects the present value of assets with long-term maturity rather than liabilities 
(Bernanke & Blinder, 1992). On the other hand, a reduction in the level of interest rates 
increases the present value of assets rather than liabilities. In this regard, monetary 
policy tightening reduces the aggregate supply of credit funds, thus affecting the 
banks’ equity value. 
                                                           
15 Alternative credit sources include the credit market and finance companies. 





The reduction of credit potentially increases finance costs or reduces bank credit to 
firms for solvency and liquidity shortfalls. Kashyap et al. (1993) argued that the interest 
rate spread increases during monetary contractions. One recalls the Asian and U.S. 
recession of the 1990s where credit to the private sector significantly declined owing 
to monetary policy contractions. For example, in the U.S., banks were unwilling to 
provide credit to importers to pay their suppliers (Claus & Grimes, 2003). A credit 
squeeze for some Asian countries, for example, lasted for months, while in other 
countries such as Indonesia, it lasted for two years (Grimes, 1998). It is important to 
note that the duration of a credit squeeze depends on how long it takes to establish 
new credit channels after a disruption.  
 
As highlighted above, the credit channel literature predicts a bank-lending channel in 
small or developing economies compared to more established/developed ones. In 
developing countries such as South Africa, a number of small firms (i.e. SMEs) depend 
on bank credit as a source of liquidity and investment. When bank funding reduces, 
small firms cancel or delay key investments, run down inventories and retrench 
workers, ultimately resulting in a decline in aggregate demand. Furthermore, most 
households in developing countries directly or indirectly depend on bank credit to 
finance their expenditure. However, studies, inter alia those of Sofianos, Wachtel and 
Melnik (1990) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992), predicted that financial innovation 
and deregulation will not significantly improve the chances of small firms to access 
capital markets. These studies argue that information asymmetries between foreign 
capital investors and domestic borrowers will remain a major deterrent for small firms. 
In the absence of valid information, foreign investors would remain unwilling to commit 
funds to these small firms.  
 
With agency costs, the impact of monetary policy tightening is further reinforced via 
the balance sheet or financial accelerator effect. In the credit market, agency costs 
arise when banks give borrowers control over borrowed funds, leading to moral 
hazard, adverse selection and monitoring costs. A delegation of control mainly occurs 




costs. Monetary policy contraction lowers the market value (or net worth) of firms and 
hence lowers the value of assets that firms can use as collateral. When this happens, 
banks may be unwilling to lend to firms without meaningful collateral. The reduction in 
the firm’s net worth might increase adverse selection, thus increasing the chances for 
firms to engage in risky investment projects. 
 
The extent to which small or large firms are affected by a credit squeeze lies in their 
ability to access short-term credit to smooth cash flow declines. On one hand, large 
firms are likely to respond to falling cash flows by using different sources of funds such 
as commercial paper and other readily available sources of capital. Therefore, large 
firms are able to maintain their current production and employment levels even in the 
face of rising interest rates and declining revenues. In the Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) 
model, the prediction is that the general balance sheet of small firms would be weaker 
than those of large firms and that the costs of lending are mostly larger than the loan 
value. In addition, high failure rates for small firms make it impossible for banks to build 
long-term relationships. As predicted by the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model, banks 
find it easy to ration credit to small firms whenever faced with a decision to reduce 
credit provision in the economy. According to the literature (see, for example, Gertler 
& Gilchrist, 1994; Kashyap, Lamont & Stein, 1994; Oliner & Rudebusch, 1996), small 
firms find themselves the biggest losers in any monetary policy tightening stance. 
  
The credit channel of monetary policy highlighted by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) is 
relevant to South Africa. The past three decades have seen monetary policy emerging 
as one of the most important policies anchoring growth, development and sustainable 
economic activity in the country.  As such, monetary policy movements have a 
widespread effect as they affect a number of real variables in the economy. For 
example, the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) adjustment of the repurchase rate 
(repo rate) affects a number of variables such as other interest rates, asset prices, the 






Importantly, SARB monetary policy adjustments have an effect on how South African 
banks conduct their business with firms and households. The conduct of banks affects 
access to credit by most bank dependent borrowers which ultimately has an impact 
on overall spending and output. In 2004, the former SARB Governor highlighted that 
credit was important in the economic growth processes and that monetary authorities 
had to ensure that credit expansion was made possible. Importantly, the former 
Governor opined that monetary authorities needed to understand the true 
characteristics of the banking system and how banks respond to sudden monetary 
policy adjustments before designing the best monetary policy framework (Mboweni 
2004). 
 
In summary, the credit channel of monetary policy underlines the role played by credit 
in the economy in general, and in developing countries in particular.  Monetary policy 
tightening or easing plays an important role in credit allocation in South Africa and is 
an important tool for credit allocation since it has an effect on the external finance 
premium17, which translates into a reduction in investment, output and expenditure. 
The increase in finance costs may have significant effects on the economy if firms’ 
balance sheets are already weak. 
  
2.5  POTENTIAL CHANNELS OF BANKING FAILURES 
Bank literature demonstrates that the stability of the financial system is important for 
economic development around the world (see, for example, Pagano, 1993; Leitão, 
2012; Allen & Oura, 2004; Koivu, 2002; Duican & Pop, 2015). In this regard, banks 
play an important role in the economy, and theory predicts that a banking crisis in all 
or part of the system may lead to significant costs to the economy. Almost all 
participants in the banking system lose out when this happens. Theory predicts that 
shareholders lose their equity holdings, while depositors risk losing all or part of their 
savings and must pay costs of portfolio reallocation. Bank creditors may miss their 
payments, while bank-dependent borrowers such as households and small firms risk 
                                                           




losing funding and face further difficulties finding alternative finance sources. Bank 
failures may develop into a banking crisis leading to an unanticipated contraction in 
the stock of money and this subsequently leads to a recession (Hoggarth, Reis & 
Saporta, 2002). Therefore, in this section, we highlight the potential channels of 
banking crises or failures as suggested in the bank literature. 
  
As discussed in the previous section, banks are deposit-taking financial institutions 
whose liabilities are short-term, while their assets are a combination of short- and long-
term loans. Banks are said to be insolvent if their liabilities are greater than their 
assets. The borrowers’ ability to repay borrowed loans affects banks’ assets. As 
discussed above under the banking theory section, information problems (moral 
hazard and adverse selection) experienced by banks make them susceptible to credit 
risk. To counter credit risk, the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) credit rationing model 
highlights that banks apply a number of strategies such as strict screening of loan 
applications, diversification of loan portfolios by lending to customers with different risk 
profiles, and requesting collateral. The screening of borrowers enables banks to 
predetermine (ex-ante) profitable and non-profitable projects. This enables profitable 
projects to be funded (ex-post). However, in a country such as South Africa with high 
levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, it should be noted that these 
strategies do not necessarily reduce credit risk, especially for banks that lend to small 
developing sectors. In addition, the collateral would be expensive to establish and 
monitor, and its value is typically subject to volatility. In this regard, bank insolvency 
may occur when a wave of loan losses occurs, especially when they are more than 
reserve requirements and equity cushions.  
 
A systemic crisis may occur because of a significant percentage of loan losses relative 
to bank capital. According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), banks that are 
not well capitalised are more vulnerable to shocks such as declines in asset prices, 
cyclical output decline and decline in terms of trade, et cetera (Lindgren, Garcia & 
Saal, 1996; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999). These shocks can adversely affect the 
economic performance of borrowers and ultimately their ability to honour their 




that adversely affect the economic performance of bank borrowers and whose impact 
cannot be reduced through risk diversification should be positively correlated with 
systemic banking crises” (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998, p. 85). 
  
The credit channel of monetary policy notes that, even in the absence of loan losses, 
banks’ balance sheets are also vulnerable to short-term adjustments in monetary 
rates. Since bank assets consist of long-term loans at fixed interest rates, return on 
assets cannot adjust quickly to counter the short-term policy rate adjustments. This 
sudden change in the interest rate exposes banks even in instances where this can 
be transferred to borrowers. Furthermore, short-term policy rate adjustments may 
affect the borrower’s ability to repay their loans. In some instances, short-term interest 
rates adjustment may also affect the deposit interest, thus eroding banks’ assets in 
the immediate future. According to the Mishkin (1996) model, short-term increases in 
interest rates might be a likely source of systemic risk. He argues that most bank 
panics in the U.S. were a result of short-term interest rate adjustments.  
 
Literature shows that banks’ ability to borrow in international markets to bridge the 
domestic funding gap is susceptible to risk. Akerlof, Romer, Hall and Mankiw (1993), 
Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1995) and Mishkin (1996) demonstrate that a shock in the 
foreign currency exchange market affects bank profitability. Foreign currency 
dominated loans were cited as the major cause of banking crises in Chile, Mexico, 
Nordic countries and Turkey (Drees & Pazarbasioglu, 1995).  
 
Speculative euphoria regarding banks’ asset portfolio quality has also been cited as a 
possible cause of bank runs18. Literature shows that this occurs when deposits are not 
insured (deposit insurance). Since bank assets are illiquid, large withdrawals of 
deposits may result in liquidity risk. In some cases, bank runs occur simply because 
depositors are aware of other depositors withdrawing their funds from one or more 
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banks. Such actions might force a sudden withdrawal of deposits even in the absence 
of risks. It should be noted that withdrawal of funds from one bank might not 
necessarily lead to a bank run (contagion) unless informed depositors take this as a 
sign of poor asset quality among all banks in the system. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) argue that bank runs should not occur in countries with 
compulsory deposit insurance. However, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
argue that, if the premiums of the compulsory insurance do not fully reflect the 
riskiness of the bank portfolios, this may lead to reckless bank behaviour, i.e. a moral 
hazard problem. This occurs because of a mismatch between the level of risk and 
premiums. However, the moral hazard problem is minimised in instances where there 
are adequate prudential regulation and strict supervision of banks as recommended 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  
 
Other authors also predict that the introduction of financial liberalisation19 increases 
bank risk-taking. Financial liberalisation mostly poses problems in countries with 
deposit insurance, where banks are tempted to take excessive risk in pursuit of more 
profits. Again, this leads to moral hazard problems. In countries with a liberalised 
financial system but with a weak bank supervision framework, banking crises can 
occur because of widespread fraudulent activities. Banks may be tempted to invest in 
projects that are too risky or projects that are a sure failure in order to create an 
opportunity to divert funds for personal use. Akerlof et al. (1993) suggest that looting 
behaviour by bank managers was the cause of the U.S. and Chile banking crisis of the 
1970s. 
 
As predicted by Minsky’s model and supported by a number of studies (Calvo, 
Leiderman & Reinhart, 1995; Bakker & Gulde, 2010; Shin & Shin, 2011; Dell’Ariccia, 
Igan & Laeven, 2012; Lane & McQuade, 2014; Fielding & Rewilak, 2015), short-term 
foreign capital inflows into banks also cause banking crises. These studies predict that 
a sudden withdrawal of foreign investment funds within the financial system creates a 
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huge funding gap in the local banking system. This occurs due to either an increase 
in foreign interest rates or a decline in domestic interest rates and investor confidence. 
Calvo et al. (1995) predict that this causes liquidity shortages in the financial system. 
 
In countries with a fixed exchange regime, speculative attacks on their currencies 
might also trigger problems in the financial sector. As speculation increases, the value 
of the local currency is devalued while bank depositors quickly rush to withdraw their 
funds and convert them to other investments. This leaves the local banking system 
with liquidity gaps and in distress. For example, banking problems in Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America in the 1990s were partly due to sudden withdrawals in short-
term foreign capital. 
 
2.6  FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND INSTABILITY 
Financial fragility and financial instability are common terms used interchangeably in 
the literature. Financial instability refers to the actual outbreak of problems in the 
financial system. In Mishkin’s (1997) model, financial instability “occurs when shocks 
to the financial system interfere with information flows so that the financial system can 
no longer do its job of channelling funds to those with productive investment 
opportunities” (Mishkin, 1997, p. 62). Financial fragility, on the other hand, refers to 
the vulnerability of the entire financial system to future outbreaks of problems within 
the financial system. According to Calomiris (1995), it is an unavoidable consequence 
of a dynamic capitalistic state. The idea of financial fragility dates back to Fisher (1933) 
and Keynes (1937) who strongly argued that the financing of investment through credit 
would potentially have devastating effects on the economy. This argument was based 
on their observations of the great depression and various other bank panics that had 
occurred around the world.  
 
In the later years, Minsky (1976) contributed to the financial fragility and instability 
debate by advancing the idea that modern capitalistic economies moved from robust 
to fragile and unstable financial systems because of their over-reliance on debt to fund 




manifestation of an increase in financial fragility. Wolfson (2002) added that the 
financial crisis20 was a reaction to increased fragility of the financial system over the 
course of the business cycle expansion. 
 
2.7 THE MINSKY THEORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 
The Hyman Philip Minsky (1982) theory of financial crises was built upon the theory of 
business cycles and the dynamics of the economic systems. The theory is an 
elaboration of Keynesian economics and Schumpeter’s business cycle theory. The 
theory is set out within the context of an expanding economy and has both theoretical 
and empirical aspects. The readily observed empirical argument is that, over time, 
capitalist economies move from inflation to debt deflation that can potentially spiral out 
of control. Minsky writes that “the economic system’s reactions to a movement of the 
economy amplify the movement—inflation feeds upon inflation and debt-deflation 
feeds upon debt-deflation” (Minsky, 1992, p. 1). In Minsky’s view, the capitalistic 
economy is characterised by high-value capital assets and dynamic financial systems.  
 
The theory concentrates mainly on the process that explains how swings between 
robustness and fragility generate business cycles in capitalist economies. Minsky 
argues that “to understand the short-term dynamics of the business cycle and the 
longer-term evolution of economies it is necessary to understand the financing 
relations that rule, and how the profit-seeking activities of enterprises, bankers, and 
portfolio managers lead to the evolution of financial structures” (Minsky, 1993, p. 106). 
Enterprise profits are the main determinants of system behaviour. Expectations of 
profits depend upon investment in the future and realised profits are determined by 
investment: thus, whether or not liabilities are validated depends upon investment. 
Investment takes place now because investors and their bankers expect investments 
to take place in the future (Minsky, 1992). 
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According to Minsky’s theory, instability in financial markets and economic conditions 
are a direct source of capitalistic economies and the roots of instability are internal to 
capitalism (Minsky, 1986). The theory assumes that the economy is characterised by 
a financial system that moves between robustness and fragility and that these are an 
integral part of the process that generates business cycles. The swings are therefore 
unavoidable unless governments and central banks intervene. With regard to the 
financial crisis, Minsky argues that it is attributable to swings in a potentially fragile 
financial system. 
 
2.7.1  Financial units and financial fragility 
Minsky believed that the increase in the level of indebtedness was an important driver 
of financial fragility, often accompanied by a mismatch between cash inflows and 
outflows. Minsky’s argues that the level of indebtedness is a determinant of the 
magnitude of financial fragility. In other words, the higher the level of indebtedness, 
the greater the scale of financial fragility. In the process, Minsky identifies three unique 
income-debt21 relations present in a modern capitalistic economy, as follows: 
i. Hedge finance units (stable); 
ii. Speculative finance units; and 
iii. Ponzi finance units (manias)22. 
Minsky found that hedge finance units, which he classified as ‘stable’, are able to repay 
their debts upon maturity using cash inflows from operations, while speculative finance 
units face some level of difficulties in debt repayment. In Minsky’s view, speculation 
refers to “an attempt to bet on the future direction and psychology of the market and 
also the more general process of financing assets whose value depends on future 
developments” (Minsky 1976, p. 120). Therefore, speculative finance units are those 
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units that issue new debt to meet their obligations. Ponzi finance units (also referred 
to as manias) completely fail to repay their debts using cash flows from operations, 
selling their existing assets or even borrowing from other sources.  
 
Importantly, Minsky’s theory highlights that the deepening of speculative financing 
units (highly leveraged and largely mismatched) leads to a movement of the financial 
system from a robust to a fragile financial structure. It also points out that if hedge 
finance units dominated, the economy might become equilibrium seeking and 
containing. In other words, hedge finance units provide a robust financial system, while 
speculative investors induce financial fragility. Minsky believed that there is a link 
between fragility and speculative finance. Under speculative finance, the financial 
system becomes more fragile, leading to a decline in liquidity and an increase in the 
debt levels, in both the short and long run. 
  
Minsky argues that, over prolonged periods of stability, the economy moves from a 
hedge financing structure to speculative and ultimately to Ponzi finance. During this 
period, both lenders and borrowers increasingly become reckless, where Ponzi 
borrowing will drive asset prices to a point where the financial system becomes 
vulnerable. This is caused by the economy seizing up because of the inevitable 
disillusionment of borrowers. Asset prices stop increasing and start falling rapidly due 
to declining confidence in the financial system. The financial system becomes illiquid, 
insolvent and susceptible to bank runs. In Minsky’s view, the collapse of speculative 
and Ponzi units will lead to the collapse of the more stable funds, i.e. the hedge units.  
 
2.7.2 The Minsky moment (movement from stability to instability) 
The Minsky ‘moment’23 refers to the gradual movement of the financial system from a 
stable financial system to a fragile financial system and ultimately to a fully-fledged 
financial crisis. This is attributed to a rapid increase in lending and debt beyond 
sustainable levels. Minsky writes that this occurs when the financial system starts 
                                                           




introducing financial engineering products in pursuit of large profits. The overuse of 
these products then increases liquidity in the economy to fund investment projects. 
 
According to Minsky, two theorems are important in explaining business cycles in a 
capitalistic economy. 
i. The economy has two financial regimes, one stable and one unstable. 
ii. During periods of sustained growth, the economy moves from financial 
relationships that make for a stable system to one that makes for an unstable 
system.  
Minsky’s theory reinforces the idea that financial crisis episodes are a result of 
capitalism, caused by the pursuit of large profits in the financial markets. According to 
this view, the pursuit of large profits in a capitalistic system is capable of moving the 
economy from financial stability to instability. 
 
2.7.3 Debt deflation 
According to Minsky, during financial crises, banks’ appetite to finance investments 
declines. The unwillingness to finance these investments decreases credit funds and 
profits. This then reduces the chances of economic agents honouring their debt 
repayment obligations. At this point, the possibility of debt deflation becomes imminent 
as debt defaults increase. This further results in a decline in aggregate demand, thus 
reducing prices and increasing the real value of outstanding debt repayments. Minsky 
argues that the central bank as a lender of last resort must intervene during this period. 
During this period, however, the central bank’s role in restoring and preventing debt 
deflations would not necessarily be enough. Minsky proposes stringent regulations to 
avoid financial innovation practices and attitudes that lead to exuberant financial 
instability. Minsky emphasises that “if the central bank interactions are not 
accompanied by regulations and reforms that restrict financial market practices, then 
the intervention sets the stage for the financing of an inflationary expansion, once the 
‘animal spirits’ of business people and bankers have recovered from the transitory 





2.7.4 The implication of the Minsky model  
It is important to emphasise the fact that the Minsky model has received great attention 
since the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the global financial crisis of 2007-09. The 
theory has advanced our understanding of the potential causes of financial crisis 
episodes and the costs associated with such disruptions. Although developed three or 
four decades ago, the theory offers an effective explanation for more recent 
international financial market events. Recent studies have used the model to explain 
why financial crisis episodes occur and how to avoid them in the future.  
 
The key modification of the Minsky predictions is the possibility that investors can 
make investments across borders. For example, before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
large investments were made in the Asian emerging markets. This was partly due to 
a decline in interest rates and the emergence of a recession in the U.S. and other 
developing economies while interest rates were rising in those emerging countries. 
The rapid increase in profits increased expectations and led to high levels of 
speculation. The increase in speculative investment also directly led to an increase in 
financial fragility. This was in line with Minsky’s earlier predictions. Wolfson (2002) 
highlights that without cross-border financial transactions, it is unlikely that financial 
fragility would have been rapid in the Asian emerging markets. Minsky’s view was that, 
over time, capitalism would lead to financial instability, which could potentially lead to 
severe financial disruptions, ultimately leading to large bailout costs. 
 
Again, the prediction that economies move from stable financial structures to unstable 
ones, best explains what later happened during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 
in the U.S. The U.S. financial structure gradually transitioned from hedge finance 
(stable) to speculative and later to Ponzi lending. Protracted increases in mortgage 
prices above their long-term price to income ratios were recorded. In Asia, some 
countries had enjoyed stability and investments from foreign markets which were 
unhedged because of the stable exchange rates that existed at that time. However, 
when the speculative gamble in the exchange rate occurred, this later proved to be 





As predicted by the Minsky theory, profit maximisation was at the epicentre of the 
financial crisis of 2007-09. Banks continued tapping into money market funds in order 
to raise funds to fulfil growing credit demand (see Chapter 5 on bank funding sources). 
This created a renewed culture of risk-taking amongst both lenders and borrowers. 
Again, Minsky’s view came to light in the U.S. when the economy gradually moved 
from stable to fragile. Between 2003 and 2004 the U.S. mortgage and lending rates 
and house prices became highly unsustainable, and by 2007-2008, the economy was 
hit by a fully-fledged financial crisis.  
 
Importantly, Minsky’s punitive measures to prevent financial bubbles have been 
incorporated by various central banks around the world including the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. These 
include the following key focus areas:  
i. Requirements for banks to maintain a certain level of liquidity in cash reserves; 
ii. Reduce speculative and Ponzi lending; 
iii. Requirements for banks to contribute to a stability fund during economic upswings 
for use during economic downturns or crisis times; 
iv. Tight controls on mortgage lending; 
v. Re-emphasis on the role of the central bank as a lender of last resort; and 
vi. The willingness of the central bank to use monetary tightening mechanisms to act 
on asset price booms. 
 
2.8  BUSINESS CYCLE THEORIES 
The aftermath of the Asian and Russian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998, the Mexican 
currency crisis of 1994 and the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has seen business 
cycle theories regaining their popularity in explaining business cycles and policy 
responses to financial crises around the world. The popular business cycle models are 
anchored in the monetary and credit system of the economy in explaining business 
cycle dynamics, and these are often referred to as the monetary business cycle. Early 
theoretical contributions date back to Ralph G. Hawtrey, John R. Hicks, Ludwig von 
Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, and Robert E. Lucas (Jr.), among others (Dobrescu, 




by monetary and credit market dynamics. In fact, these models believe that monetary 
mismanagement lies in the heart of macroeconomic problems and the misallocation 
of resources in the economy.  
 
The pure monetary model developed by British economist Ralph G. Hawtrey in 1922 
is perhaps the most popular business cycle theory. Hawtrey assumed that business 
cycles are a monetary phenomenon since aggregate demand in the economy is in 
itself a monetary reflection. He argues that all changes in the economy are a direct 
manifestation of changes (expansion and contraction) in the money supply. Hawtrey 
believed that all recessions and depressions experienced in the economy are driven 
by monetary factors. Hawtrey acknowledged that the banking system plays a critical 
role in providing money through bank credit in the economy.  
 
Hawtrey argued that enterprise growth is possible because of lower interest rates on 
bank loans, which induces business investors to demand more credit from the banking 
system. The increase in bank credit in the economy stimulates enterprise investments, 
leading to an increase in production, employment and aggregate income. According 
to this model, the upward cumulative process in economic activity results in an 
economic boom. However, Hawtrey highlighted that the upward movement will not last 
forever because banks will eventually curtail the provision of credit. Hawtrey argues 
that during the upswing, prices of goods and services will rise while foreign exchange 
reserves will decline, negatively affecting economic growth. The rapid growth of credit 
during the upswing diminishes the banking system cash reserves. Given this, the 
banking system will be unable to advance more credit to enterprises and, to control 
the increase in prices, banks will start recalling outstanding loans from enterprises. By 
this time, Hawtrey argues, aggregate demand, production and employment will decline 
to lead to a downward movement in economic activity and ultimately a recession. 
During the contraction period, the banking system will build up more reserves because 
of limited demand for credit and the process will restart again with banks issuing new 





Another interesting theory that provides a compelling explanation of the business 
cycles is the Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT). The ABCT argues that business 
cycles are a result of rapid credit growth in the economy caused by monetary policy-
induced low-interest rates. The ABCT’s earlier contributor, Ludwig von Mises, believed 
that low policy rates stimulate credit growth and lead to business booms. He argued 
that cheap credit creates the illusion that bad projects are actually good investments 
to enterprises. According to von Mises, the growth of credit in the economy is followed 
by price increases, and enterprises will begin to experience a shortage of funds to 
maintain capital investment they had initiated. As the cycle of credit growth continues, 
enterprise worries subside, since they will access more credit to continue their 
investments. At the end, when credit growth declines, the level of malinvestment is 
rectified during the recession. Von Mises opined that the level of credit growth in the 
economy creates room for over-investment and consumption patterns that are not 
aligned to consumer time preferences and available resources. 
 
Another strong supporter of the Austrian business cycle, Friedrich von Hayek, 
authored the monetary over-investment theory of business cycles, arguing that 
equilibrium in the economy can be achieved when investment and consumption are 
equal. He argued that the state of equilibrium and stability in the economy can be 
disrupted by changes in money supply and in the investment-savings relationship. 
Hayek believed that changes in the investment-savings relationship are a result of an 
increase in investment projects with savings remaining constant.  
 
Hayek predicted that investments increase owing to declining interest rates, an 
increase in the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC), and an increase in enterprise 
future expectations. Hayek’s theory clearly distinguishes between interest rate 
changes due to consumer time preferences and changes. Under the consumer 
preference changes, the production system and prices will adjust according to 
consumers’ time preferences, while under the induced scenario, changes in interest 
rates present a false market signal leading to inefficiencies in resource allocation 
during different stages of production. Following Hawtrey’s monetary over-investment 




economy create an unsustainable boom where excess funds are channelled into the 
early stages of the production process. Hayek’s theory acknowledges that the inability 
of the banking system to maintain neutral levels of money supply in the economy 
causes trade cycles. He believed that a neutral money supply was the only solution to 
eliminate trade cycles.  
 
Providing another valuable insight, another British economist, John Richard Hicks, 
developed the Hicks theory of trade cycles. Hicks’s model relates the business cycle 
to the Harrod-Domar growth theory and argues that the business cycle occurs in 
tandem with the growth in the economy and that business cycles ought to be examined 
in line with Harrod-Domar’s arguments. Hicks believed that the business cycle is a 
phenomenon of a growing economy. Equilibrium in the economy is reached when the 
rate of economic growth is equivalent to the natural growth rate, and the investment 
growth pattern should be equivalent to the savings growth pattern. Hicks argued that 
equilibrium growth in the economy is possible when both investment and savings rates 
increase.  
 
New classic economist Robert E. Lucas’s monetary business cycle theory also 
provides an interesting explanation. Lucas developed his model by questioning why 
capitalist economies’ aggregate variables underwent constant fluctuations in trend. 
Lucas’s theory is anchored by the rational expectations concept, which concept means 
that individuals utilise all available information to predict the price levels of goods and 
services. Lucas pointed out that this information includes monetary policy shifts, global 
developments (movements in oil and gas prices and other commodity prices) and in 
some cases economic theory. Importantly, the Lucas model believes that unforeseen 
shifts in aggregate demand in the economy are responsible for cyclical fluctuations. 
He further argued that expected shifts in production and employment cause an 
expansion in the economy, while unexpected shifts result in a recession caused by a 
reduction in production and unemployment. Following on the other business cycle 
theories, Lucas also opined that any unanticipated changes in aggregate demand, for 
example, money supply, interest rate movements, government fiscal position and 




that expected movements in aggregate demand will not alter the state of equilibrium 
between wages and prices. 
 
Using the rational expectations concept, Lucas writes that individuals expect future 
changes in money supply when making their future decisions. If the price of goods and 
wages are indeed flexible, these will be adjusted based on these expectations. 
Therefore, the expected changes in aggregate demand on the basis of anticipated 
changes in the money supply will not necessarily have a bearing on both production 
and employment levels.  
 
However, Lucas notes that an unexpected future decline in aggregate demand brought 
about by the unexpected decline in the money supply will cause disequilibrium in 
wages and prices. This will subsequently result in a decline in the level of production 
and employment in the economy. The continuous decline will ultimately cause a 
recession in the economy until aggregate demand rises to expected levels. According 
to Lucas, it is only an unexpected decline in aggregate demand that causes a 
recession. If the decline in aggregate demand is expected, business and workers will 
reach a consensus on wage levels that will keep the same level of employment in the 
economy.  
 
2.8.1 Implications of the business cycle theories 
Business cycle theories, especially monetary ones, provide a compelling diagnosis of 
the causes of the business cycle around the world and South Africa is no exception. 
The implications of the monetary business cycles are straightforward. First, these 
models suggest that monetary authorities should not artificially alter the interest rate 
and money supply because this has a direct effect on credit supply or the level of 
inflation. Second, monetary authorities should not restrict businesses from pulling out 
of unprofitable investment projects during economic downswings. The continuous 
occurrence of financial crisis events around the world and the events leading up to 
them have reignited interest in a number of business cycle theories. The interest in 




credit growth and asset bubbles. Empirical evidence on the causes and propagation 
of business cycles confirms some of the theoretical arguments presented above. 
 
For example, Rothbard (2000) studied the Great Depression of 1929-1936 and found 
that rapid credit growth generated an artificial boom as suggested by the ABCT. In 
addition, he found that government intervention did not allow investors to pull their 
funds out of unprofitable projects, which resulted in a protracted recession. Rothbard 
argues that important financial resources were channelled into 
unprofitable/unproductive projects in artificially expanding economic sectors. He also 
found that the continued increase in credit provision and inflation meant that investors 
could not liquidate unprofitable projects.  
 
Mulligan (2006) found that rapid credit growth induced a short-run increase in 
production, investment and consumption, while in the long run all three factors 
significantly declined to result in a recession. Keeler (2001) analysed the U.S. 
business cycles and found that expansion in the money supply caused business 
cycles which were driven by an increase in price levels and changes in the nominal 
interest rates. Powell (2002) argued that in Japan monetary and financial policy 
expansions protracted and aggravated the recession. O’Driscoll and Shenoy (1976) 
studied the stagflation period of the 1970s and concluded that rapid credit growth 
induced nominal demand and, in the process, distorted the pricing of goods and 
services and facilitated the misallocation of resources. O’Driscoll and Shenoy (1976) 
argued that credit growth creates artificial consumption expansion because this 
creates excess income for some households and firms in the economy. 
 
2.9  SUMMARY: MINSKY AND MONETARY CYCLE THEORIES 
The Minsky theory and the monetary cycle theories (Hawtrey, Hicks, von Mises, 
Hayek, and Lucas Jr.) have received great attention since the global financial crisis. 
These theories have contributed to informing policymakers and academics around the 




theoretical level, these theories have provided realistic explanations of the causes of 
business cycles around the world.  
 
The monetary cycle theories discussed here strongly suggest that investment and the 
accumulation of capital play a significant role in explaining business cycles. These 
theories argue that economic recessions begin when the level of investment slows 
and recessions will turn into expansions when the level of investment increases in the 
economy. Minsky’s theory is also built on the concept of business cycles and the 
dynamics of the economic system. Like the monetary cycle theories, Minsky also 
emphasises the level of investment (i.e. hedge, speculative and Ponzi units) as a 
significant contributor to business cycles.  
 
Just like the ABCT that argues that rapid credit growth created over-investment in the 
economy that was misaligned with consumer time preferences and resources, Minsky 
also holds that rapid credit growth created high debt levels beyond sustainable levels. 
Minsky opined that this was possible when financial institutions started introducing 
financial engineering products in pursuit of large profits. 
 
In this study, the focus is on understanding the relationship between credit booms and 
banking sector fragility in South Africa, and the Minsky financial instability hypothesis 
provides a practical explanation of why financial crises occur and how to avoid them 
in the future. The explanation provided by the Minsky theory is relevant in the South 
African context since it provides a very detailed demonstration of the possible dangers 
of credit booms and busts.  
 
This financial crisis of 2007-2009 provides a direct reflection of Minsky’s prediction on 
hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance. It also shows that reckless lending behaviour 
by banking institutions in pursuit of large profits may gradually move the financial 
system from stable to fragile, to a full-fledged financial crisis. It is important to note that 
the current rapid credit growth experienced in South Africa is in general, according to 




an important predictor of subsequent financial and economic crisis episodes. 
Furthermore, the high levels of indebtedness in South Africa are a cause for concern, 
especially when one considers Minsky’s prediction around the dangers of high levels 
of debt in the economy.  
 
Furthermore, the free movement of foreign capital across countries as predicted by 
Minsky remains the biggest driver of excess liquidity which feeds credit growth in many 
countries, and South Africa is no exception24. The empirical results in Chapter Three 
show that foreign capital inflows have had a significant contribution to credit booms in 
South Africa. 
 
In summary, this chapter provides a general theoretical perspective of the key factors 
that explain business cycles and bank failures around the world. The discussion here 
is also relevant in the South African environment. The rapid acceleration in 
unsecured25 lending from 2010 to 2013 led to the collapse of the African Bank26. The 
collapse of the bank created a high level of speculation in the MMFs that had major 
investments held by the bank. Although small, the collapse of this bank led to the 
downgrading of the top four commercial banks in South Africa by major rating 
agencies, while another micro-lender, Capitec, saw a slight decline in the value of its 
shares. This reminded academics and policymakers about the potential threat of 
contagion risk to banking stability as suggested in this section. Also, this section 
provides an important basis for the following chapter on the aggregate drivers of credit 
booms.   
                                                           
24 See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of the triggers of credit booms in South Africa. 
25 Unsecured loans not collateralised by any assets to which the creditor can have recourse 
in case of failure by the debtor to meet the credit obligations. SARB views credit cards, 
overdrafts, personal loans and financing of SMEs as forms of unsecured lending. 






AGGREGATE DRIVERS OF CREDIT BOOMS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA27  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
What are the key factors that explain the spectacular credit booms in South Africa? 
Responding to this question is important, given the acceleration of private sector credit 
over the past three decades in South Africa. Given the global financial crisis of 2007-
09 that was preceded by credit boom episodes around the world, ongoing 
investigations are required to determine measures to prevent a similar crisis in the 
future especially in a country like South Africa that already has high unemployment, 
poverty and inequality problems compounded by persistent high budget deficits. The 
financial and economic costs of financial system failure are immense and cannot be 
absorbed by an already stretched South Africa fiscus.  
 
Financial crisis literature shows that credit booms present a policy dilemma in a 
number of economies, especially developing ones. First, credit booms signal 
increased access to finance for investment and stimulating economic activity (Aisen & 
Franken, 2010; Abedifar et al., 2016; Alaabed & Masih, 2016). Other studies, inter alia 
those of Mendoza and Terrones (2012), Elekdag and Wu (2011), Enoch and Ötker-
Robe (2007) and Arena et al. (2015) suggest that credit booms disrupt financial system 
stability and potentially cause severe economic turbulence. These studies argue that 
credit booms are more naturally associated with a banking crisis than with other forms 
of crises. Some argue that rapid credit growth is an important predictor of subsequent 
financial and economic crisis episodes (Mendoza & Terrones, 2012; Schularick & 
Taylor, 2012). Elekdag and Wu (2011) argue that credit booms tend to end abruptly in 
the form of severe financial and economic disturbances.  
                                                           
27 This chapter has been accepted for publication by the Journal of Economics and 





In the literature, credit booms occur when credit provision expands by more than that 
extended during a cyclical expansion (Mendoza & Terrones, 2012). Gourinchas, 
Valdes and Landerretche (2001) define credit booms as periods which deviate from 
the historical trend. Booms and Are (2004) highlight that credit booms are associated 
with excessive growth in private sector credit.  
 
The intention of this chapter is to understand the triggers of the current credit booms 
in South Africa using annual data for the period 1970-2016. Understanding the triggers 
of credit booms would allow South Africa policymakers and academics to predict, 
reduce or even avoid these booms, especially given the potential dangers and costs 
associated with booms and busts. South Africa currently faces numerous problems, 
including high unemployment and inequality, low growth and per capita incomes, 
political instability (Aucoin & Cilliers, 2016), et cetera. Given the important role played 
by credit in the South African economy any disturbances in the banking and financial 
system would have adverse consequences for the country.  
 
Furthermore, South Africa presents an interesting case to investigate, given that past 
and recent studies have confirmed the existence of credit booms in South Africa (see, 
for example, Booms & Are, 2004; Mendoza & Terrones, 2008; 2012; Gozgor, 2014; 
Arena et al., 2015). Gozgor (2014) points out that South Africa had the highest mean 
credit-to-GDP of 185 per cent, followed by China, Malaysia and Thailand respectively 
using data spanning 1970-2016. Booms and Are (2004) identified 1985 and the 1990s 
as the years in which credit expansion in South Africa reached its peak. Mendoza and 
Terrones (2012) identified 2007 as the peak date for credit booms, while recently, 
Arena et al. (2015) also established the presence of credit booms in South Africa and 
established that credit booms started in 2005, peaked in 2007 and ended in 2008. 
However, these studies only established the existence of credit booms without 
necessarily identifying the main factors triggering this growth. Financial crisis literature 
points to the fact that various triggers of credit booms are country-specific, with a 
limited number citing the dominance of external factors. To date, the exact drivers of 




attempt to pinpoint the true drivers of credit booms in the country. This study 
contributes to the larger pool of credit boom literature and country-specific studies.  
 
The rest of the chapter is presented as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the South 
African banking system and credit growth trends, while Section 3.3 explores relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3.4 presents the estimation techniques and 
results, and Section 3.5 provides conclusions and policy recommendations.  
 
3.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING SYSTEM AND BANK CREDIT 
3.2.1 Background: the banking system 
The banking sector is one of the most fragile sectors around the world (Denis & 
Negotei, 2018) and the South African banking sector is no exception (Mishi & 
Khumalo, 2019). This makes the sector one of the most closely monitored to ensure 
stability (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia & Mauro, 2010). Therefore, the importance of the 
sector in economic development and the stability thereof need no emphasis (Beck, 
Demirguc‐Kunt, Laeven & Levine, 2008).  
 
According to the Reserve Bank (2016), the stability of the sector in South Africa is 
important to maintain confidence among investors and depositors to reduce or 
eliminate bank runs or any other threat to the financial system. According to Theobald 
(2013), South Africa once experienced a near banking crisis in 2001-2002 when three 
banks, namely BoE, Saambou and Unifer28, exited the market within a three months 
period. Theobald (2013) further highlights that various authorities in South Africa 
urgently tried to calm the market by issuing open-ended guarantees on some banks 
that were facing the contagion effect such as BoE Bank, African Bank, Investec and 
Nedbank. However, Theobald (2013) indicated that this move did not prevent the three 
banks from exiting the market even though the guarantees were meant to demonstrate 
that the banks were safe. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) noted that there was a major 
                                                           
28 According to Theobald (2003), BoE Bank was the sixth largest bank in South Africa while 




systemic risk in the South African financial system in 1997 caused by bank 
insolvencies. It is, therefore, imperative to note that a banking crisis can occur in 
banking at any time and that the contagion effect is difficult to overcome.  
 
The South African banking sector is one of the most developed and advanced in Africa 
(Odhiambo, 2009) and compares favourably with the rest of the world (Banking 
Association of South Africa, 2013). Mlambo and Ncube (2011) highlight that in 2008, 
the South African banking sector represented about 40.4 per cent of total banking 
assets in Africa, 49.9 per cent of bank credit and 42.4 per cent in total bank deposits 
(Mlambo & Ncube, 2011). 
 
The South Africa banking sector is highly concentrated, oligopolistic and consists of 
five dominant banks i.e. ABSA (founded 1991), Standard Bank (founded in 1862 in 
London), First National Bank (founded in 1838), Nedbank (founded in 1888) and 
Investec (founded in 1974) (Coppock, Forte, Ncube, Ooka, Richards & Vyas, 
2008). Table 3.1 shows the total assets structure of the South African banking 
sector based on aggregate data submitted to the SARB by banks between 2015 
and 2016. The total asset structure of banks in South Africa consists of 90.5 per 
cent of assets held collectively by the top 5 banks, 5.9 per cent by local branches 
of foreign banks, and 3.5 per cent by other banks (South African Reserve Bank, 
2016). There is a significant number of banks registered in South Africa with the 
majority being foreign-owned. Since 199029, there has been a gradual move towards 
fully opening up the financial services industry to local as well as foreign investors, 
resulting in an increase in the number of banks licenced by the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) and consequently a rapid increase in credit to the private sector.  
 
A significant number of new entrants in the banking sector have begun offering 
banking products that identify with the formerly unbanked population and low-income 
                                                           
29 During the 1990s, the Bank Act 1990 (Act No. 94 of 1990) was passed into law, and the 
banking system immediately underwent a process of amalgamation with a number of 




households. The opening up of the sector has successfully attracted significant 
interest from foreign banks, with a number of them buying shares of the top banks in 
the country (SARB, 2016). For example, Barclays Group based in the United Kingdom, 
acquired ABSA in 2005 while in 2007 China’s ICBC acquired 20 per cent of the shares 
of Standard Bank. According to the SARB, there is also a significant number of foreign 
bank branches registered and operating in South Africa. 
 
According to statistics from the SARB (2016), there were 60 registered banks in 2000, 
while a significant decline occurred in 2001 to only 43 banks due to small banks failing 
due to not complying with their licence conditions. By 2013, the sector had 73 active 
banks, with only 10 listed as locally owned, and 3 mutual banks. As of 2016, there 
were 74 registered banks, of which 10 are locally owned, 15 are foreign bank 
branches, 38 are foreign bank representatives, 6 are foreign-controlled banks30 and 3 
are mutual banks, of which 2 are currently in liquidation (SARB, 2016). The decline in 
the number of active banks in South Africa shows the level of volatility in the sector. 
Since the inception of the Bank Act in 1990, a number of banks have emerged, while 
at the same time a significant number have failed or filed for liquidation. It should be 
noted that the banks that have entered and exited the sector over the past 3 decades 
are often small banks with limited banking assets. The top 5 banks with a market share 
of 90.5 per cent (discussed above) have remained in the sector over the past 30 years. 
It is important to note that, based on Table 3.1, the ranking of smaller banks (from 10 
and below) alongside the top 5 banks in the country shows the threat they are faced 
with in the banking market. The two new entrants (Tyme Digital Bank and Discovery 
Bank) must be prepared to operate in a highly oligopolistic banking market otherwise 




                                                           




Table 3.1: Total asset structure of the South African banking sector in 2018 
Ranking Registered Bank Total Assets (R million) Growth (%) 
1 Standard Bank 1 254 849 1.64 
2 FNB 1 120 747 10.23 
3 Absa 983 378 7.51 
4 Nedbank 892 006 2.6 
5 Investec 415 285 7.29 
6 Capitec 87 033 21.34 
7 African Bank 31 356 -14 
8 Grindrod 16 696 9.91 
9 Mercantile 12 892 8.9 
10 Bidvest Bank 8 508 21.39 
11 Sasfin 7 778 14.97 
12 Albaraka 5 930 10.10 
13 Ubank 5 224 12.90 
14 HBZ Bank 4856 14.97 
15 South African Bank of Athens 2 355 3.95 
16 Tyme Digital* 1 403 100 
17 Habib Overseas Bank 1 186 4.46 
18 Discovery Bank* 622 100 
*New commercial banking licence 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2018) 
 
On the regulatory front, the sector is well regulated, with institutions such as the SARB, 
the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA), the National Credit Regulator (NCR) 
and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) overseeing the operations and conduct of 




banks are regulated and supervised through a three-tier system which comprises of 
Tier I, Tier II and Tier III. Tier I (also known as the top tier) regulatory framework is the 
Bank Act 1990 (Act No. 94 of 1990) and contains the enduring principles and 
overarching enabling framework. Tier II (the middle tier) consists of regulations relating 
to banks, which contain the bulk of internationally agreed stipulations, requirements 
and standards. Tier III contains directives, circulars and guidance notes issued by the 
Registrar of Banks mainly to deal with operational matters that change frequently or 
require urgent attention (SARB, 2016). 
 
It should be noted that the new regulatory frameworks have allowed small banks such 
as the African Bank and Capitec Bank to penetrate the market. These boutique micro-
lenders mainly provide financial services to low-income households and the previously 
unbanked population. According to the FinScope Report (2014), in 2014 75 per cent 
of South Africans had access to banks, credit unions, cooperatives31 and post office 
and microfinance institutions representing 27.4 million banked adults. Banking in 
South Africa is mostly driven by transactional products/services. According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014), unsecured loans32 in South Africa increased 
by 47 per cent between 2010 and 2012, reaching 11.7 per cent of total bank loans by 
2013. The growth of unsecured loans has become common in South Africa as banks 
try to offset weak corporate credit demand. 
 
3.2.2 Bank credit in South Africa 
Available literature indicates that credit booms have emerged as a leading indicator 
of banking sector fragility in most countries around the world (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Barajas et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
credit booms are often more associated with banking crises rather than with other 
types of crises (Mendoza & Terrones, 2012). It is important to note that such credit 
                                                           
31 In 2018, there were 22 registered Cooperative Financial Institutions in South Africa (SARB, 2018)  
32 Unsecured loans do not require collateral and are riskier but more lucrative for banks. The 
SARB views credit cards, overdrafts, personal loans and financing small medium enterprises 




booms present opportunities and severe challenges for policymakers around the 
world and South Africa is no exception.  
 
Given the above background, it is important to provide an analysis of the behaviour 
of credit in South Africa over the period 1970 to 2016. This will be of great assistance 
to policymakers, regulatory authorities and academics in comparing the South African 
growth trends with the rest of the world. Available statistics show that the credit-to-
GDP ratio33 in South Africa has rapidly accelerated over the last 30 years. Figure 3.1 
supports the findings of Booms and Are (2004), Mendoza and Terrones (2008; 2012), 
Gozgor (2014) and Arena et al. (2015) that credit booms exist in South Africa. In 
Figure 3.1, we observe low levels of credit provision before independence in 1994. 
This coincides with the apartheid period when South Africa was under broad trade 
sanctions characterised by huge capital and investment withdrawals. However, we 
observe a rapid increase in credit from 131.6 per cent in 1994 to a record peak of 192 
per cent in 2007. This period covers the new political dispensation that attracted 
significant foreign capital into the financial sector that increased funds for credit. 
Furthermore, significant reforms in the sector accompanied by the consolidation of 
banks increased credit provision. Before the financial crisis, there was also a steep 
increase in mortgage loans and unsecured loans, mostly from the household sector. 
To date, the 200734 peak in the series is the highest ever recorded in South Africa in 
46 years, while the lowest was in 1980.  
 
                                                           
33 Importantly, a number of studies (Kaminsky, 1999; Goodhart, Miguel, Basurto & Hofmann, 
2006) revealed that the ratio of credit-GDP was a good early predictor of future defaults.  
34 It should be noted that during this period South Africa was preparing for the hosting of the 
2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup. According to the National Treasury (2015), infrastructure 
investment was envisaged to total R600 billion between 2006-2010 with the construction of 
stadiums, transport infrastructure, broadcasting and telecommunication, ports of entry 




Figure 3.1: Credit-to-GDP ratio in South Africa (1970-2016) 
Source: World Bank 
Regarding the composition of loans, in 2009, mortgage loans represented the largest 
share of 51 per cent of total loans while general loans35 and instalment sales 
contributed 31 per cent and 10 per cent respectively (see Figure 3.2). The rest of the 
loans were for investments, leasing finance and bills. In 2016, the picture is slightly 
different: mortgage loans take up 40 per cent while general loans contribute 42 per 
cent, up from 31 per cent in 2009 (see Figure 3.3). According to the SARB, the 
changes are due to the rapid increase in unsecured loans to households and corporate 
sector loans since 2013 (South African Reserve Bank, 2016). Due to the recent 
subdued economic growth, financial institutions are now in favour of advancing credit 
to the more financially stable corporate entities, rather than households, due to their 
perceived risk. 
  
                                                           
35 General loans include personal loans (mostly unsecured), term loans, structured 

































































Figure 3.2: Composition of loans in South Africa (2009) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Composition of loans in South Africa (2016) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
Mortgage loans and house prices reveal an interesting relationship. As shown in 




























emerging markets, saw rapid increases in house prices. In order to catch up with the 
increasing costs of acquiring houses, mortgage loans also increased during this 
period, with an average growth of 17 per cent per annum. Interestingly, the gap 
between property prices and mortgage loans has been gradually widening since the 
early 1990s. This difference could potentially reflect that banks are not willing to fund 
the entire property purchase prices. Since 2008, the gap has widened further, an 
indication that banks have become more risk-averse since the financial crisis of 2007-
09. Regarding mortgage to total loans, there has been a gradual increase since the 
early 1990s. For example, mortgage loans represented 35 per cent and 38 per cent of 
total loans in 1990 and 2000 respectively. In 2009, mortgage loans peaked at 50.6 per 
cent of total loans, which were mainly driven by high property prices (see Figure 3.4). 
However, since 2010, there has been a gradual decrease in mortgage loans, due to 
the uptake of general loans mainly by the business sector.  
 
Figure 3.4: Mortgage loans and house prices in South Africa (1970-2016) 










































































Figure 3.5: Composition of bank credit by economic sector (2016) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
An analysis of credit composition by economic sector reveals that households are the 
biggest consumers of bank credit in the country. For example, in 2016, households 
took up 35.2 per cent of total bank credit, followed by finance and insurance, real 
estate and community, and social and personal services with 18.4 per cent, 10.1 per 
cent and 9.1 per cent respectively (see Figure 3.5). This shows that households are 
still the dominant sector reliant on bank credit in South Africa. However, according to 
the SARB (2016), currently, the agricultural sector is the sector most reliant on bank 
credit as the sector engages in efforts to recover from the 2016 drought. However, the 
sector only accounts for 2.3 per cent of total credit provided. The wholesale and retail 
trade, manufacturing and business services sectors represent 4.9 per cent, 4.8 per 
cent and 3.8 per cent respectively.  
 
In Figure 3.6 we compared the rate of credit growth and that of GDP growth. 
Interestingly, credit growth seems to follow the same pattern as economic growth in 
South Africa but at different magnitudes. For example, in 2006 and 2007, when GDP 
grew by 5.6 per cent and 5.4 per cent respectively, credit grew by 25.8 per cent and 
21.5 per cent respectively. Figure 3.6 suggests that credit provision in South Africa is 

























procyclical, in other words, it responds to economic upswings and downswings. 
Interestingly, studies on South Africa, inter alia those of Akinboade and Makina 
(2009), Fourie, Botha and Mears (2011) and Akinsola and Ikhide (2018), also 
confirmed the procyclical credit extension in South Africa. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Credit and GDP growth in South Africa (1970-2016) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
3.3  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we review empirical studies on the main drivers of credit booms. A 
number of studies on credit booms have been on mostly advanced and emerging 
countries and to a lesser extent in developing countries. Interestingly, there have been 
mixed findings. For example, some studies seem to suggest that factors such as 
inflation, GDP growth, asset prices, foreign capital and liabilities and the exchange 
rate play a major role in credit booms while some others suggest internal bank factors 
such as profitability, NPLs, size of bank capital, ownership, et cetera. We have noted 
that these conflicting results arise due to differences in research methods, choice of 
variables, data frequency and even location of the study.  
 
A number of studies have been conducted in various countries, particularly since the 



































































2010; Mendoza & Terrones, 2008; Aisen & Franken, 2010; Elekdag & Wu, 2011; 
Glaeser, Gottlieb & Gyourko, 2012; Dell’Ariccia, Igan, Laeven & Tong, 2014; Fielding 
& Rewilak, 2015; Arena et al., 2015, among others).  
 
For example, before the global financial crisis, Ituwe (1983) had argued that the ability 
of a bank to provide credit was largely driven by the ‘quantum of cash in its vault’. 
Interestingly, Bakker and Gulde (2010), regarding nine new European Union (EU) 
member states, confirmed that factors external to the region such as ‘bad fortunes’ 
were significant drivers of credit boom-bust cycles while also establishing that rapid 
credit growth was a result of high liquidity in global markets. Bakker and Gulde (2010) 
opined that the new EU states were an attractive destination for foreign capital, which 
most likely accelerated credit availability. 
 
Some recent studies on credit booms have associated the recent financial crisis with 
buoyant asset prices, in particular property prices, that were not driven by favourable 
economic fundamentals (Goodhart & Hofmann, 2008; Mendoza & Terrones, 2008; 
Acharya & Richardson, 2009; Elekdag & Wu, 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014). These 
studies highlighted that the increase in the asset prices significantly increases 
household wealth and collateral which ultimately triggers a higher borrowing appetite36 
and credit expansion.  For example, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) confirmed a link between 
the decrease in credit standards and increased mortgage securitisation rates as 
property prices accelerated. The study also found that increased mortgage 
securitisation greatly affected the lending behaviour of banks during the period leading 
up to the crisis, while Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) found a strong relationship 
between shocks in money supply and buoyant property prices.  
 
Another important factor relates to the studies of Elekdag and Wu (2011) on 99 credit 
booms around the world, Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (2001) on 91 
developed and developing countries, and Dell’Ariccia, Igan, Laeven, Tong, Bakker, 
and Vandenbussche (2012) on 170 developed and emerging countries. These studies 
                                                           




found a strong and positive association between credit booms and loose 
macroeconomic policy (lower policy rate) in countries that have experienced credit 
boom episodes. Elekdag and Wu (2011) noted that a lower policy rate inflates the 
price of assets which increases collateral values, thereby incentivising borrowing and 
increasing borrowing appetite.  
 
Elekgad and Wu (2011), in particular, mentioned low policy rates as a prominent factor 
in 13 of the worst credit booms in developed and emerging economies. They revealed 
that, during the pre-peak years, global interest rates were significantly below the 
domestic policy rates of the most economies that experienced credit boom episodes. 
Elekdag and Wu (2011) opined that low policy rates lower the prime rate and ultimately 
reduce borrowing costs. Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2012) identify loose 
macroeconomic factors as triggers of credit booms. The study also opined that credit 
boom episodes often occurred in countries that had a fixed exchange rate and poor 
bank supervision, et cetera. Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2012) argued that countries 
under a fixed exchange rate regime tend to direct their monetary policy stance towards 
protecting a fixed exchange rate and concentrate less on devising policies to identify 
and prevent credit boom episodes. Gourinchas et al. (2001) and Stepanyan and Guo 
(2011) also identified other factors, such as fixed exchange rates, poor regulatory 
oversight, and domestic deposits37 as major drivers of credit booms in several 
developed and emerging countries. 
  
Other studies, inter alia those of Gourinchas et al. (2001), Mendoza and Terrones 
(2008), Rai and Kamil (2010), Stepanyan and Guo (2011), Magud, Reinhart and 
Vesperoni (2014), Lane and McQuade (2014) and Fielding and Rewilak (2015), 
demonstrated large capital inflows as a major cause of excessive credit growth during 
the pre-peak years of credit booms. These studies found a strong asymmetric 
relationship between credit booms and large foreign capital inflows in several 
countries. Importantly, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) noted that large inflows of 
foreign capital are sometimes channelled to the local credit market in the form of 
                                                           




wholesale funds38 which increase liquidity in the market and fuel excessive credit 
growth. For example, Stepanyan and Guo (2011) investigated the dynamics of bank 
credit pre- and post the financial crisis in 38 emerging market economies. They found 
that countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania had high 
credit growth rates (>30 per cent) while countries such as Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic had average growth. They attributed this to their over-reliance on 
foreign capital as a source of credit growth before the financial crisis39. Stepanyan and 
Guo (2011) demonstrated that countries that over-relied on foreign capital (pre-crisis) 
experienced a drastic decline in credit provision after the crisis. 
  
Mendoza and Terrones (2012) also agreed with Stepanyan and Guo (2011), using 
cross-sectional data covering developed and emerging countries around the world 
when they suggested that surges in foreign capital played a significant role in 
accelerating credit growth.  
 
Rai and Kamil (2010) argued that the sources of credit funds (internal or external) in 
Latin America and Caribbean countries were important prior to and during the financial 
crisis, with those that depended heavily on foreign funding being the worst affected. 
  
However, Elekdag and Wu (2011) provide an interesting twist to the foreign capital 
and credit booms relationship in the literature. Elekdag and Wu (2011) opined that not 
all credit booms are triggered by foreign capital, as some asset classes, such as the 
property market, private and public equity, foreign direct investments (FDI), fixed 
income assets and investment in nonfinancial institutions, among others, might have 
been absorbing these funds. Elekdag and Wu (2011) suggest strong domestic factors 
as significant drivers of credit growth instead of foreign capital flows. 
 
                                                           
38 Please refer to Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on wholesale funding sources.  
39 Countries such as Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia had a high level of foreign 




Although the aggregate factors driving credit booms have been studied extensively, 
as discussed above, the majority of studies cover developed countries with advanced 
financial systems and institutional structures. Limited evidence exists for African 
countries and in particular South Africa. This is not surprising, considering the low 
levels of credit provided through formal channels and the general level of financial 
development in the continent. Regarding country studies, no study has been 
conducted in South Africa; we could only find cross-sectional studies on credit booms 
that incorporate South African data (i.e. Booms & Are, 2004; Mendoza & Terrones, 
2008; 2012; Gozgor, 2014; and Arena et al., 2015). For example, in a sample of 24 
emerging countries including South Africa, Gozgor (2014) found that South Africa had 
the highest mean credit-to-GDP ratio of 175.3 on average, followed by China, Malaysia 
and Thailand. More recently, Arena et al. (2015) also identified the presence of credit 
booms in South Africa and concluded that the start date was 2005, peaking in 2007 
and ending in 2008.  
 
Importantly, these studies (Terrones & Mendoza, 2008; 2012; Gozgor, 2014; Arena et 
al., 2015) provided compelling insight into the behaviour of credit and further 
highlighted other additional factors, for example, that equity and property prices were 
possibly fuelling credit booms in South Africa. The additional factors identified, such 
as equity and property prices, are consistent with the literature on credit boom-busts. 
Furthermore, like other countries, positive growth trends during the build-up phase of 
the crisis in South Africa had a significant impact on credit booms. There is also an 
emphasis on surges in foreign capital as an important trigger of credit booms in most 
emerging market economies, including South Africa.  
 
3.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
3.4.1 Data source 
The study utilised annual time series data spanning 1970 to 2016 collected from the 
South African Reserve Bank and World Bank data portal. This period covers the pre-




economic growth and political stability, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the 
post-crisis period.  
3.4.2 Definition of variables 
3.4.2.1 Credit booms 
This is our variable of interest, and we used the credit-to-GDP ratio as an indicator of 
credit booms in South Africa as suggested by financial crisis literature (see Schularick 
& Taylor 2012; Arena et al., 2015; Barajas, Chami & Yousefi, 2016). Given its increase 
over the years, Barajas et al. (2016) suggest that the ratio provides information on the 
banking sector mobilisation of funds and how funds are allocated in the economy. 
Arena et al. (2015) point out that credit booms are related to the permanent increase 
in the credit-to-GDP ratio in a number of countries that have experienced some form 
of credit booms. 
3.4.2.2 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
We included GDP per capita as a measure of domestic income in South Africa. High 
growth in GDP per capita stimulates domestic demand for credit (Gozgor, 2014). 
However, adverse shocks on economic performance can potentially affect credit 
supply, especially in developing and emerging countries (Takáts, 2010).  
3.4.2.3 Real interest rates 
Studies of Terrones and Mendoza (2012), Stepanyan and Guo (2011), Magud et al. 
(2014), and Arena et al. (2015) demonstrate the relationship between the monetary 
policy rate and credit booms. Lower real interest rates in the economy signal a 
monetary policy easing stance and therefore the possibility of rapid growth in credit in 
the economy, especially in developing and emerging countries (Elekdag & Wu, 2011). 
We, therefore, expect the lower real interest rates to stimulate rapid credit growth in 
South Africa. 
3.4.2.4 Mortgage loans 
Financial crisis literature suggests that mortgage loans played a significant role in 
triggering credit booms around the world (Demyanyk & van Hemert, 2009; Dell’Ariccia 
et al., 2014). In this paper, we used total mortgage loans to the private sector obtained 




3.4.2.5 Stock market prices 
Literature also suggests that real stock market prices are related to credit booms 
(Booms & Are, 2004; Terrones & Mendoza, 2008). In particular, Terrones and 
Mendoza (2008) opined that rising stock market prices may possibly trigger excessive 
borrowing. For this reason, we used the JSE all-share index as a proxy for stock 
market prices.  
3.4.2.6 Foreign capital flows 
Much of the literature in this study points out the strong link between surges in foreign 
capital and credit booms in a number of emerging countries (Elekdag & Wu, 2011; 
Glaeser et al., 2012; Fielding & Rewilak, 2015). We used annual growth rates 
calculated using data sourced from the SARB.  
 
3.5 EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION  
To empirically establish the main drivers of credit booms in South Africa, we apply the 
robust autoregressive-distributed lags (ARDL) bounds test methodology by Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (2001) using data over the period 1970-2016. The ARDL (p,q) 
approach is chosen because of its superiority over other traditional cointegration 
approaches (i.e. Engle & Granger; Johansen; Johansen & Juselius, among others). 
First, this method can be used irrespective of the variables’ integration properties 
(integrated order zero [I(0)] or [I(1)]). Second, the method allows us to derive an ECM 
through a simple linear transformation without losing the long-run information in the 
equations. Third, the ARDL model is the most appropriate for small samples and 
endogeneity is less of a problem because it is free of residual correlation (see 
Odhiambo, 2010). The estimated ARDL bounds test model is as follows:  
∆𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
∆𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚1
𝑖=1
∆JSEG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1







∆𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟1
𝑖=1
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐽𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐺𝑡−1





∆𝐽𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘2
𝑖=1
∆JSEG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚2
𝑖=1
∆DCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=0







∆𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟2
𝑖=0
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐽𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐺𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1+ 2𝑡 
(3.2) 
∆𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘3
𝑖=1
∆LMLG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚3
𝑖=1
∆DCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛3
𝑖=0







∆𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟3
𝑖=0
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐽𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1+ 3𝑡 
(3.3) 
∆𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘4
𝑖=1
∆FCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚4
𝑖=1
∆DCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛4
𝑖=0







∆𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟4
𝑖=0
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐽𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1+ 4𝑡 
(3.4) 
∆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘5
𝑖 =1
∆𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚5
𝑖=1
∆𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛5
𝑖=0







∆𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛱𝑖
𝑟5
𝑖=0
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐽𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1+ 5𝑡 
(3.5) 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘6
𝑖=1
∆GDP𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚6
𝑖=1
∆DCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛6
𝑖=0







∆𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟6
𝑖=0
∆𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐽𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑖𝑡−1+ 6𝑡 
 (3.6) 
where DCG = domestic credit as percentage of GDP; JSEG = Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange all-share index growth rate; LMLG = log of mortgage loans to the private 




GDP = GDP per capita growth rate; k, m, n, p, q, r = optimal lag lengths, 𝐿𝑛 is the 
natural logarithm of variables; 1𝑡 6𝑡 are white noise error terms; and ∆ = first difference 
operator. The study uses the Wald test (joint f-statistic) to determine the lower and 
upper bounds. To determine the optimum length, we apply the Akaike Information 
Criterion because of its superiority to other information criteria e.g. the Schwarz 
Bayesian Criteria (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). The null and alternative hypotheses 
of no co-integration in Equations 3.1 to 3.6 are 𝐻𝑂: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 = 0 
and 𝐻1: 𝛽1 ≠ 𝛽2 ≠ 𝛽3 ≠ 𝛽4 ≠ 𝛽5 ≠ 𝛽6 ≠ 0 respectively. We used Pesaran et al. (2001) 
and Narayan (2005) for two critical values for lower and upper bounds. The lower 
bound values are developed under the assumption that ARDL variables are integrated 
order zero while the upper bound values assume variables are integrated order 1. 
 
We proceed to determine whether cointegration exists using three scenarios as 
follows: (i) we reject the 𝐻𝑂 : 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 = 0 if the calculated F-
statistic is greater than the upper bound critical values; (ii) we do not reject 𝐻𝑂: 𝛽1 =
𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 𝛽5 = 𝛽6 = 0 if the calculated F-statistic is less than the lower bound 
critical values, and (iii) the study cannot reach a firm conclusion if the calculated F-
statistic is between the lower and the upper bound critical values (Pesaran et al., 
2001).  
 
3.5.1 ECM-based Granger causality test  
After establishing the presence of long-run relationships between variables in 
Equations (3.1) to (3.6) through the ARDL bounds procedure, we proceed to determine 
Granger-causality between credit booms and the other variables in the models. We 
apply the following Granger-causality models (Ho & Odhiambo, 2011; Cherni & Jouini, 
2017): 
∆𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
∆𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚1
𝑖=1
∆JSEG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1







∆𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟1
𝑖=1






∆𝐽𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘2
𝑖=1
∆JSEG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚2
𝑖=1
∆DCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=0







∆𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟2
𝑖=0
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜃2𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 8𝑡 
(3.8) 
 
∆𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘3
𝑖=1
∆LMLG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚3
𝑖=1
∆DCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛3
𝑖=0







∆𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟3
𝑖=0
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜃3𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 9𝑡 
(3.9) 
 
∆𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘4
𝑖=1
∆FCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚4
𝑖 =1
∆DCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛4
𝑖=0







∆𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟4
𝑖=0
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜃4𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 10𝑡 
     (3.10) 
 
 ∆𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘5
𝑖=1
∆Ri𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚5
𝑖=1
∆DCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛5
𝑖 =0







∆𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟5
𝑖=0
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜃5𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 11𝑡 
     (3. 11) 
 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘6
𝑖=1
∆GDP𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚6
𝑖=1
∆DCG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛6
𝑖=0







∆𝐹𝐶𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ Π𝑖
𝑟6
𝑖=0
∆𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜃6𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 12𝑡 





In Equations 3.7 to 3.12, the study included the lagged error correction term 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 
generated from the long-run equilibrium relationship, and 𝜃1to 𝜃6 are the coefficients 
of the lagged error correction term (ECT). 
 
3.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
3.6.1 Stationarity tests 
In order to verify that the variables in the equations are not integrated of order 2 (l(2)), 
we apply the standard unit root tests i.e. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-
Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) tests. To confirm the 
endogenous structural breaks in the series, we apply the Zivot and Andrews (ZA) 
breakpoint unit root test since standard unit root tests (i.e. ADF, PP and KPSS) in 
Table 3.2 tends to be biased towards the rejection of the null hypothesis even in the 
presence of structural breaks in the series. The empirical results in Table 3.2 reveal 
that there are no variables that are I(2), in other words, most of the variables are 
stationary after first difference.  
 
The ZA test results in Table 3.3 also confirm that there are no I(2) variables; however, 
the results identify structural breaks in the variables. There are considerable 
differences in the location of these structural breaks in the variables. In some 
instances, the location of breaks is different between a variable in levels and first 
difference. The first set of breaks occurred during the early 1980s, 1990s and late 
2000s. For example, the credit boom (DCG) series break dates are 2006 and 2007, 
while the foreign capital (FCG) break date is 1999. For the mortgage loans (LMLG) 
series, the break date is 2008, while the GDP per capita (GDP) break date is 1992. 
The occurrence of these breaks is not surprising since most coincide with a number 
of events that took place in South Africa, for example, the imposition and subsequent 




Table 3.2: Unit root tests 
Variable Model Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Phillips-Perron (PP) Kwiatkowski Phillips 
 Schmidt and Shin 
(KPSS) 
Conclusion 
Lag 𝝉𝝉, 𝝉𝝁 , 𝝉 𝚽𝟑 , 𝚽𝟏 BW 𝝉𝝉, 𝝉𝝁 , 𝝉 BW 𝝉𝝉, 𝝉𝝁 
DCG Intercept 0 -3.679*** 13.537***  1  -
3.745*** 






Intercept and Trend 0 -4.231*** 9.183**  5 -3.949***  1 0.106* 
None 0 -1.424   6 -1.029   
DDCG Intercept 0 -7.548*** 56.966***  13 -10.403***  13 0.255* 
Intercept and Trend 0 -7.521*** 28.306***  0 -12.382***  15 0.183*** 
None 0 -7.635**   13 -10.502***   





Intercept and Trend 1 -6.135*** 15.768***  17 -8.565***  18 0.193** 
None 0 -4.587***   2 -4.549***   
DJSEG Intercept 5 -6.310*** 27.308***  44 -25.072***  27 0.363** 
Intercept and Trend 5 -6.323*** 23.423***  44 -32.645***  27 0.312 
None 5 -6.393***   44 -25.365***   




Intercept and Trend 0 -2.517 3.203  2 -2.603  4 0.132** 
None 0 -0.942   1 -0.943   
DLMLG Intercept 0 -6.530*** 42.644***  1 -6.530***  1 0.0470* 
Intercept and Trend 0 -6.474*** 20.985***  2 -6.476***  2 0.0410* 
None 0 -6.591***   1 -6.590***   






Intercept and Trend 0 -7.033*** 24.747***  3 -7.031***  4 0.098* 
None 0 -5.855***   2 -5.921***   
DFCG Intercept 0 -12.959*** 167.947***  23 -36.291***  15 0.193* 
Intercept and Trend 0 -12.811*** 82.073***  23 -37.566***  15 0.180*** 
None 0 -13.109***   23 -36.885***   
Ri Intercept 0 -3.245** 10.527***  2 -3.211**  4 0.494***  
Non-stationary: 
Integrated of 
Intercept and Trend 0 -3.783** 7.592**  2 -3.785**  3 0.163*** 




DRi Intercept 1 -6.675*** 33.736***  7 -9.645***  5 0.108* order 0 
 Intercept and Trend 4 -5.863*** 17.486***  7 -9.470***  5 0.110* 
None 1 -6.751***   7 -9.792***   




Intercept and Trend 0 -4.314*** 9.305**  3 -4.246***  2 0.127** 
None 0 -4.229***   2 -4.215***   
DGDP Intercept 1 -7.001*** 37.948***  44 -19.63***  45 0.500*** 
Intercept and Trend 1 -6.914*** 24.766***  44 -19.23***  45 0.500 
None 1 -7.085***   44 19.173***   
Notes:  Superscripts ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.  
The critical values for ADF are as follows: with intercept - 3.581 (1%), -2.927 (5%) and -2.601 (10%); Intercept and trend -4.171 (1%), -
3.511 (5%) and -3.186 (10%); with no intercept and no trend -2.616 (1%), -1.948 (5%) and -1.612 (10%).  
PP critical values are: with intercept, 3.581152 (1%), -2.927 (5%) and -2.601 (10%); with intercept and trend, -4.171 (1%), -3.511 (5%) 
and -3.186 (10%); with no intercept and no trend -2.616 (1%), -1.948 (5%) and -1.612 (10%).  
Critical values for KPSS tests: with intercept, 0.739 (1%), 0.463 (5%) and 0.347 (10%); with intercept and trend, 0.216 (1%), 0.146 (5%) 
and 0.119 (10%).  
ADF critical values for 𝚽𝟑 , 𝚽𝟏 are obtained from the Dickey and Fuller (1981) tables for the empirical distribution 𝚽𝟏 and𝚽𝟑. 




Table 3.3: Zivot-Andrews stationarity tests accounting for structural breaks: 
1970-2016 
Variables Model Lag t-stat Breakpoint 
DCG Intercept 0 -4.847** 2007 
Intercept & Trend 0 -4.837** 2006 
JSEG Intercept 0 -7.193*** 1980 
Intercept & Trend 0 -7.075*** 1980 
LMLG Intercept 0 -4.573** 2008 
Intercept & Trend 0 -4.609* 2008 
FCG Intercept 2 -14.169*** 1999 
Intercept & Trend 2 -13.478*** 1999 
Ri Intercept 0 -5.718*** 1980 
Intercept & Trend 0 -5.434*** 1980 
GDP Intercept 0 -5.037*** 1992 
Intercept & Trend 0 -5.157** 1992 
Variables in First Difference 
DDCG Intercept 0 -8.051*** 1988 
Intercept & Trend 0 -7.934*** 1988 
DJSEG Intercept 0 -9.427*** 1981 
Intercept & Trend 0 -9.285*** 1980 
LMLG Intercept 0 -7.532*** 2009 
Intercept & Trend 0 -7.398*** 2009 
DFCG Intercept 0 -14.533*** 2001 
Intercept & Trend 0 -14.938*** 2001 
DRi Intercept 0 -8.273*** 1980 
Intercept & Trend 0 -8.431*** 1980 
DGDP Intercept 0 -8.385*** 1984 
Intercept & Trend 0 -8.271*** 1984 
Notes: Superscripts ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The Zivot-Andrews breakpoint tests critical values with intercept are as follows -4.949 
(1%), -4.444 (5%) and -4.194 (10%) and critical values with  intercept and 
trend are -5.348 (1%), -4.860 (5%) and -4.607 (10%).  
The test selected a maximum of 9 lags. 




3.6.2 Cointegration Test: ARDL bounds test 
Table 3.4 presents the empirical results of ARDL bounds F-test for Equations 3.1-3.6 
to establish the long-run relationship when DCG, JSEG, LMLG, FCG, Ri and GDP are 
modelled as endogenous variables. The results show that there is a long-run 
relationship between variables in Equations 3.1, 3.2, 3.5 and 3.6. This is confirmed by 
the calculated F-statistics of Equations 3.1, 3.2, 3.5 and 3.6 that are greater than the 
5 per cent critical values of Narayan (2005) and Pesaran et al. (2001). In Equations 
3.3 and 3.4, the calculated F-statistic is lower than the 5 per cent critical values of both 
Pesaran et al. (2001) and Narayan (2005). Therefore, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration is rejected in Equations 3.1, 3.2, 3.5 and 3.6 and it is concluded that the 
variables have a long-run relationship when credit boom, GDP per capita, stock market 
prices and real interest rates are dependent variables. 
 
Table 3.4: Bounds F-test for cointegration 
Dependent Variable Function F-Test Statistic 
DCG DCG (JSEG, LMLG, FCG, Ri, GDP) 4.671** 
JSEG JSEG (DCG, LMLG, FCG, Ri, GDP) 19.115*** 
LMLG LMLG (DCG, JSEG,FCG, Ri, GDP) 1.952 
FCG FCG (DCG, JSEG, LMLG, Ri, GDP) 3.407 
Ri Ri (DCG, JSEG, LMLG, FCG, GDP) 9.172*** 
GDP GDP (DCG, JSEG, LMLG, FCG, Ri) 4.441** 
CRITICAL VALUES 
 1% 5% 10% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Pesaran et al. (2001) 3.06 4.15 2.39 3.38 2.08 3.0 
Narayan (2005) 3.674 5.019 2.694 3.829 2.276 3.38 
Notes:  Superscripts ***, **, * denote, 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.  
Narayan (2005) critical values: case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend.  
Pesaran et al. (2001) critical values: unrestricted intercept and no trend.  
 
The Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM tests results presented in Table 3.5 
indicate that the equations do not suffer from serial correlation. In other words, the 




Table 3.5: Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM tests 
DCG F-statistics 1.214 Prob. F(2,21) 0.315 
Obs*R2 4.135 Pro. Chi-square(2) 0.127 
JSEG F-statistics 0.167 Prob. F(2,21) 0.847 
Obs*R2 0.675 Pro. Chi-square(2) 0.713 
LMLG F-statistics 0.837 Prob. F(2,21) 0.447 
Obs*R2 3.173 Pro. Chi-square(2) 0.204 
FCG F-statistics 0.252 Prob. F(2,16) 0.780 
Obs*R2 1.313 Pro. Chi-square(2) 0.519 
Ri F-statistics 0.041 Prob. F(2,28) 0.960 
Obs*R2 0.125 Pro. Chi-square(2) 0.940 
GDP F-statistics 0.630 Prob. F(2,23) 0.541 
Obs*R2 2.284 Pro. Chi-square(2) 0.319 
Source: Author’s calculations using Eviews 10 
 
3.6.3 ECM-based Granger causality test 
Having established the cointegration amongst the variables in the 6 equations, we 
proceeded to determine the Granger-causality between variables when DCG, JSE, 
LMLG, FCG, Ri and GDP are dependent variables. Although the presence of 
cointegration in Equations 3.1, 3.2, 3.5 and 3.6 indicate the possibility of Granger-
causality in at least one direction, it does not reveal the direction of temporal causality 
(Narayan & Smyth, 2005; Ho & Odhiambo, 2011). To detect the short-run causality we 
apply the Wald test (F-Statistics) of lagged differences of the independent variables 
and the long-run causality using the significance of the t-statistics of the lagged ECT 
in Equations 3.7 to 3.12. However, we can only generate the lagged ECT t-statistic 
from Equations 3.7, 3.8, 3.11 and 3.12 in which the long-run relationship was detected. 







Table 3.6: Short and long-run Granger non-causality test 
Dependent 
Variable 
Causal direction F-statistic ECT t-statistic  R2 
Domestic credit 
growth (DCG) 
Stock Market prices (JSEG) → 
Domestic credit growth (DCG) 
2.226(0.131) -0.821(-6.421)*** 0.88 
Stock Market prices 
(JSEG) 
Domestic credit growth (DCG) → 
Stock Market prices (JSEG) 
3.524(0.049)** -1.420(-11.974)*** 0.89 
Domestic credit 
growth (DCG) 
Mortgage loans (LMLG) → Domestic 
credit growth (DCG) 
7.610(0.000)*** -0.821(-6.421)*** 0.88 
Mortgage loans 
(LMLG) 
Domestic credit growth (DCG) → 
Mortgage loans (LMLG) 
10.580(0.000)*** - 0.85 
Domestic credit 
growth (DCG) 
Foreign Capital (FCG) → Domestic 
credit growth (DCG) 
5.388(0.012)** -0.821(-6.421)*** 0.88 
Foreign Capital 
(FCG) 
Domestic credit growth (DCG) → 
Foreign Capital (FCG) 
3.078(0.054)* - 0.94 
Domestic credit 
growth (DCG) 
Real Interest rates (Ri) → Domestic 
credit growth (DCG) 
3.812(0.016)** -0.821(-6.421)*** 0.88 
Real Interest rates 
(Ri) 
Domestic credit growth (DCG) → 
Real Interest rates (Ri) 
10.678(0.003)*** -0.129(-8.776)*** 0.75 
Domestic credit 
growth (DCG) 
GDP per capita (GDP → Domestic 
credit growth (DCG) 
3.877 (0.0108)** -0.821(-6.421)*** 0.88 
GDP per capita 
(GDP) 
Domestic credit growth (DCG) → 
GDP per capita (GDP) 
5.353(0.0030)*** -0.398(-6.209)*** 0.83 
 
The results in Table 3.6 confirm a long-run bidirectional causality between Stock 
Market prices (JSEG) and credit booms (DCG). This is supported by a significant (1 
per cent level) and negative lagged ECT. However, short-run causality between Stock 
Market prices (JSEG) and credit booms is not supported by the Wald test, since the 
F-statistic is not significant at 5 per cent. We also find a long-run unidirectional causal 
relationship running from mortgage loans to credit booms. This is confirmed by a 
significant and negative lagged ECT as expected. However, we find short-run 
bidirectional causality between mortgage loans and credit booms which is confirmed 
by significant F-statistics for both the credit booms and mortgage loans equations. 
Furthermore, as expected, our results confirm short and long-run unidirectional causal 
flow running from foreign capital to credit booms. The direction of causality is 
confirmed in the credit boom equation by a negative and significant lagged ECT and 
the F-statistics of the Wald test. Table 3.7 provides a summary of causality between 
credit boom, stock market prices, mortgage loans, foreign capital, real interest rates 




Table 3.7: Summary of causality 
Variables Direction of causality Conclusion 
Credit booms 




causality flow between credit 
booms and stock market 
prices, and short-run 
unidirectional causality from 
credit booms to stock market 
prices. 
Credit booms and stock market 
prices Granger-cause each in 
the long run. 
Credit booms Granger-cause 







causality from mortgage 
loans to credit booms and 
short-run bidirectional 
causality between mortgage 
loans and credit booms. 
Mortgage loans Granger-cause 
credit booms in the long run. 
Mortgage loans and credit 
booms Granger-cause each 
other in the short run. 
Credit booms 
(DCG) and foreign 
capital (FCG) 
Long-run unidirectional 
causality from foreign capital 
to credit booms and a short-
run bidirectional causality.  
Foreign capital flows Granger-
cause credit booms in the long 
run. 
Foreign capital and credit 
booms Granger-cause each 
other in the short run. 
Credit booms 
(DCG) and real 
interest rates (Ri) 
Short- and long-run 
bidirectional causality 
between credit booms and 
real interest rates. 
Real interest rates and credit 
booms Granger-cause each 
other in both the short and long 
run. 
Credit booms 
(DCG) and GDP 
per capita (GDP) 
Short- and long-run 
bidirectional causality 
between GDP per capita and 
credit booms. 
GDP per capita and credit 
booms Granger-cause each 
other both in the short and long 
run. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has investigated the aggregate drivers of credit booms in South Africa using 
data for the period 1970-2016. We applied the ARDL bounds testing methodology and 
the error correction model. Previous studies on this subject cover developed and 
emerging markets with advanced financial markets while the literature on Africa, and 
in particular South Africa, is limited. The study leads to several important empirical 
findings. First, we found a strong persistent pattern of rapid credit growth in South 
Africa with the credit-to-GDP ratio peaking at 192 per cent in 2007. This also confirmed 
previous cross-country studies of Mendoza and Terrones (2012), Gozgor (2014), and 




South Africa. This was also confirmed by studies of Akinboade and Makina (2009), 
Fourie et al. (2011) and Akinsola and Ikhide (2018). Second, stock market prices and 
credit booms Granger-cause each other in the long run, while unidirectional causality 
runs from credit booms to stock market prices in the short run. This relationship is well 
supported in the literature on credit booms around the world (Booms & Are, 2004; 
Schularick & Taylor, 2012). 
 
Third, we established that mortgage loans Granger-cause credit booms in the long 
run, while we find directional causality in the short run. The long-run relationship 
between the growth of mortgage loans and rapid credit growth is supported by studies 
in other countries (Demyanyk & van Hemert, 2009; Drehmann, Borio & Tsatsaronis, 
2011). Empirical studies show that the growth of mortgage loans increases property 
prices and improves households’ wealth and subsequently increases the amount of 
credit to the private sector.  
 
Fourth, as expected, foreign capital flows induce credit booms in the long run while we 
found bidirectional causality in the short run. The long-run empirical results are 
important in explaining credit booms in a number of countries and South Africa is no 
exception. This finding supports Minsky’s assertion that the free movement of capital 
across countries will be the main source of excess liquidity which will fund rapid credit 
growth around the world. Studies on South Africa (see, for example, Terrones & 
Mendoza, 2012; Gozgor, 2014) also support this finding. The free movement of foreign 
capital across borders has already been experienced in this country. During the build-
up phase of the financial crisis, South Africa received a high influx of portfolio funds 
from international credit markets and some of these have found themselves within the 
banking sector and may be used to finance credit. 
 
Finally, both the real interest rates and GDP per capita have a bidirectional relationship 
with credit booms in South Africa. The link between domestic macroeconomic policies 
is consistent with the literature on credit booms. The low-interest-rate environment 




Elekdag and Wu (2011), Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2012), and Glaeser et al. 
(2012), support our findings on the role of interest rates in credit booms.  
 
The findings of this study point to important policy implications. The identification of 
the triggers of credit booms is important for policymakers in order to gauge and 
formulate appropriate strategies to reduce the risk of a crisis or, at least, limit its 
consequences in the economy. We argue policymakers to increase their surveillance 
of the banking sector, given the social and economic costs associated with bank 
failures. The Reserve Bank should develop early warning indicators to distinguish 
between good and good booms. In conclusion, we argue that regulatory authorities 
should not take a ‘wait-and-see’ approach in dealing with the credit booms, given the 
dilemma these present. South Africa needs to adopt a proactive macroprudential 









The severity of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 triggered a continuous 
investigation into the causes and possible solutions to avoid a similar crisis. Credit 
booms were at the epicentre of the financial crisis. Empirical assessments reveal that 
these credit booms present a dilemma for policymakers in a number of emerging and 
developing countries, and South Africa is no exception. Credit booms in some 
instances mean more finance that stimulates and supports investment and economic 
growth (Arestis & Demetriades, 1997; Levine, 2002; 2005; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008a; 
Abedifar, Hasan & Tarazi, 2016; Seven & Yetkiner 2016). In a country such as South 
Africa, it represents a welcome ‘catch-up’ from historic low levels to finance 
consumption and huge capital expenditure backlogs. 
 
In contrast, sustained credit booms can lead to vulnerabilities in the banking sector 
which can end in serious financial and economic disruptions (Pazarbasioglu, Johnsen, 
Hilbers & Ötker, 2005; Duenwald, Gueorguiev & Schaechter, 2007; Gorton, 2009; 
Foos et al., 2010; Festić et al., 2011; Soedarmono, Sitorus & Tarazi, 2017). The 
suggestion is that credit booms not supported by strong economic fundamentals and 
output growth may have a negative effect on the banking system (Ozili & Outa, 2017). 
According to the literature, credit booms signal poor underwriting standards in the 
economic upswing which ultimately affect credit risk in the downturns (Salas & 
Saurina, 2002; Berger & Udell, 2004; Jiménez & Saurina, 2006; Foos et al., 2010; Ozili 
& Outa, 2017). 
 
Bank loans represent the biggest assets in the South African banking sector and, as 




environment where bank credit is the dominant source of finance for households and 
firms. Credit risk, therefore, relates to the potential loss incurred by banks in the event 
that a counterparty fails to fulfil their contractual obligations on time and it is affected 
by systematic (external) and idiosyncratic (internal) factors (Yurdakul, 2014; 
Chatterjee, 2015; Pool, De Haan & Jacobs, 2015). 
 
The principal setting of the study is influenced by three conditions; first, there has been 
a rapid acceleration in credit growth over the past years in South Africa and this 
presents a potential risk in the banking sector in the event of a shock to the economy. 
Raising levels of indebtedness also presents a risk to the banking system as predicted 
by the Minsky theory of financial crises. There is a high probability of greater loan 
defaults (accelerated increase in unsecured credit) in the economy in the event of a 
shock to the system. Second, the performance of the South African economy has 
remained subdued over the years with the economy unable to attract substantial 
investment and create adequate employment. Available literature (Mian & Sufi, 2018; 
Coimbra & Rey, 2018) shows that the poor performance of the economy is a trigger 
for credit risk. Third, the performance of most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) poses 
a serious default risk to South African banks who have extended significant amounts 
of loans to them. 
  
Given the above, the intention of this study is to empirically determine whether 
excessive credit growth signals future vulnerabilities in the banking sector in South 
Africa. We answer this question by assessing the growth-risk nexus in bank lending, 
using annual time series data from 1992-2017. Based on the literature in the 
subsequent sections, the study includes the business cycle as an intermittent variable 
to reinforce the growth-risk argument made in this study. Literature shows that the 
business cycle40 is an important factor for both credit growth and credit risk 
management (see, for example, Aydemir & Guloglu, 2017; Mian & Sufi, 2018; Coimbra 
& Rey, 2018).  
                                                           




The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 explores relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature on credit booms, credit risk and the business cycle, 
and Section 4.3 provides an overview of the credit market in South Africa. Section 4.4 
is the methodology section, which presents the estimation techniques and the 
empirical analysis, while Section 4.5 provides policy recommendations and concludes 
the study.  
 
4.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
This section looks at the empirical literature on the importance of credit risk 
management, how banks define credit risk, and the main factors driving credit risk 
around the world. A number of studies have attempted to establish the growth-risk 
nexus in bank lending. Importantly, most studies define their preferred measure of 
credit risk, since there is no single method preferred in the literature. In this chapter, 
we have relied on existing literature on financial system stress testing (Moretti, Stolz, 
& Swinburne, 2008; Havrylchyk, 2010; Oros & Salisteanu, 2015; Pool et al., 2015; 
Curcio, de Simone & Gallo, 2017) and have adopted bank loan loss provisions (LLPs) 
as a proxy for credit risk in South Africa. LLPs are funds set aside to act as shock 
absorbers for current and future loan losses (Cummings & Durani, 2016). In other 
words, LLPs are used to mitigate risk by absorbing losses emanating from their bank 
loan portfolios. LLPs are an important component of the banking sector since they 
provide sensitive information to a wider audience. The use of LLPs has gained 
popularity in stress testing programmes since 2007-2008 (see, for example, Moretti et 
al., 2008; Havrylchyk, 2010; Oros & Salisteanu, 2015; Pool et al., 2015; Curcio et al., 
2017). 
  
Importantly, due to changes in reporting requirements by the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB), data on nonperforming loans (alternative proxy) in South Africa is not 
available spanning our study period. LLPs can either be procyclical or countercyclical 
depending on whether they are backward-looking (non-discretionary) or forward-
looking (discretionary). Backward-looking LLPs take into consideration past events, 
such as the number of problem loans, with LLPs increasing or decreasing during 




world (Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2012; Pool et al., 2015; Soedarmono, Pramono & Tarazi, 
2017).  
 
Forward-looking LLPs are built up in the upswing for use during downswings, 
countercyclical in nature and based on the expected loan default risk over the business 
cycle (Bikker & Matzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008; Cummings & Durrani, 
2016). Importantly, since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) through the Basel III accord has recommended the 
use of forward-looking credit risk models, arguing that backward-looking models are 
outdated and exacerbate procyclicality. BCBS’s argument is that banks tend to relax 
credit standards during upswings due to their positive anticipation of economic and 
future fortunes and hence increase the probability of default in the downswings (Berger 
& Udell, 2004; Wezel, 2010; Bushman & Williams, 2012). According to Soedarmono, 
Pramono and Tarazi (2017), the banking sector becomes risk-averse during 
downturns and limits credit provision which in turns dries up liquidity in the market and 
deepens the economic recession. For this reason, the Basell III framework 
recommendation is that banks should build countercyclical capital buffers during 
upswings for use during bad times to avoid credit restrictions during downswings. 
 
On the theoretical front, various arguments are presented on the importance of banks 
in financial system stability and economic development (see Levine, 2002; Abedifar et 
al., 2016). With the established role of banks, a crisis in all or part of the system may 
lead to significant costs to the economy. Almost all participants lose out when this 
happens. Shareholders lose their equity holdings, while depositors risk losing all or 
part of their savings and the costs of portfolio reallocation. Bank creditors may miss 
their payments, while bank-dependent borrowers risk losing funding and potentially 
face difficulties in finding alternative sources. According to Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta 
(2002), bank failures may develop into a crisis, resulting in an unanticipated 
contraction in the stock of money and subsequently a recession. Banks are deposit-
taking financial institutions whose liabilities are short-term, while their assets are 
mainly short- and long-term loans to households and firms, hence banks are insolvent 





According to literature (Bonfim, 2009; Ali & Daly, 2010; Castro, 2013; Chatterjee, 2015; 
Pool et al., 2015), ex-post credit default risk is the biggest challenge facing the banking 
sector. Banks use various models to minimise this risk, by, for example, screening 
loan applications, diversifying loan portfolios (lending to customers with different risk 
profiles) or requesting collateral. Screening borrowers enables a bank to predetermine 
(ex-ante) profitable and non-profitable projects. It also enables profitable projects to 
be funded (ex-post). However, theory predicts that diversification does not necessarily 
eliminate credit default risk, especially in banks that lend to certain non-performing 
economic sectors in developing countries. Collateral is also expensive to establish and 
monitor, and its value is typically subject to volatility (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 
1998). 
 
Importantly, bank insolvency may occur when a wave of loan losses (NPLs) occur, 
especially when they are more than reserve requirements and equity cushions 
(Mishkin, 1996). A systemic crisis may occur because of a significant percentage of 
loan losses relative to bank capital. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, p. 85) 
explain that: “shocks that adversely affect the economic performance of bank 
borrowers and whose impact cannot be reduced through risk diversification should be 
positively correlated with systemic banking crises”. In this regard, shocks are positively 
associated with systemic banking crises and banks that are not adequately capitalised 
are more vulnerable to shocks. According to Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the decline in asset prices, cyclical output decline and 
deterioration in the terms of trade are some of the shocks that cause loan losses and 
subsequently bank crises.  
 
Since bank assets consist of long- and short-term loans at fixed interest rates, sudden 
adjustments in interest rates affect banks’ return on assets41. Banks are exposed in 
instances where this change in the interest rate cannot be quickly transferred to 
                                                           





borrowers. Mishkin (1996) asserts that short-term interest rate increases may be a 
likely source of systemic risk. He opined that the most recent banking problems in the 
U.S. were associated with sudden adjustments in the level of interest rates. 
  
On the empirical front, there are burgeoning studies that demonstrate that during 
economic upswings, banks underestimate credit risk and accelerate credit provision, 
while overestimating credit risk during downswings and therefore reducing credit 
growth. This credit risk management practice accelerates economic recession i.e. the 
procyclicality of credit provision and risk management (Berger & Udell, 2004; 
Soedarmono, Sitorus & Tarazi, 2017a; Ozili & Outa, 2017). 
 
For example, Bikker and Matzemakers (2005) looked at 800 banks in 29 OECD 
countries and confirmed the dependency of provisioning behaviour on changes in the 
macroeconomic performance while also establishing that banks increase provisioning 
during downturns and decrease them during upturns.  
 
Some studies also found that banks’ behaviour reflected developments in the business 
cycle, and established that excessive credit growth in the upswing affected bank 
stability for years ahead, for example, 3-4 years in Spain (Salas & Saurina, 2002), 3-
4 years on 16,000 banks across 16 major countries (Foos et al., 2010) 2-3 years in 
Australia (Hess, Grimes & Holmes, 2009), and in central and eastern Europe (Festić 
et al., 2011). In particular, Salas and Saurina (2002) found that excessive loan growth 
resulted in high loan losses 2-3 years into the future. 
 
Other studies (for example, Pool et al., 2015; Soedarmono, Pramono & Tarazi, 2017; 
Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2012; Ozili & Outa, 2017) have demonstrated the procyclicality of 
backward-looking credit risk management practices around the world. For example, in 
12 OECD countries, Pool et al. (2015) established that LLPs were mostly procyclical 
and backward-looking. They argued that LLPs had a negative effect on credit provision 
and strengthened business cycle volatility. Using a sample of Islamic banks, 




‘incurred loan loss model’ (I-LLM42) to the new ‘expected loan loss model’ (E-LLM43) 
within Islamic banks, banks’ provisioning behaviour remained procyclical, with 
macroeconomic factors playing a significant role. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) 
confirmed that non-discretionary LLPs amplified banks’ lending fluctuations in 
developed and emerging markets (Europe, Japan, US, Central and South America, 
and South and East Asia) with a stronger effect on emerging countries. Recently, Ozili 
and Outa (2017) observed that LLPs were procyclical and exacerbated a recession if 
unanticipated. Ozile and Outa (2017) gave an example of an increase in LLPs to 
counter the effects of credit losses during the financial crisis of 2007-09 in the US. 
 
Interestingly, another group of studies suggests that credit risk management through 
LLPs must be related to the credit cycle (Packer & Zhu, 2012; López, Tenjo & Zárate, 
2014; Cummings & Durani, 2016). These studies opined that credit risk in downturns 
was a direct manifestation of rapid credit growth during upswings. They also 
highlighted that banks should be mindful of the underlying risk built up during the 
episodes of rapid credit growth and subsequently build up LLPs for use during 
downturns as recommended by the BCBS. In particular, López et al. (2014) in 
Colombia found that bank loans advanced during rapid credit upswings had a high 
default risk compared to loans granted during downswings. In Australia, Cummings 
and Durani’s (2016) study found evidence of countercyclical buffer provisions in more 
than 66 per cent of banks in operation. Furthermore, they found that lending growth 
was a major deciding factor in the banks’ credit risk assessment models.  
 
                                                           
42 According to the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB), in the incurred loan loss model (I-LLM), LLPs are set aside after NPLs 
have been realised. The I-LLM is backward-looking and does not enable banks to create 
provisions during economic booms, which in turn triggers procyclical effects on credit growth. 
43 According to the FASB and IASB, in the E-LLM, LLPs are created prior to loans being 
granted, allowing banks to have sufficient LLP reserves in good times to enable lending 





Despite the growing literature on the growth-risk nexus, unfortunately, only limited 
studies focus on rapid credit growth and credit risk in developing countries and in 
particular Africa (see, for example, Ikhide, 2003; Akinboade & Makina, 2009; 
Havrylchyk, 2010; Ozili & Outa, 2017). Ozili and Outa (2017) established that African 
banks’ provisioning behaviour was procyclical and reflected the business cycle, and 
that in some instances LLPs were used for income smoothing. The two studies in 
South Africa, Akinboade and Makina (2009) and Havrylchyk (2010), established the 
procyclicality of bank lending and LLPs. For example, Akinboade and Makina (2009) 
analysed the linkage between bank lending behaviour and the business cycle, where 
they found a link between procyclical behaviour in bank lending and LLPs. Later, 
Havrylchyk (2010) appreciated the importance of the LLP in stress testing by including 
it as a proxy in her study. Havrylchyk (2010) appreciated the importance of LLPs in 
stress testing the South African financial system and opined that the high level of 
mortgage loans to the private sector exposed the banks to risk associated with 
changes in interest rates and property prices. Importantly, the results of these studies 
in South Africa are consistent with the notion that lending practices and credit risk 
management tend to be procyclical over the business cycle. This implies that rapid 
credit growth amplifies the build-up of credit risk in the banking system. 
 
This study follows that of Havrylchyk (2010) on South Africa; however, two major 
drawbacks are worth noting regarding the Havrylchyk (2010) study: (i) various events 
have occurred which have since changed the dynamics in the South African banking 
sector and the economy. For example, the credit-to-GDP ratio has remained above 
160 per cent, there has been an increase in unsecured credit, top commercial banks 
have been twice downgraded and subdued economic performance over the past 10 
years; (ii) the findings might no longer be relevant since it only utilised data over the 
period 1994 to 2007: this period does not cover the post-crisis years. In 2016, South 




political and policy uncertainty. The country continues to face numerous structural 
imbalances, i.e. high unemployment, poverty, shortage of skills, inequality44, et cetera.  
 
4.3 OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CREDIT MARKET 
The South African financial sector is one of the most advanced and well-structured on 
the African continent (Odhiambo, 2009). The sector has undergone a number of 
changes over the past three decades, including the introduction of the Bank Act, 1990 
(Act No. 94 of 1990), the National Credit Act, 2005 (No. 34 of 2005) (NCA), and the 
regulation of credit provision through the National Credit Regulator45. Regulatory 
institutions such as the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), Financial Services Board 
(FSB), National Credit Regulator (NCR) and Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), 
among others, oversee the operations of the financial system in South Africa. In 
particular, the NCA is concerned with reforms in overdrafts, credit cards, instalment 
agreements, micro-loan services, et cetera. These reforms were necessitated by the 
failure of financial institutions to exercise due consideration in the provision of credit 
specifically in the wake of increasing debt levels in the country. It is envisaged that 
these new reforms will foster changes in financial institutions’ lending behaviour 
(Chipeta & Mbululu, 2012). 
 
As discussed above, this study uses LLPs as a proxy for credit risk in South Africa. 
Figure 4.1 presents the growth rates of total bank loans and LLPs46 from 1992-2017. 
We observe that in some instances an increase in credit growth is accompanied by an 
increase in LLPs in the following year. For example, during the 1990s, credit growth 
                                                           
44 These are systematic risk factors (i.e. changes in the macroeconomic factors, economic 
policies and political changes) which often affect credit risk in the economy (Yurdakul, 2014; 
Chatterjee, 2015; Pool, De Haan & Jacobs, 2015). 
45 These changes seek to protect private and collective interest within the South African credit 
market. 





averaged 15 per cent while LLPs grew by 24.4 per cent. Interestingly, between 2000 
and 2007, credit growth accelerated (18.2 per cent) owing to good economic fortunes, 
while LLPs (5.5%) grew at a moderate rate. However, when credit growth declined 
from a peak of 28.15 per cent in 2007, LLPs suddenly jumped from 30 per cent growth 
in 2007 to a peak of 122 per cent in 2008, while credit growth decreased from 22.4 per 
cent to 14.2 per cent. We also note that, since 2009, bank credit growth has averaged 
around 5.7 per cent while LLP growth has hovered around 7.8 per cent. Subdued 
economic conditions during the past decade have forced local banks to slightly reduce 
the credit growth in the private sector as depicted in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Total loan growth and LLP growth in South Africa (1992-2017) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
As discussed in the literature above, credit risk is linked to the business cycle, and in 
Figure 4.2 we attempt to establish the link between the business cycle and LLPs in 
South Africa. LLPs seem to respond to business cycle fluctuations, i.e. during the 
upswings, LLPs decline, while during economic downswings, LLPs increase 
significantly. For example, between 2003 and 2006, when the business cycle indicator 
















































































the business cycle indicator was negative, LLP growth averaged 47 per cent. 
Therefore, our observations are in line with LLP studies in general (for example, Pool 
et al., 2015; Ozili & Outa, 2017) and in particular, the Akinboade and Makina (2009) 
study that established that bank LLPs were largely driven by business cycle 
fluctuations in South Africa (see Figure 4.2).  
 
 
Figure 4.2: LLP growth and the business cycle 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
The rapid increase in credit provision has also seen an increase in household debt, as 
shown by the debt to disposable income ratio in Figure 4.3. The ratio has remained 
above 65 per cent since 2005, reaching a peak of 86 per cent in 2008. According to 
First National Bank (2014), the household debt-service risk index was at 6.06 points 
(high-risk range), which was 0.56 points higher than the tolerance range of 5.5. 
Mortgage loans contribute to the largest share of household debt to disposable 
income. According to Statistics South Africa, mortgage loans47 contributed 54 per cent 
of total loans in 2009, 7 per cent in 2010 and 43 per cent in 2016 respectively.  
                                                           















































































Figure 4.3: Household debt-to-income ratio 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
Although the BCBS has recommended the use of forward-looking credit risk 
management models since 2007-2009, statistics show that credit risk management in 
South Africa still exhibits backward-looking (non-discretionary) characteristics. As 
shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, prior to the financial crisis, bank lending appetite was at 
its highest, characterised by high risk-taking by banks with the debt-to-income ratio 
rapidly increasing from 2004 onwards. However, the post-crisis years saw credit risk 
increasing, thus compelling banks to relook at their risk appetite and credit provision 
strategies. 
  
4.4  EMPIRICAL TECHNIQUES AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.4.1 Data sources and definition of variables 
In this chapter, we used annual time-series data obtained from the South African 









































































4.4.1.1 Definition of variables 
4.4.1.1.1 Bank credit risk (CR) 
Credit risk in this study is proxied by LLPs which have been used in various prominent 
studies such as Salas and Saurina (2002), Pool et al. (2015), and Cummings and 
Durrani (2016), among others. 
4.4.1.1.2 Business Cycle Indicator (BC) 
In the literature, the build-up of bank systemic risk is sometimes driven by business 
cycle fluctuations in a number of countries (see, for example, López et al., 2014; Ozili 
& Outa, 2017, among others). During economic upswings, banks increase credit to 
households and firms because loan defaults are relatively low. In this period, banks 
even issue loans to low-quality borrowers with the hope of maximising returns. 
However, during the downturn, loan defaults begin to surface since households and 
firms are unable to service their outstanding debt. We use the annual Composite 
Coincident Business Cycle Index published by the South African Reserve Bank. This 
indicator reflects South Africa’s aggregate economic activity and includes indicators of 
sales, income, employment and production in the economy. Akinsola and Ikhide 
(2018) argued that this was the ideal indicator of the business cycle in South Africa 
compared to real GDP growth.  
4.4.1.1.3 Total loans (CRED) 
Relying on Foos et al. (2010) and Festić et al. (2011), we included total loans to the 
private sector as a proxy for credit booms to establish the growth-risk nexus in bank 
lending. The literature reviewed here shows that excessive credit growth affects bank 
credit risk management through LLPs. According to Keeton (1999) and Castro (2013), 
excessive credit growth provides a signal that banks are relaxing their credit 
standards, which ultimately reveals the low quality of loans in circulation.  
 
4.4.2 Empirical model specification 
In order to establish the growth-risk nexus in bank lending in South Africa, we apply 
the robust autoregressive-distributed lags (ARDL) bounds testing procedure by 




preferred because of its superior qualities over other traditional cointegration 
methods48 and is suitable for small sample sizes such as the one used in this study. 
This approach can also be applied irrespective of the regressors’ order of integration 
and allows variables to have different lag lengths. Furthermore, an error correction 
model (ECM) can be derived through a simple linear transformation, integrating both 
short- and long-run adjustment without losing long-run information. The estimated 
ARDL (p, q) bounds test model is as follows:  
 
∆𝐶𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
∆𝐶𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚1
𝑖=1
∆BC𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1
∆CRED𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐶𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡−1+ 1𝑡 
     (4.1) 
 
∆𝐵𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘2
𝑖=1
∆BC𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚2
𝑖=1
∆CR𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=1
∆CRED𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡−1+ 2𝑡 
    (4.2) 
 
∆𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘3
𝑖=1
∆CRED𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚3
𝑖=1
∆CR𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛3
𝑖=1
∆BC𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝐵𝐶𝑡−1+ 3𝑡 
     (4.3)  
where CR = bank credit risk; BC = business cycle indicator; CRED = total credit to the 
private sector; k, m, n = optimal lag length; 1𝑡 − 3𝑡 are white noise error terms; and 
∆ = first difference operator. We employed the bounds test procedure based on the 
joint F-statistic (Wald test). We used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to 
determine the lag length of models because of its superiority to other information 
criteria i.e. the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). The null 
hypothesis of no cointegration between the variables in Equations 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 is 
𝐻𝑂: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 0 against the alternative hypothesis of no cointegration, which is 
𝐻1: 𝛽1 ≠ 𝛽2 ≠ 𝛽3 ≠ 0. Narayan (2005) and Pesaran et al. (2001) each present two sets 
                                                           
48 Cointegration methodologies such as Engle and Granger, Johansen, Johansen and Juselius 




of critical values for small and large samples. The lower bound values assume that 
ARDL variables are I(0), while the upper bound values assume variables are I(1). The 
study proceeded to determine whether cointegration exists using three scenarios, as 
follows: (1) the study rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration if the calculated F-
statistic is greater than the I(1) critical values; (2) the study does not reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration if the calculated F-statistic is lower than the I(0) critical 
values; and (3) there is inconclusive inference if the calculated F-statistic is between 
I(0) and the I(1) critical values. 
 
4.4.3 ECM-based Granger causality test  
After establishing the existence of long-run relationships in Equations 4.1 – 4.3 using 
the ARDL bounds test, we proceeded to determine Granger-causality. Relying on 
Cherni and Jouini (2017), we applied the following Granger-causality models: 
∆𝐶𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
∆𝐶𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚1
𝑖=1
∆BC𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1
∆CRED𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜑1𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 4𝑡 
    (4.4) 
∆𝐵𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘2
𝑖=1
∆𝐵𝐶𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚2
𝑖=1
∆CR𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=1
∆CRED𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜑2𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 5𝑡 
     (4.5) 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘3
𝑖=1
∆𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚3
𝑖=1
∆CR𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛3
𝑖=1
∆BC𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜑3𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 6𝑡 
                                                                (4.6) 
In Equations 4.4 to 4.6, we included the lagged error correction term (𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1) 
generated from the long-run relationship, and 𝜑1  𝑡𝑜 𝜑3 as the coefficients of correction 
in disequilibrium. 
 
4.4.4 Nonlinear Autoregressive-Distributed Lags (NARDL)  
After establishing Granger-causality, we proceeded to verify the nature of the 
cointegration relationship between credit risk, business cycle and credit booms 




using Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo’s (2014) nonlinear ARDL model. The NARDL 
methodology is a recent extension of the Pesaran et al. (2001) ARDL bounds 
approach and takes into consideration nonlinear and asymmetric cointegration 
between variables while also differentiating between short- and long-run impacts of 
exogenous variables on the endogenous variables. 
  
Equation 4.1 above assumes linearity and symmetry in the way credit risk is related to 
credit booms and the business cycle. However, according to Shin et al. (2014), this 
might not necessarily be true because there is a possibility of nonlinearity and 
asymmetry in the way credit risk is related to credit booms and the business cycle. 
Given this, it is important to capture the non-linear and asymmetric cointegration 
between credit risk, credit booms and the business cycle. We transform Equation 4.1 
into a NARDL Equation 4.7 as follows: 
∆𝐶𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
∆𝐶𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑚1
𝑖=1
∆BC𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1










      (4.7) 
where 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛿𝑖 , 𝛾𝑖 = short-run coefficients; 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3, 𝜃4 = long-run parameters. The 
difference between the short-run coefficients 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛿𝑖  and 𝛾𝑖 measure the impact of the 
business cycle (BC) and credit booms (CRED) on credit risk (CR), while the long-run 
coefficients 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3, 𝜃4 measure the time and reaction speed towards equilibrium. We 
applied the Wald test procedure in order to establish the long-run asymmetry (𝜃 =
𝜃+ = 𝜃−) and short-run asymmetry (𝜆 = 𝜆+ = 𝜆− ; = 𝛿+ = 𝛿− ; 𝛾 = 𝛾 + = 𝛾 −) for the 
variables in Equation 4.7. We further applied the bounds test procedure that is based 
on the joint F-statistic (Wald test). 
 
To establish the effects of positive and negative changes of the regressors, we 
proceeded to decompose them into their positive and negative components 𝑋𝑡
+ and 
𝑋𝑡














     (4.8) 
𝑋𝑡








     (4.9) 
where X represents the regressors 𝐵𝐶t and 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷t. 
To determine the presence of an asymmetric long-run relationship, we employed the 
Shin et al. (2014) bounds test which is a joint test for all lagged regressors. Banerjee, 
Dolado and Mestre (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2001) each present critical values, i.e. 
t-statistics and the F-statistic, respectively. Banerjee et al.’s (1998) null hypothesis 
t-statistic test is HO: θ = 0 while the alternative hypothesis is 𝐻1 : θ < 0, while Pesaran 
et al.’s (2001) null hypothesis is HO: θ
+ = θ− = θ = 0. Importantly, the rejection of the 
null hypothesis for both the t-statistic and F-statistic signifies the presence of a long-
run relationship among variables in Equation 4.7. 
 
4.4.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.4.5.1 Stationarity tests 
The study employed three traditional unit root tests: PP (Phillips & Perron, 1988), 
KPSS (Kwiatkowski, Philips, Schmidt & Shin, 1992) and ADF (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) 
in order to verify that the variables in the equations are not integrated of order 2 (l(2)). 
The empirical results of the unit root test in levels and first differences are presented 
in Table 4.1 and the results show that there are no variables that are I(2). Simply put, 
most of the variables are stationary after first difference. 
  
We applied the Zivot and Andrews’s (ZA) breakpoint unit root test to confirm the results 
presented in Table 4.1. The ZA tests take into consideration the presence of 




fact that the ADF, PP and KPSS tests tend to be biased towards the null hypothesis 
in the presence of a structural break in the series. The breakpoint test also provides 
an insight into the possibility of a shift in the vector of cointegration (Charfeddine & 
Khediri, 2016). As shown in Table 4.2, the ZA test confirms that there are no variables 
that are I(2). In Table 4.2, the Zivot and Andrews (ZA) unit root test results take into 
account the presence of endogenous structural breaks and show that the majority of 
variables are I(2); however, the test has identified structural breaks for every series. 
The breaks differ slightly from one series to the other; however, the majority of breaks 
occurred around the 2000s, mainly 2007, 2008 and 2009. The outcome and 
occurrence of these breaks are not surprising since most coincide with the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. In this regard, the ZA test results are consistent with the 
financial crisis literature that highlighted the financial and economic disruptions 




Table 4.1: Standard unit root tests 
Variable Model ADF PP KPSS 
Lag 𝝉𝝉, 𝝉𝝁 , 𝝉 𝚽𝟑 , 𝚽𝟏 BW 𝝉𝝉, 𝝉𝝁, 𝝉 BW 𝝉𝝉, 𝝉𝝁 
CR Intercept 0 -2.639 4.529  2 -2.622  1 0.158* 
Intercept and Trend 0 -3.457* 7.303  2 -3.451*  15 0.126* 
None 0 -1.189   0 -1.189   
DCR Intercept 0 -6.118*** 37.434***  12 -11.406***  7 0.227*** 
Intercept and Trend 0 -5.927*** 17.905***  13 -11.859***  7 0.150* 
None 0 -6.289***   12 -11.867***   
CRED Intercept 0 -1.788 3.197*  1 -1.977  3 0.313*** 
Intercept and Trend 0 -2.417 3.215*  1 -2.578  2 0.081*** 
None 0 -1.102   0 -1.102   
 
DCRED 
Intercept 0 -4.349*** 18.922***  2 -4.336**  1 0.084*** 
Intercept and Trend 0 -4.272** 9.139***  2 -4.257**  1 0.044*** 
None 0 -4.405***   1 -4.407***   
BC Intercept 0 -2.669 3.462  2 -3.078  2 0.171* 
Intercept and Trend 0 -3.150 5.567*  2 -3.552*  0 0.083*** 
none 0 -2.094   0 -2.094   
DBC Intercept 0 -5.090*** 25.917***  6 -6.403***  4 0.164*** 
Intercept and Trend 0 -5.007*** 12.559**  5 -6.125***  4 0.095*** 




Notes: Superscripts ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.  
 Critical values for ADF are as follows: with intercept - 3.724 (1%), -2.986 (5%) and -2.632 (10%); Intercept and trend -4.374 (1%), -
3.603 (5%) and -3.238 (10%); with no intercept and no trend -2.660 (1%), -1.955 (5%) and -1.609 (10%).   
 PP critical values are: with intercept, -3.724 (1%), -2.986 (5%) and -2.632 (10%); with intercept and trend, -4.374 (1%), -3.603 (5%) 
and -3.238 (10%); with no intercept and no trend -2.660 (1%), -1.955 (5%) and -1.609 (10%).  
 Critical values for KPSS tests: with intercept, 0.739 (1%), 0.463 (5%) and 0.347 (10%); with intercept and trend, 0.216 (1%), 0.146 
(5%) and 0.119 (10%). 




Table 4.2: Zivot-Andrews unit root tests accounting for structural breaks: 1992-
2017 
Variables Model Lag t-stat Breakpoint 
CR Intercept 0 -10.286*** 2008 
Intercept & Trend 5 -7.280*** 2007 
DCR Intercept 3 -8.445*** 2008 
Intercept & Trend 3 -7.581*** 2008 
CRED Intercept 3 -3.889 2013 
Intercept & Trend 2 -4.234 2003 
DCRED Intercept 0 -5.634*** 2009 
Intercept & Trend 2 -4.234 2003 
BC Intercept 0 -4.226* 2009 
Intercept & Trend 3 -3.499 2003 
DBC Intercept 3 -6.194*** 2009 
Intercept & Trend 0 -5.555*** 1996 
Notes: Superscripts ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 The ZA critical values with intercept only -4.226 (1%), -4.443 (5%) and -4.193 (10%) 
and critical values with intercept and trend are -5.347 (1%), -4.859 (5%) and -4.607 (10%). 
  
 The test selected a maximum of 5 lags. 
 
 
4.4.5.2 Cointegration test: ARDL bounds test 
After confirming that our variables are not I(2), we proceeded to establish the ARDL 
bounds test. Table 4.3 shows the results of the bound F-test for Equations 4.1, 4.2 
and 4.3 when Credit Risk, Business Cycle and Credit Booms are modelled as 
dependent variables. The ARDL bounds test confirms the presence of long-run 
relationships in all equations, as depicted by the calculated F-statistic that is greater 
than the 1 per cent and 5 per cent of both Pesaran et al. (2001) and Narayan’s (2005) 
critical values. In other words, Table 4.3 confirms the rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration in Equations 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3; therefore, a long-run relationship 
exists between variables Credit Risk, Business Cycle and Credit Booms when they 





Table 4.3: Bounds F-test for cointegration 
Dependent Variable Function F-Test Statistic 
CR CR (BC, CRED) 6.501*** 
BC BC(CR, CRED) 4.531** 
CRED CRED (CR, BC) 7.142*** 
CRITICAL VALUES 
 1% 5% 10% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Pesaran et al. (2001) 4.13 5.00 3.10 3.87 2.63 3.35 
Narayan (2005) 5.15 6.26 3.53 4.42 2.91 3.69 
Notes: Superscripts ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 Critical values for the bounds test for 30 observations are taken from Narayan (2005) 
case II: restricted intercept and no trend, and Pesaran et al. (2001) critical value 
table: restricted intercept and no trend.  
 
 
We proceeded to test the variables in Equations 4.1 to 4.3 for serial correlation. Table 
4.4 shows the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test of serial correlation and the 
results confirm that the models do not suffer from serial correlation.  
 
Table 4.4: Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test  
CR F-statistics 0.120 Prob. F(2,13) 0.882 
Obs*R2 0.438 Pro. Chi-square(2) 0.803 
BC  F-statistics 0.424 Prob. F(2,6) 0.672 
Obs*R2 2.726 Pro. Chi-square(2) 0.255 
CRED F-statistics 0.178 Prob. F(2,13) 0.838 
Obs*R2 0.166 Pro. Chi-square(2) 0.734 
Source: Eviews calculations 
 
4.4.5.3 ECM-based Granger causality test results 
Once we had confirmed the presence of cointegration in Equations 4.1 to 4.3, we 
proceeded to establish the Granger-causality between variables when Credit Risk, 




presence of cointegration in Equations 4.1 to 4.3 indicates the possibility of Granger-
causality in at least one direction, we still needed to run the Granger-causality test to 
confirm the exact direction of causality among variables. The results of the short- and 
long-run non-causality test are reported in Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5: Short- and long-run Granger non-causality test 
Dependent 
Variable 
Causal direction F-statistic (Wald 
Test) 
ECT t-statistic  R2 
Credit Risk 
(CR) 
Business cycle (BC) → Credit 
Risk (CR) 
0.468(0.757) -1.329(-4.014)*** 0.69 
Business 
cycle (BC) 
Credit Risk (CR) → Business 
cycle (BC) 
6.091(0.015)** -1.323(-7.992)*** 0.89 
Credit Risk 
(CR) 
Total loan growth (CRED) → 
Credit Risk (CR) 
6.097(0.011)** -1.301(-5.405)*** 0.69 
Credit boom 
(CRED) 
Credit Risk (CR) → Credit 
boom (CRED) 
5.447(0.0167)** -0.044(-5.851)*** 0.71 
 
The empirical findings in Table 4.5 show a long run bi-directional causality between 
credit risk and the business cycle as shown by a negative and statistically significant 
(1 per cent level) coefficient of the lagged error correction term (ECT). However, in the 
short run, causality only runs from credit risk to the business cycle, as confirmed by a 
statistically significant F-statistic of the Wald test. Table 4.5 also shows a unidirectional 
causality between credit risk and credit boom, both in the short and long run. The long- 
and short-run causality is supported by a negative and statistically significant (1 per 
cent level) coefficient of the lagged ECT and a statistically significant F-statistic 
respectively. Table 4.6 below provides a summary of causality based on the findings 
in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.6: Summary of causality 
Variables Direction of causality Conclusion 
Credit Risk (CR) and 
Business Cycle (BC) 
Long-run bidirectional causality 
between credit risk and the 
business cycle and short-run 
unidirectional causality running 
from credit risk to the business 
cycle. 
 Credit risk and business cycle 
Granger-cause each other in the 
long run. 
 Credit risk Granger-causes the 




Credit Risk (CR) and 
Credit Boom (CRED) 
Long- and short-run bidirectional 
causality  
 Credit risk and credit booms 
Granger-cause each other in the 
long run. 
 Credit boom and credit risk 
Granger-cause each other in the 
short run. 
 
4.4.5.4 NARDL bounds test: results 
Having confirmed the presence of cointegration in our variables using the Pesaran et 
al. (2001) ARDL bounds test, we proceeded with Shin et al.’s (2014) NARDL model. 
Table 4.7 presents the NARDL short- and long-run cointegration results for Equation 
4.7. First of all, the NARDL results confirm the ARDL findings that there is a long-run 
relationship between credit risk, business cycle and credit boom for the period 1992-
2017 in South Africa. This is confirmed by the calculated F-statistic of 56.99061 which 
is significant at 1 per cent and greater than the Pesaran et al. (2001) critical values. 
  
Secondly, the business cycle and credit booms explain about 99.9 per cent (R2 = 
0.999) of credit risk in South Africa. The ECT in the model explains the slight variation 
(0.01 per cent) in credit risk. The model does not suffer from serial autocorrelation 
(χSC
2 ) or heteroscedasticity problem (χHET
2 ), and the functional form of the model is 
properly specified (χFF
2 ) (see Table 4.7). The findings indicate that the empirical results 
are reliable and consistent.  
 
Third, the short- and long-run WALD tests (WLR and WSR) confirm the significance of 
asymmetry at 1 per cent. Therefore, the NARDL F-statistic of 56.99 suggests that there 
is a long-run asymmetric relationship between credit risk, business cycle and credit 








Table 4.7: Short- and long-run cointegration results 
Variable Coefficient Prob 
Long Run 
Constant 89.285*** 0.009 
LCRt−1 -10.107*** 0.009 
BCt−1
+  22.763*** 0.011 
BCt−1
−  -34.449*** 0.012 
LCREDt−1
+  -0.006*** 0.010 
LCREDt−1
−  -0.539 0.290 
Short Run 
∆LCRt−1 7.875*** 0.010 
∆LCRED+ 0.262*** 0.015 
ΔLCREDt−2
+  -0.245*** 0.020 
ΔBCt −1
−  6.846*** 0.006 
∆CREDt−2
−  0.161*** 0.015 
∆BC− 38.987*** 0.012 
∆LCREDt−1
+  -0.289*** 0.007 
∆BC+ 1.287 0.160 
ΔBCt −1
+  -13.049*** 0.009 
ΔLCREDt−1
−  0.400*** 0.009 
∆LCRt−2 5.839*** 0.010 
∆LCRED− -0.232*** 0.010 
∆BC+t−2 -4.800*** 0.010 
ΔBCt −2
−  -7.164*** 0.013 
 
R2 0.999  
Adjusted R2 0.989  
Pesaran et al. (2001) 56.990***  
χSC
2  0.218 (0.721) 
χHET
2  0.583 (0.793) 
χFF
2  0.531 (0.598) 
WLR,BC 73.094[0.013]*** WSR,BC 67.574[0.014]*** 




4.4.5.4.1 Long run  
The NARDL results reveal that, in the long run, a positive shock to the business cycle 
has a positive effect on credit risk in South Africa. This is supported by a positive and 
significant coefficient of 22.76. This shows that any positive developments in the 
business cycle positively change the financial well-being of households and firms, 
which helps increase the probability of repayment of credit. 
 
The negative shocks during a business cycle have a negative impact on credit risk in 
South Africa. This is supported by a negative and significant coefficient of 34.449. As 
demonstrated in the literature (Borio & Lowe, 2001; Pederzoli & Torricelli, 2005; 
Jiménez & Saurina, 2006), the business cycle plays an important role in credit risk. 
Rapid credit growth in the upswings manifests in credit risk in the downswings. The 
results show that negative shocks have a higher and more pronounced effect on credit 
risk than positive shocks. The long-run findings on the relationship between business 
cycle and credit risk validate the fact that the occurrence of nonperforming loans in 
South Africa were linked to the performance of the economy. We demonstrated in 
Figure 1.4 that nonperforming loans in South Africa increased during the downswing 
while they decreased during the upswing years. Drawing on these findings, related to 
the business cycle, we advise banks not to compromise their credit standards by 
accelerating credit provision in the upswing. Such lending practices negatively affect 
the performance of bank loans in the downswings. 
  
In the long run, positive shocks during credit booms have a negative effect on credit 
risk. This is supported by a negative and significant coefficient (-0.006***). This 
suggests that any excessive credit growth has a negative effect on credit risk. This 
finding is not surprising for South Africa, as rapid credit growth has created high levels 
of over-indebtedness that have manifested during the past 10-12 years, with the debt 
ratio peaking at 85.7% in 2008 and averaging around 75% between 2010 and 2017. 
Furthermore, the sharp increase in credit, especially unsecured loans, is a recipe for 
credit risk in the long term. These are the same unsecured loans that caused the 
collapse of Islamic Bank in 1997, Saambou in 2002 and African Bank in 2014, among 




over-accumulation of credit helps explain the development of financial fragility in an 
economy. Furthermore, the effects of a rapid credit growth on credit risk are well 
supported in the literature (see, for example, Hilbers et al., 2005; Demyanyk et al., 
2011; Ozili & Outa, 2017; Soedarmono, Sitorus & Tarazi, 2017). On the other hand, 
negative shocks during a credit boom have a negative effect on credit risk, however 
insignificant. According to the Austrian business cycle theory, cheap credit often 
creates the illusion that bad projects are actually good investments to households and 
firms. However, when credit growth starts declining, consumers do not have an 
incentive to continue servicing their debts because the promise to receive more credit 
is no longer available.  
4.4.5.4.2 Short run 
In the short run, negative shocks to the business cycle in the very short term (lag 0 
and lag 1) have positive effects on credit risk, while negative shocks to the business 
cycle at lag 2 have a negative effect on credit risk in the short run. This suggests that 
negative shocks to the business cycle have varying effects on credit risk depending 
on the number of lags. Positive shocks to the business cycle at lag 1 (-13.049***) and 
lag 2 (-4.800***) have a negative effect on credit risk while positive shocks to the 
business cycle in the very short term have a positive (1.287) effect, however 
statistically insignificant. This is because positive shocks to the business cycle within 
the same year (very short term) do not necessarily bring about immediate effects on 
credit risk; the insignificant coefficient is therefore not surprising in this case. 
 
Positive shocks during credit booms in the very short term (0.262***) have a positive 
and significant impact on credit risk, while positive shocks at lag 1 (-0.289***) and lag 
2 (-0.245***) have a negative effect on credit risk. This, in essence, means that positive 
shocks during a credit boom in the very short term improve credit risk, while positive 
shocks to total credit at lags 1 and 2 have a negative effect on credit risk. Negative 
shocks during a credit boom in the very short term (-0.232***) have a negative and 
significant effect on credit risk, while negative shocks at lag 1 (0.400***) and lag 2 
(0.161***) have a positive and significant impact on credit risk. This shows that short-






4.5  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter, we have empirically explored whether credit booms led to future 
vulnerabilities in the banking sector in South Africa, applying time-series data from 
1992-2017. In other words, we have explored the growth-risk nexus in bank lending. 
The business cycle is included as an intermittent variable to reinforce the growth-risk 
argument in this chapter.  
 
Statistical evidence reveals that credit risk management models are still backward-
looking and exhibit procyclicality. This means that the South African banking sector is 
yet to implement the BCBS Basel II recommendations of forward-looking credit risk 
management models. Our results are in line with the studies of Ikhide (2003), 
Akinboade and Makina (2009), Havrylchyk (2010) and Ozili and Outa (2017) on South 
Africa. 
 
Econometric models reveal evidence of a long-run relationship between credit risk, 
credit booms and business cycle in South Africa. For example, we found that credit 
risk and the business cycle Granger-cause each other in the long run, while in the 
short run, credit risk Granger-causes the business cycle. Credit risk and credit booms 
Granger-cause each other, in both the short and long run. 
 
Furthermore, the NARDL revealed strong evidence of an asymmetric long-run 
relationship among the variables in the models. Specifically, in the long run, positive 
shocks to the business cycle have a positive impact on credit risk, while negative 
shocks to the business cycle have negative effects on credit risk. In other words, 
negative developments in the economy increase the risk of credit defaults in South 
Africa. This is important because it emphasises the significance of the business cycle 
as a determinant of credit risk and this is in line with the growth-risk literature (see 
Soedarmono, Sitorus & Tarazi, 2017; Ozili & Outa, 2017). Positive shocks during credit 
booms have negative effects on credit risk. This finding suggests that rapid credit 




short run, negative and positive shocks during a business cycle and credit booms have 
different effects on credit risk, depending on the lag length. These different effects are 
all rooted in the credit risk literature reviewed in this chapter.  
 
On the policy front, we note that, while overcoming credit booms is important for 
minimising systemic risk, regulatory authorities and policymakers should be mindful of 
the role played by bank credit in a country such as South Africa still suffering from high 
levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality. The banking sector should adopt 
sophisticated methods of credit risk measurement through quantitative credit models 
which make it possible to quantify credit risk accurately. South African authorities 
should move with speed in the implementation of BCBS countercyclical capital buffer 
recommendations in full. While Government and regulatory bodies should discourage 
credit booms not related to consumption and investment booms in South Africa, we 
propose that forums should be established through relevant institutions to preach and 
encourage a culture of building up savings compared to overreliance on credit to fund 
day-to-day consumption. Lastly, we recommend strict penalties for credit providers 






BANKING SECTOR FUNDING SOURCES AND 
CREDIT BOOMS  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
Since the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the identification and prediction of banking 
and financial crises have dominated discussions amongst policymakers around the 
world. There is a burgeoning literature on the finance-growth nexus that suggests that 
excess finance (in the form of credit booms) is a direct manifestation of financial 
deepening in a number of developed and emerging market economies (see, for 
example, Minsky, 1986; Levine, Loayza & Beck, 2000; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009b; 
Rousseau & Wachtel, 2011; Hansen & Sulla, 2013; Kraft & Jankov, 2015; Davis, Mack, 
Phoa, & Vandenabeele, 2016; Koong et al., 2017).  
 
In particular, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Rousseau and Watchel (2011) opined 
that excess finance starts as ‘economic lifeblood’ to end as an ‘economic toxin’ for a 
number of countries that have experienced credit booms which induced financial or 
banking crises. Studies, inter alia those of Jordà et al. (2011) and Davis et al. (2016), 
suggest that rapid domestic credit growth leads to excess finance (credit booms) and 
that large asset price variations ultimately trigger banking and financial crisis episodes. 
Caggiano, Calice and Leonida (2014) also add market liquidity problems that lead to 
systemic insolvencies. 
  
Importantly, there is a growing list of studies that strongly suggest that banking sector 
sources of finance are highly correlated with credit cycles, liquidity49 shocks and 
                                                           
49 The Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2008) defines bank liquidity as the ability of the 
banking sector to accumulate assets and honour its obligations as they become due without 




financial stability (see, for example, Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Adrian & Shin, 2010; 
Huang & Ratnosvski, 2011; and Jung & Kim, 2015, among others).  
 
Just like any other business enterprises, the banking sector requires funds to finance 
their operations. The banking sector can either borrow funds (bank liabilities) or utilise 
their own funds (owners’ equity). In terms of bank liabilities, there are two broad 
categories: the first relates to the traditional retail bank deposits mobilised from 
households and businesses, and the second source relates to wholesale funds 
sourced through institutional markets (Huang & Ratnovski, 2009; Adrian & Shin, 2010; 
Shin & Shin, 2011; Amidu, 2013; Jung & Kim, 2015; Lozano & Guarín, 2014; Guarin 
& Lozano, 2017).  
 
Finance mobilised through retail deposits50 relates to the core liabilities of the banking 
sector and consists of short and medium-term deposits from the non-bank domestic 
creditors (see Adrian & Shin, 2010; Shin & Shin, 2011; Haung & Ratnosvski, 2011; 
Amidu, 2013; Lozano & Guarin, 2014; Jung & Kim, 2015; Guarin & Lozano, 2017). 
Retail deposits constitute the largest source of finance for the banking sector and its 
growth is linked to the aggregate household wealth and the overall performance of the 
economy (Lozano & Guarin, 2014).  
 
On the other hand, wholesale funds are generally classified as non-core liabilities of 
the banking sector and are generally sourced from institutional markets such as repos, 
call loans, short-term foreign bank debt, long-term bank debt securities, et cetera. 
(Guarin & Lozano, 2017). Jung and Kim (2015) argue that the banking sector acquires 
wholesale funds from institutional markets to supplement the limited supply of funds 
sourced through retail deposits51 to finance growing demand for credit during credit 
                                                           
50 Bank deposits include demand deposits, savings deposits, term deposits (with different 
maturity dates) and small deposits. 
51 Huang and Ratnosvski (2011, p. 250) concluded that retail deposits were “unsophisticated, 




boom periods. Shin and Shin (2011) established that these funds grew52 in line with 
the economy’s credit cycle. However, they also argued that this finance source was 
highly volatile in nature. Guarin and Lozano (2017) agreed and suggested that the 
increasing popularity of wholesale funding in the banking system serves to fulfil the 
growing demand for credit to maximise investment opportunities in the credit market. 
  
Empirical literature (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010; Elekdag & Wu, 2013; López-
Espinosa, Moreno, Rubia, & Valderrama, 2012; Damar, Meh, & Terajima, 2013; 
Lozano & Guarin, 2014; Jung & Kim, 2015) also shows that wholesale funds can 
potentially create excess leverage in the market. According to these studies, excess 
liquidity exposes the entire financial system to liquidity risk and vulnerabilities when 
negative shocks occur leading to large scale withdrawals. Large holdings of wholesale 
funds often signal banks’ willingness to face greater risk exposure (Hahm, Shin & Shin, 
2013). In fact, the changes in the dynamics of wholesale funds reflect the underlying 
pace of credit growth relative to the trend and the exposure to systemic risk as well as 
the vulnerability of the entire financial system (see, for example, Elekdag & Wu, 2013; 
Shin & Shin, 2011; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011; Hahm et al., 2013; and Lozano & Guarin, 
2014 among others). For example, Hahm et al. (2013) argue that a credit boom is 
reflected in the composition of banking system liabilities when core liabilities “cannot 
keep up with the asset growth and banks have to turn to other funding sources (non-
core liabilities) to finance their lending” (Hahm et al., 2013, p. 3). In support, Shin and 
Shin (2011) add that the movements in the composition of non-core bank liabilities 
reflect the risk premium and the state of the financial cycle in the economy.  
 
Against this background, the intention of this chapter is to answer the following critical 
question: What is the relationship between banking sector funding sources, credit 
booms and the implications for financial stability in South Africa? This study is 
particularly relevant for South Africa because of the following reasons; first, having 
established in previous chapters the triggers of credit booms in South Africa and how 
credit booms affect credit risk, it is important to determine the interaction between bank 
                                                           




funding sources and credit booms and how this relationship affects financial system 
stability. Second, SARB (2017) highlighted that non-core bank funding (wholesale 
funds) represented 41 per cent of total banking sector funds while bank core funds 
(bank deposits) represented only 26.3 per cent. The ratio of credit to domestic deposits 
(financial intermediation ratio) has remained above 100 per cent since 1992 (see 
Figure 5.2). In fact, the ratio peaked at 165 per cent in 2009, up from 120 per cent in 
1992 and 114 per cent in 2002. Since 2010, the ratio has remained above 145 per 
cent. This ratio suggests that credit provision in South Africa far exceeds the level of 
funds mobilised through domestic deposits. This, in essence, suggests that South 
African banks, like all other international banks, could be relying on funds other than 
domestic deposits to fund growing credit demand in the country. In this context, 
capturing how positive and negative variations in banking sector funding sources affect 
rapid credit growth provides policymakers with a broader perspective on the sensitivity 
of risk to financial system stability.  
 
The empirical analysis applies the Shin et al. (2014) robust nonlinear autoregressive 
distributed lags (NARDL) cointegration methodology using time series data from 1992-
2017 obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). The NARDL method is 
used to decompose the nonlinear and asymmetric link between the sources of finance 
and credit booms and the implications for financial stability. Importantly, results that 
emerge from this chapter will be important for countercyclical macro-prudential policy 
formulation in South Africa. Despite the growing literature on this subject (Huang & 
Ratnovski, 2011; Amidu, 2013; Hahm et al., 2013; Lozano & Guarín, 2014; Jung & 
Kim, 2015; Gaurin & Lozano, 2017, among others), studies on emerging and 
developing countries are non-existent. To our knowledge, the empirical nonlinear and 
asymmetric relationship between credit booms and banking sector finance sources is 
the first study of its kind and provides an important empirical contribution to the banking 
and financial stability literature in South Africa.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents relevant literature 




African credit market, Section 5.4 introduces the empirical methodology and analysis, 
and Section 5.5 provides conclusions and brief policy recommendations.  
 
5.2  RELATED LITERATURE 
In this section, we discuss the theoretical arguments on the role of banks in liquidity 
creation and financial stability. This section also looks at empirical studies on the 
relationship between bank funding sources and credit booms, their sustainability, and 
the risk attached to each funding source.  From a theoretical perspective, a number of 
arguments have been presented regarding the effects of banks’ liquidity creation on 
financial system stability. According to financial intermediation literature, liquidity 
creation is one of the most important roles performed by banks in the economy and 
occurs both on the liability and the asset side of banks’ balance sheets (Diamond & 
Dybvig, 1983). On the liability side, liquidity creation occurs when banks fund long-
term projects using both transaction deposits and wholesale short-term funds. 
Importantly, the associated exposure to liquidity risk is a fundamental feature of banks. 
It acts as a discipline tool and supports the efficient operation of the banking system 
(Diamond & Rajan, 2000). 
 
There are competing views presented in the literature regarding bank finance sources 
and their vulnerability to liquidity and market risk. One school of thought in support of 
wholesale funds argues that these funds instil market discipline by allowing 
sophisticated financial investors to exercise strict monitoring and oversight over the 
banking system (Calomiris, 1999). Calomiris (1999) and others argue that wholesale 
funding is useful in offsetting the unexpected withdrawal of bank deposits from 
insolvent financial institutions. However, another strand of research argues that short-
term wholesale funds are affected by negative public signals that compel wholesale 
financiers to withdraw their funds (Huang & Ratnovski, 2011). Negative market news 
discourages wholesale investors from exercising their monitoring, triggering the 
withdrawal of these funds and creating huge liquidity gaps in the system. Vazquez and 
Federico (2015) argue that over-reliance on short-term wholesale funds in order to 
finance their balance sheets was a leading factor in the build-up to the financial crisis 





On the empirical front, there are burgeoning studies that focus on rapid credit growth 
and finance sources (see Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011; 
Shin & Shin, 2011; Damar et al., 2013; Lozano & Guarín, 2014; Vazquez & Federico, 
2015; Guarin & Lozano, 2017). These studies focus mainly on the interaction between 
the credit cycle, liquidity creation, financial stability and sources of finance for the 
banking sector. The majority of the studies emphasise the potential risk to financial 
stability generated by the banking sector practice of increasing short-term wholesale 
funds in their portfolios. For example, Huang and Ratnovski (2009) on Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and Canadian banks, 
Damar et al. (2013) on Canadian banks, and Lozano and Guarín (2014) on Colombian 
banks demonstrated that finance sources such as wholesale funds exposed the 
banking sector to liquidity risk and financial fragility and ultimately caused economic 
turbulence. 
 
Using a sample of 1,334 large banks across 101 countries, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010) analysed the implications of banks’ activities and funding strategies 
on risk and returns during the period leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-09. The 
study found that non-deposit wholesale funding lowered the rate of return on assets, 
compared to retail deposit funding. They argued that wholesale funds came in the form 
of increased bank fragility in a number of countries in the sample. Importantly, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) concluded that banks’ strategies of short-term 
funding in the form of non-deposit wholesale funding was very risky and consistent 
with the collapse of the banking system in the United States.  
 
The seminal work of Shin and Shin (2011) on Korean banks also supported the 
negative findings on the banking systems’ reliance on wholesale funds. They noted 
that in periods of rapid credit growth, traditional funding sources (core liabilities) were 
not sufficient to cover the growing demand for bank credit. Consequently, banks would 
seek alternative finance sources other than core liabilities. They classified this 
alternative finance as banking sector non-core liabilities which take the form of short-




liabilities were susceptible to exchange rate depreciation and increased borrowing 
spreads. 
 
Following up on Shin and Shin’s (2011) study, Hahm et al. (2013) used a panel probit 
regression analysis in a sample of developing and emerging countries to determine 
the predictive power of the non-core liabilities ratio for currency and credit crises. They 
found that the non-core liabilities ratio was an important predictor of credit and 
currency crises in a number of countries in the sample. The study concluded that credit 
booms were reflected in the banking sector’s composition of liabilities and that non-
core liabilities provided a useful signal for future financial vulnerabilities.  
 
López-Espinosa et al. (2012) used CoVaR methodology to measure the contribution 
of a number of factors to systemic risk on a set of large international bank data 
covering 18 countries They found that short-term wholesale funds were a key trigger 
of risk episodes in a number of countries. López-Espinosa et al. (2012) argued in 
support of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s stance on introducing 
standards for banks’ net stable funding (NSF)53 ratio and punishing banks for 
undesirable exposure to liquidity risk. 
 
In Colombia, Lozano and Guarín (2014) used a logit regression model to establish the 
relationship between financial vulnerability and bank finance sources. The study 
established that, like other countries, wholesale funding of credit growth had become 
very popular in the Colombian banking industry. Lozano and Guarín (2014) argued 
that banks’ practices of overreliance on wholesale funds was a potential source of 
financial fragility. In conclusion, the study recommended the use of monitoring tools to 
determine the finance sources to guard against future bank disruptions. 
 
                                                           
53 According to Basel III, the net stable funding ratio is meant to “promote resilience over a 
longer time horizon by creating incentives for banks to fund their activities with more stable 




Providing a different view, some studies (see, for example, Calomiris, 1999; 
Goodfriend & King, 1998; Van den End & Tabbae, 2012, among others) have 
attempted to demonstrate the positive side of wholesale funding for the banking sector. 
These studies highlighted the positive impact on the banking sector tapping into the 
wholesale funds market as compared to the traditional retail deposits model. In 
particular, they argued that wholesale funds were free from the local deposit supply 
constraints and that the financiers of wholesale funds provided market discipline 
because of their level of sophistication (Calomiris, 1999). These studies also noted 
that retail deposits are relatively unsophisticated and risk-insensitive since, in most 
cases, they are covered by deposit insurance. They further argued that this was 
possible since wholesale financiers had the means to gather information on bank 
transactions (bank-financed projects) compared to retail deposit funders (Goodfriend 
& King, 1998). Goodfriend and King (1998) suggested that wholesale funds were 
important in refinancing unexpected local deposit withdrawals, while Van den End and 
Tabbae (2012) established that wholesale funds were pursued for the purpose of 
guaranteeing liquidity. 
 
However, recent studies (Shin, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010; Acharya, Gale 
& Yorulmazer, 2011; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011; Hahm et al., 2013; Georgescu, 2015) 
have challenged the suggestions of Calomiris (1999) and Goodfriend and King (1998), 
arguing that the over-reliance on this finance option has dire consequences for the 
banking system and financial stability as witnessed in the U.S. They contended that 
wholesale funds were susceptible to sudden withdrawals in the event of noisy public 
signals (Shin, 2009; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011; Hahm et al., 2013; Georgescu, 2015). 
Shin (2009) in particular cited the United Kingdom which experienced a sudden 
withdrawal of wholesale funds as a result of negative noise generated by the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2009.  
 
Other studies, inter alia those of Adrian and Shin (2010), Damar et al. (2013) and 
Dewally and Shao (2013), demonstrated the link between wholesale funds, asset 
prices and leverage. Dewally and Shao (2013) in particular established that banks 




users of retail deposit funds They found that the relationship varied from one market 
to another and depended on a country’s risk attitude. 
 
Another interesting angle relates to the studies of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) 
on 1,334 banks in 101 countries, Craig and Dinger (2013) on 589 US banks, Amidu 
(2013) on 978 banks in 55 countries, and Ritz and Walther (2015) on Eurozone 
commercial banks. These studies accessed the substitution risk from banking sector 
retail deposits to wholesale funds. These scholars concurred that there was a general 
increase in bank risk when the banking system substitutes retail deposits for a 
wholesale funding strategy across a sample of international banks.  
 
Figure 5.1 depicts Hahm et al.’s (2013) banking sector balance sheet before and after 
a credit boom. As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 5.1, before a credit boom, the 
banking system operates as usual, mobilising and receiving traditional retail deposits 
and issuing credit to the households and firms. However, as shown in the top panel, 
when credit demand grows rapidly because of new borrowers, the pool of mobilised 
deposits cannot keep pace, and banks are forced to borrow from foreign creditors 
(non-core liabilities) to finance the gap. Shin and Shin (2011) supported this assertion 
by indicating that the amount of foreign currency liabilities held by the banking system 
indicates the levels of liquidity and the vulnerability of the system to capital outflows. 
It is clear that when domestic deposits do not grow in line with credit supply, the 
banking sector’s balance sheet is transformed with non-core funding sources. Hahm 
et al. (2013, p. 4) concluded that “a higher incidence of noncore funding will be 
associated with above-trend growth in credit and compressed risk premiums”. In 
summary, Figure 5.1 demonstrates that when retail deposits are relatively ‘sticky’ and 
do not necessarily grow in tandem with credit supply, the banking sector balance sheet 





Figure 5.1: Credit booms financed by non-core liabilities 
Source: Hahm et al. (2013) 
 
5.3  BACKGROUND: CREDIT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
During the 1990s, the Bank Act (Act No. 94 of 1990) was passed into law and the 
banking system immediately underwent a process of consolidation with a number of 
mergers and acquisitions registered54. Post-independence South Africa was 
characterised by an influx of mainly small to medium banks that were most interested 
in servicing the low-income groups or the previously excluded section of the 
population. A number of these banks were funded by the interbank market and 
continued to exhibit elements of financial instability (Loate & Viegi, 2017).  
 
                                                           
54 For example, one of the current top four biggest banks in South Africa, ABSA, was formed 




According to the South African Reserve Bank (2016), the banking landscape is 
characterised by five big banks55 which control about 90.5 per cent of total banking 
assets in South Africa. These banking assets are mostly funded by deposits, current 
accounts and other forms of credit which constitute 86 per cent of all total banking 
liabilities (South African Reserve Bank, 2017). Table 5.1 shows the total number of 
banks registered or licenced in terms of the Bank Act, 1990 (Act No. 94 of 1990) in 
South Africa from 2007-2017.  
 
Table 5.1: Number of banks in South Africa  
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of 
banks 




14 14 13 13 12 14 14 14 15 15 15 
Total 33 33 31 30 29 31 31 31 32 32 34 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2018) 
 
Like all other banks around the world, the South African banks’ balance sheets include 
liabilities and assets56. The liabilities side of the balance sheets includes domestic 
deposits57, foreign currency deposits, foreign currency funding to the domestic sector 
and foreign sector, debt securities, share capital and reserves and other liabilities to 
the public. The asset side includes banknotes and coins, gold coins, mortgage 
advances, credit cards, foreign currency, loans and advances, shares and other 
                                                           
55 The top five banks in South Africa are ABSA Bank, Standard Bank, Nedbank, First National 
Bank and Investec.  
56 This includes credit cards, home loans, commercial mortgages, lease and instalment 
debtors, et cetera. 
57 Bank deposits include cash managed, cheque and transmission deposits, savings, short, 




investments. According to the SARB (2017), the banking sector was mainly funded by 
deposits which constituted 86.4 per cent of banking sector liabilities in 2017, down 
from 87.6 per cent in 2016 while derivatives and other trading liabilities were 7.4 per 
cent and 4 per cent respectively. Importantly, bank wholesale funding remained the 
most dominant source of funding for banks and represented 44.1 per cent of total bank 
funds in 2017, up from 41 per cent in 2016. Bank deposits constituted 26.3 per cent of 
total bank funds in 2017, down from 26.6 per cent in 2016.  
 
As discussed above, banks require substantial finance to fulfil their liquidity creation 
role which plays an important part in financial stability and the economy in general. 
Figure 5.2 shows the intermediation ratio in South Africa. Figure 5.2 shows that the 
level of intermediation has remained above 120 per cent since 1992. In other words, 
this shows that bank credit provision exceeds the level of funds mobilised by banks in 
the form of domestic deposits. The suggestion here is that the banking sector uses 
funding sources other than the domestic deposit market to fund growing demand for 
credit in the country. Literature shows that this is possible if the domestic financial 
market is integrated with other financial systems around the world (see, for example, 
Lane & McQuade, 2014; Magud et al., 2014; Fielding & Rewilak, 2015). The ratio also 






Figure 5.2: Financial intermediation ratio in South Africa (1992-2017) 
Source: International Financial Statistics 
 
In Figure 5.3, we compare the growth in retail deposits (core liabilities) and wholesale 
funds (non-core liabilities) in South Africa over the period 1992-2017. There is an 
interesting pattern between bank deposits and wholesale funds. As confirmed in the 
literature above, we notice the volatile nature of wholesale funds compared to the 
relatively stable bank deposits. For example, we notice a 19 per cent decline in 
wholesale funds in 1999, followed by a 28 per cent increase in 2000, a 54 per cent 
growth in 2001 followed by a 0.079 per cent decline in 2002, and significant growth 
from 2004 (25 per cent) to 2007 (51 per cent). This growth in wholesale funds is not 
surprising since it coincides with the period leading up to the financial crisis when the 
banking sector decided to tap into the wholesale funds market to finance the growing 
demand for credit in the economy. The bank deposits trend follows a smooth trajectory 
except for a slight dip during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, i.e. 0.4 per cent growth in 
2009. The retail deposit trends in South Africa confirm that traditional bank deposits 
are relatively stable as suggested in the literature; however, they are susceptible to 










































































Figure 5.3: Bank deposits and wholesale funding in South Africa (1992-2017) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank and author’s calculations 
 
In Figure 5.4, we establish the link between credit growth, wholesale (non-core) and 
deposit finance. Again, there is an interesting pattern in the relationship between credit 
growth and wholesale funds and bank deposits. Specifically, we notice that wholesale 
funds are highly volatile, as shown by the unpredictable swings; however, to a certain 
extent, the funding follows the trend of credit growth over the years. For example, 
when credit growth declines, wholesale funds also decline, and when credit growth 
increases, wholesale funds also increase. During the build-up phase of the financial 
crisis of 2007-09, we notice a sharp increase in both credit growth and wholesale funds 
and, similarly, a decline in credit growth at the height of the crisis is accompanied by 
a decline in wholesale funds. Importantly, our observations are in line with bank and 
financial crisis literature regarding the use of wholesale funds to bridge the shortfall in 

















































































Figure 5.4: Growth in bank credit, non-core and core liabilities growth 
Source: South African Reserve Bank and author’s calculations 
 
In Figure 5.5 we observe a substantial variation in the ratio of wholesale funds in 
relation to deposits in South Africa, ranging from the first peak of 16 per cent in 1996, 
0.8 per cent in 1999, and 17.4 per cent in 2007, to a peak of 22.5 per cent in 2012. 
However, since 2016, the ratio has slightly declined from the 2012 peak, with 15.4 per 
cent recorded in 2017. The steep increase in wholesale funds indicates that South 
African banks were taking up more wholesale funds (foreign currency liabilities) to 
supplement their local deposits as explained in the literature. However, this wholesale-
induced excess liquidity exposes domestic banks to vulnerabilities as shown by the 
level of volatility in the series. Overall, there is a slight deviation from the trend in the 
ratio, with the first between 1994 and 1997, the second between 2001 and 2006 and 
the third between 2007 and 2013. The first deviation coincided with the build-up phase 
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The second deviation occurred during the build-up 
phase of the financial crisis of 2007-09 where the domestic credit/GDP ratio 
accelerated to an average of 172 per cent between 2001 and 2006, reaching 192.5 
per cent in 2006. The third deviation relates to the start and end of the financial crisis 


















































































Figure 5.5: Ratio of wholesale funds to deposits in South Africa 
Source: South African Reserve Bank and author’s calculations 
 
Figure 5.6 shows the ratio of bank credit to total assets in the South African banking 
system. This ratio measures the share of total bank loans outstanding as a percentage 
of banking sector assets and shows the portion of banking sector assets that are tied 
up in illiquid bank loan assets (Marozva, 2015). Figure 5.5 shows that the ratio was an 
average of 60.8 per cent between 1992 and 2017. This means that, in general, 60.8 
per cent of banking sector assets are tied up in illiquid loan assets, confirming that the 
core business of banks is that of providing credit to the private sector. It is worth noting 
that in 1995 the ratio peaked at 71.3 per cent while the lowest ratio was recorded in 
2003 at 52.5 per cent. The maximum and minimum values of this ratio suggest that in 
1995 banks were slightly aggressive with 71.3 per cent of their assets as loans, while 
the number declined to 52.5 per cent in 2003. According to Berger and Bouwman 
(2009), the higher the ratio, the more susceptible the banking sector is to liquidity risk58 
while the lower the ratio, the lower the risk. Borio and Lowe (2004) indicate that this 
ratio provides useful information on the state of the financial cycle and the level of 
                                                           
58 This scenario would suggest that the banking system might fail to honour its obligations 




































































vulnerability in the banking system. Table 5.2 shows bank liquidity, banking sector 
core and non-core finances, and credit growth in South Africa from 1992 to 2017. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Bank credit to total assets ratio in South Africa (1992-2017) 
Source: South African Reserve Bank and author’s calculations 
 








1992 0,65 8,19  11,58 
1993 0,69 8,37 31,22 16,24 
1994 0,69 16,02 -4,23 16,63 
1995 0,71 17,00 48,18 19,51 
1996 0,71 15,15 19,76 17,48 
1997 0,70 18,37 -6,24 15,14 
1998 0,69 19,20 12,90 17,04 
1999 0,66 9,62 -18,99 6,70 
2000 0,64 9,54 28,44 9,78 









































































2002 0,59 12,84 -0,08 8,17 
2003 0,53 12,19 -17,45 12,58 
2004 0,57 13,37 25,24 16,79 
2005 0,62 19,79 46,65 21,83 
2006 0,64 24,38 44,82 28,15 
2007 0,64 20,93 51,44 22,44 
2008 0,59 16,67 28,35 14,27 
2009 0,62 0,42 0,01 -0,57 
2010 0,62 4,89 10,42 4,24 
2011 0,60 9,29 12,21 7,20 
2012 0,62 3,89 13,36 9,82 
2013 0,63 7,03 -5,26 6,20 
2014 0,62 8,00 12,91 7,78 
2015 0,58 9,77 17,79 9,01 
2016 0,61 5,70 -0,60 5,57 
2017 0,61 4,77 -23,02 2,51 
Source: South African Reserve Bank and author’s calculations 
 
Given the above background, the South African Reserve Bank has demonstrated that 
it understands the importance of promoting the soundness of the banking system and 
financial stability and has made great strides in implementing the BCBS Basel III 
principles for ‘sound liquidity risk management and supervision’ as part of the liquidity 
framework. In 2011, SARB decided to include the BCBS Basel III proposals in its bank 
regulatory and supervisory instruments in order to ensure a resilient liquidity risk profile 
i.e. liquidity coverage ratio59 (LCR) and NSF60 ratio. The proposal was to implement 
the LCR and NSF proposals in a phased approach starting from 2015 to 2018, in line 
with the timelines of the BCBS (South Africa Reserve Bank, 2011). Since then, there 
has been a strong commitment from SARB to continuously review the implications of 
the liquidity framework on credit provision and economic growth and identify the 
                                                           
59 The LCR is concerns the maintenance of high-quality liquid assets that are easy to convert 
to cash within a 30-day period to meet liquidity requirements.  
60 According to the SARB (2011), the objective of the NSF ratio is to promote the medium- and 




unintended consequences when they arise, especially for an emerging economy such 
as South Africa.  
 
5.4  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
5.4.1  Data sources and definition of variables  
The study uses annual time series data obtained from the South African Reserve Bank 
database spanning the period 1992 to 2017.  
5.4.1.1 Credit growth (DCG) 
In Chapter 3 and 4, we discussed in detail the level of credit growth in South Africa. 
Bank loans in South Africa represent the biggest assets in the banking sector. 
Statistics show that in 2017, total banking assets amounted to R5 157 billion, up from 
R4 877 billion in 2016. This represented an annual growth of 5.7 per cent in 2017 up 
from a 1 per cent growth in 2016. According to the SARB (2017), the growth in banking 
sector assets was mainly due to an increase in loans and advances to the private 
sector, investment, short-term negotiations and derivatives. Loans are, therefore, a 
very important source of livelihood for South African banks. It is important to highlight 
that banking sector assets are mainly funded by deposits, current accounts and other 
creditors. Financial crisis literature suggests that excessive credit growth has been an 
informative signal of banking system fragility in countries that endured banking or 
financial crisis episodes (see, for example, Davis et al. (2016); Koong et al., 2017, 
among others). In particular, Davis et al. (2016) highlighted two important sources of 
risk and vulnerability: (i) rapid growth of credit to the private sector and sharp 
deviations in asset prices, and (ii) the decrease in market liquidity. Davis et al. (2016) 
suggested that rapid credit growth was linked to declining bank liquidity61. Based on 
the suggestion in the literature (Barajas, Chami & Yousefi, 2013; Davis et al., 2016) 
that the ratio of credit to GDP acts as an important informative signal of financial 
fragility in the economy, we have adopted the same credit measure.  
                                                           
61 Rapid credit growth depends on the amount of liquidity in the banking system (Pilbeam, 




5.4.1.2 Wholesale funds (WholeG) 
Statistics from the South African Reserve Bank show that wholesale funding has 
remained the dominant source of funds for the banking sector. Interestingly, just in 
2016, wholesale funding stood at 41% of total banking sector funds; however, in 2017, 
there was a 3.1 per cent increase to 41.1% (SARB, 2017). This is an interesting fact, 
considering that literature shows that during credit boom episodes, when domestic 
deposits cannot keep pace with the rate of asset growth, the banking sector seeks 
alternative finance in the form of wholesale funds mainly from institutional markets to 
finance their lending (Borio & Lowe, 2004).  
 
Existing literature (see for example Feldman & Schmidt, 2001; Shin & Shin, 2011; 
Elekdag & Wu, 2011; Hahm et al., 2013) suggests that monetary aggregates often 
serve as informative signals on the state of the financial cycle in an economy by 
providing an insight into the magnitude and changing structure of the liabilities of the 
banking sector. In particular, Shin and Shin (2001) and Hahm et al. (2013) agree that 
large compositions of noncore liabilities of the banking sector, especially the banking 
sector’s liabilities as a portion of the foreign sector, serve as an indicator of 
vulnerabilities in the banking sector which could lead to a crisis. Shin and Shin (2011) 
argue that banking sector liabilities, especially those linked to the foreign sector, 
constitute a major share of non-core bank liabilities in a number of emerging countries 
with open capital markets since the local wholesale market is not adequately 
developed to support rapid credit expansion (Shin & Shin, 2011). Borio and Lowe 
(2004) point out that the credit to money ratio provides information about the level of 
domestic credit growth in the economy. A higher ratio suggests that the composition 
of bank liabilities is an informative signal that domestic credit to the private sector is 
growing faster than core liabilities, compared to noncore liabilities, to support growing 
credit demand.  
 
Hahm et al. (2013) suggested that credit booms were reflected by the composition and 
size of non-core banking sector liabilities. In this case, we have relied on Hahm et al. 
(2013) and Shin and Shin’s (2011) studies in calculating non-core liabilities of the 




to the foreign sector plus M362 minus M263. We expect high levels of wholesale funding 
to have a positive influence on credit booms in South Africa as suggested by the 
literature. 
5.4.1.3 Deposits (LDEPG) 
Relying on previous studies (for example, Kim et al., 2003; Elekdag & Wu, 2011 and 
Huang & Ratnovski, 2011) that suggest that the level of deposits is linked to the 
performance of the economy, we have used the ratio of total banking sector deposits 
to nominal GDP (LDEPG) as a proxy for total deposits in South Africa. In the literature 
discussed in Section 5.2, various studies (see Kim, Kliger & Vale, 2003; Demirgüç-
Kunt & Huizinga, 2010; Jung and Kim, 2015), opined that domestic deposits are a 
stable source of long-term finance for the banking sector. Bank deposits in South 
Africa mainly consist of current accounts, fixed and notice deposits and call deposits, 
the largest component being the fixed and notice deposits which in 2017 represented 
28.5 per cent, while current account and call deposits represented 20.9 per cent and 
19 per cent respectively (SARB, 2017). Bank deposits in South Africa have averaged 
12 per cent growth between 1992 and 2017. We expect growth in the ratio of deposit 
to nominal GDP to have a positive impact on credit booms in South Africa. 
 
5.4.2  Empirical model 
To determine the relationship between rapid credit growth and banking sector sources 
of finance in South Africa, we apply Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo’s (2014) robust 
nonlinear autoregressive-distributed lags (NARDL) cointegration methodology. The 
NARDL model is an asymmetric extension of the conventional linear autoregressive 
distributed lags ARDL (p, q) of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). The NARDL approach 
                                                           
62 M3, sometimes referred to as ‘near, near’ money, is defined as M2 plus institutional market 
funds (money market funds); short-term repos and larger liquid assets. It includes less liquid 
assets that are more closely associated with finances of larger finance institutions and big 
businesses than with small corporations and private individuals. 
63 M2, sometimes referred to as ‘near’ money, is defined as M1 (physical currency and coins, 
demand deposits, travellers’ cheques, et cetera) plus savings deposits, mutual funds, money 




is preferred in this study because it enables us to capture the nonlinear and 
asymmetric nature of the relationship we are investigating. This methodology is 
suitable because macroeconomic variables often possess asymmetric and nonlinear 
characteristics that can be brought to the fore by the NARDL approach. Importantly, 
the Shin et al. (2014) approach is preferred over other methods such as the smooth 
transition model or the vector error correction model (VECM) because of its superior 
qualities in dealing with small sample sizes (Sek, 2017). Unlike the other traditional 
cointegration techniques, the NARDL method can also be applied with a mixture of 
regressors’ orders of integration, i.e. 1(0) or I(1), and it also takes care of the multi-
collinearity problem by selecting the appropriate lag order for all variables in the model 
(Shin et al., 2014; Sek, 2017).  
 
The conventional linear ARDL (𝑝, 𝑞) model developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) is 
expressed as follows:  
 𝛾𝑡 = ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝛾𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
′𝑞
𝑖=0 𝜒𝑡−𝑖+ 𝑡          (5.1) 
  
where 𝛾𝑡  = dependent variable; 𝜆𝑖  = vector of scalars; 𝜒𝑡 = 𝑘 𝑥 1 vector of exogenous 
variables; 𝛿𝑖
′
= 𝑘 𝑥 1 coefficient vectors for 𝜒𝑡 variables and 𝑡 = disturbance term. We 
can rewrite Equation (5.1) in an error correction format as follows: 
∆𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1 ∆D𝐶𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼1
𝑚1
𝑖=1 ∆DEPG𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼2
𝑛1
𝑖=1 ∆WholeG𝑡−𝑖 +
𝜃1𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝜃3WholeG𝑡−1+ 1𝑡  (5.2) 
 
where DCG = ratio of credit/GDP; DEPG = domestic deposits; WholeG = wholesale 
funds; k, m, n = optimal lag length for the dependent and independent variables and 
∆ = first difference operator. The ARDL (p, q) Equation (5.2) assumes the linearity and 
symmetry in the way rapid credit growth is related to deposit finance and wholesale 
funding. However, this assumption might be too restrictive, given the potential 
nonlinearity in macroeconomic variables, and in particular rapid credit growth, deposits 
and wholesale funding. Given this, we re-specify Equation (5.1) using the recently 
developed robust NARDL cointegration technique developed by Shin et al. (2014) 




The NARDL cointegration approach is as follows: 
∆𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼1
𝑘1
𝑖=1
∆D𝐶𝐺𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼2
𝑚1
𝑖=1













                                                                               (5.3) 
where 𝛼1 , 𝛼2, 𝛼3 = short-run coefficients; and 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3, 𝜃4 = long-run parameters. 
Importantly, the difference between the short-run parameters 𝛼1 − 𝛼3  measures the 
immediate impact of the independent variables (DEPG and WholeG) on the dependent 
variable (DCG), while the long-run parameters 𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3, 𝜃4 measure the reaction 
speed and time towards equilibrium. We employ the Wald test to establish the long-
term asymmetry (𝜃 = 𝜃+ = 𝜃−) and the short-term asymmetry (𝛼 = 𝛼+ = 𝛼−) for the 
variables in the model. We employed the bounds test procedure based on the joint F-
statistic (Wald test). Relying on Burnham and Anderson (2004), we used the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the lag length of variables in Equation 5.3. 
Burnham and Anderson (2004) opined that the AIC was superior to other information 
criteria, i.e. the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria. 
  
The regressors can be decomposed into their positive (Equation 5.4) and negative 
(Equation 5.5) components 𝑋𝑡
+ and 𝑋𝑡
− which are the partial sums of positive and 
negative movements in 𝑋𝑡 as follows:  
𝑋𝑡
+ = ∑ ∆𝑋𝑗
+ =𝑡𝑗=1 ∑ max (∆𝑥𝑗, 0)
𝑡
𝑗=1  (5.4) 
𝑋𝑡
− = ∑ ∆𝑋𝑗
− =𝑡𝑗=1 ∑ min (∆𝑥𝑗 , 0)
𝑡
𝑗=1  (5.5) 
 
where X represents DCGt and WholeGt. To establish the presence of an asymmetric 
long-term relationship, we employ the Shin et al. (2014) bounds test which is a joint 
test for all lagged regressors. Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre (1998) and Pesaran et al. 
(2001) each present critical values, i.e. t-statistics and the F-statistic, respectively. The 
null hypothesis of the Banerjee et al. (1998) t-statistic test is HO: θ = 0 against the 
alternative hypothesis 𝐻1: θ < 0, while the null hypothesis of the Pesaran et al. (2001) 
F-statistic tests is HO: θ




t-statistic and F-statistic tests indicates the existence of a long-run relationship among 
the variables.  
 
5.4.3 Empirical analysis 
5.4.3.1 Stationarity tests 
In theory, the NARDL model of Shin et al. (2014) requires that variables should be 
integrated order zero (I(0)) or integrated order one (I(1)) to establish cointegration in 
variables. In other words, stationarity tests are only meant to verify that variables are 
not I(2). To verify this, we applied three traditional unit root tests: Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski, Philips and Shin (KPSS). Table 
5.3 presents the unit root tests results of ADF, PP and KPSS and, in general, the 




Table 5.3: Standard unit root tests  
Variable Model ADF PP KPSS 
Lag 𝝉𝝉, 𝝉𝝁, 𝝉 𝚽𝟑 , 𝚽𝟏 BW 𝝉𝝉, 𝝉𝝁, 𝝉 BW 𝝉𝝉, 𝝉𝝁 
DCG Intercept 0 -2.144 4.599**  4 -2.223  3 0.651* 
Intercept and Trend 0 -2.545 3.834**  0 -2.545  3 0.185* 
None 0 0.735   7 1.242   
DDCG Intercept 0 -6.816 46.460***  6 -7.547***  8 0.317*** 
Intercept and Trend 0 -7.014*** 24.615***  15 -14.953***  24 0.500 
None 0 -6.609***   3 -6.870***   
DEPG Intercept 0 -2.337 5.463**  2 -2.354  2 0.361** 
Intercept and Trend 0 -2.995 4.826**  4 -2.849  2 0.122** 
None 0 1.066   6 -0.844   
DDEPG Intercept 0 -5.031*** 25.312***  9 -6.292***  11 0.309*** 
Intercept and Trend 0 -5.040*** 12.705***  9 -7.714***  15 0.281 
None 1 -5.140***   8 -6.236***   
WholeG Intercept 5 0.124 3.834**  3 -2.129  2 0.632* 
Intercept and Trend 1 -4.662*** 7.382***  5 -3.423**  4 0.115*** 
none 5 -1.964**   12 -1.097   
DWholeG Intercept 4 -6.059*** 12.805***  16 -8.211***  19 0.412** 
Intercept and Trend 4 -5.946*** 10.349***  15 -8.212***  18 0.387 
None 4 -5.188***   13 -6.267***   
Notes:  Superscripts ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.  
 The critical values for ADF are as follows: with intercept - 3.737 (1%), -2.991 (5%) and -2.635 (10%); Intercept and trend -4.394 (1%), -3.612 




 PP critical values are: with intercept, -3.737 (1%), -2.991 (5%) and -2.635 (10%); with intercept and trend, -4.394 (1%), -3.612(5%) and -3.243 
(10%); with no intercept and no trend -2.664 (1%), -1.955 (5%) and -1.608 (10%).  
 Critical values for KPSS tests: with intercept, 0.739 (1%), 0.463 (5%) and 0.347 (10%); with intercept and trend, 0.216 (1%), 0.146 (5%) and 
0.119 (10%).  
 ADF critical values for 𝚽𝟑 , 𝚽𝟏 are obtained from the Dickey and Fuller (1981) tables for the empirical distribution 𝚽𝟏 and𝚽𝟑. 











Our study included the ZA (Zivot and Andrews, 1992) unit root test which takes into 
account the presence of endogenous structural breaks. The use of the ZA test is 
motivated by the fact that the traditional ADF, PP and KPSS unit root tests tend to be 
biased towards the rejection of the null hypothesis in the presence of a structural break 
in the series (Kim & Perron, 2009).  
 
Table 5.4 presents the ZA unit root empirical results and the findings confirm Table 
5.3 that there are no 1(2) variables. However, the ZA tests confirm the presence of 
structural breaks in each series. The structural breaks differ from one series to 
another; however, most of the breaks occurred around 2000, 2008 and 2015. The 
majority of these breaks coincided with the dot com bubble burst that caused the 2000 
stock market crash, the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the recovery phase after 
the financial crisis with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) ending 2015 up by 
nearly 2 per cent, reflecting the potential depth of liquidity in the market. Importantly, 
the ZA test identified breaks that are consistent with banking and financial crisis 
literature around the world. 
 
Table 5.4: Zivot-Andrews unit root tests accounting for structural breaks 
Variables Model Lag t-stat Breakpoint 
DCG Intercept 0 -4.192 2000 
Intercept & Trend 0 -4.229 2000 
DDCG Intercept 0 -8.434*** 2008 
Intercept & Trend 0 -8.221*** 2008 
DEPG Intercept 1 -5.816*** 2008 
Intercept & Trend 1 -6.103*** 2008 
DDEPG Intercept 1 -7.407*** 2009 
Intercept & Trend 5 -8.065*** 2008 
WHOLEG Intercept 1 -4.799** 2007 
Intercept & Trend 3 -5.309** 1999 
DWHOLEG Intercept 4 -7.149*** 2015 
Intercept & Trend 4 -7.688*** 2015 




 The ZA critical values with intercept only -4.949 (1%), -4.443 (5%) and -4.193 (10%) 
and critical values with intercept and trend are -5.347 (1%), -4.859 (5%) and -4.607 
(10%). % lags were selected for the tests.  
 
5.4.3.2 NARDL bounds tests: cointegration results 
Having fulfilled the precondition of the Shin et al. (2014) NARDL that there is no 
variable integrated of order 2 (I(2)), we proceeded with the cointegration test. The 
short- and long-run cointegration results are presented in Table 5.5.  
 
First of all, we notice that wholesale funds and domestic deposits explain 95.5 per cent 
(R2 = 0.955) of rapid domestic credit growth in South Africa. In other words, wholesale 
funds and domestic deposits explain 95.5 per cent of rapid credit growth while the 
error correction term in the model explains the rest of the variation in rapid credit 
growth (4.5 per cent). The results show that the model does not suffer from 
autocorrelation as reflected by the Durbin Watson (DW) test statistic (2.023). The 
model also does not suffer from serial autocorrelation as confirmed by (χSC
2 ) in Table 
5.3. The Ramsey Reset test (χFF
2 ) confirms that our model is properly specified; in other 
words, the functional form of our model is properly designed. We also note that our 
model does not suffer from the heteroscedasticity (χHET
2 ) problem. The above tests 
indicate that our empirical results are reliable and consistent. 
 
Importantly, the cointegration results of the NARDL bounds F-test confirm the 
presence of a long-run relationship among domestic credit growth, wholesale funds 
and domestic retail deposits for the period 1992-2017. This is confirmed by the 
calculated F-statistic (9.505) which is greater than the Pesaran et al. (2001) 1 per cent 
critical values. It should be noted that the Wald tests for both the long and short run 
(WLR and WSR) indicate the significance of asymmetry (see Table 5.5). These Wald 
test findings reveal the existence of a short-run and long-run nonlinear and asymmetric 
relationship between rapid credit growth, wholesale funds and deposit finance. These 
results also suggest that excluding the intrinsic nonlinearities among these variables 




credit growth, wholesale funds and retail deposit finance have a long-run asymmetric 
relationship in the South African economy.  
 
Table 5.5: Cointegration results 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Long Run 
Constant 1682.602*** 5.884 0.002 
LDCGt−1 -35.470*** -5.786 0.002 
WholeGt−1
+  21.342*** 4.332 0.007 
WholeGt−1
−  22.446 0.777 0.472 
DEPGt−1
+  2.192*** 3.704 0.013 
DEPGt−1
−  -0.170 -0.127 0.903 
Short Run    
∆WholeG− -10.124* -1.943 0.109 
∆LDCGt−2 -15.034*** -4.065 0.009 
ΔWholeGt−2
+  -13.786*** -4.084 0.009 
ΔWholeGt−1
+  -9.720** -2.647 0.045 
∆DEPGt−1
+  5.311*** 4.019 0.010 
∆WholeG+ 11.600*** 3.479 0.017 
∆DEPGt−1
−  -2.248*** -3.741 0.013 
∆DEPG+ 5.920*** 3.079 0.027 
∆DEPGt−2
−  -0.793 -1.440 0.209 
ΔWholeGt−2
−  4.348** 2.035 0.097 
∆DEPGt−2
+  3.940*** 3.023 0.029 
R2 0.955   
Adjusted R2 0.811   
Durbin Watson 2.023   
χSC
2  0.087 [0.918]  
χHET
2  9.177 [0.905]  
χFF
2  1.074 [0.305]  




WLR,WholeG 22.742[0.00]*** WSR,WholeG  6.140[0.036]*** 




Notes: Superscripts ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively while “+”, “-
” represent positive and negative variations. 
 WholeG+ and WholeG− are long-run estimates associated with positive and negative 
variables.  
 χSC
2  is the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test of serial correlation, χHET
2  denotes 
the heteroscedasticity tests and χFF
2  denotes the functional form test. WLR and WSR 




5.4.3.2.1 Long run 
In the long run, a positive shock to wholesale funds has a positive impact on rapid 
credit growth in South Africa (a positive and significant coefficient of 21.342 at 1 per 
cent). This suggests that any positive shock in wholesale funding boosts credit booms 
in South Africa. During the build-up phase of the financial crisis of 2007-09, South 
Africa recorded a large influx of portfolio funds from developed markets around the 
world. Some of these portfolio funds found themselves in the South Africa banking 
sector which may have been used to finance excess demand for credit. Global 
quantitative easing after the financial crisis also saw an increase in net capital inflows 
into the country’s bond market increasing from R7 billion in 2007 to R92 billion in 2012 
(National Treasury, 2015).  
 
Lower or sometimes negative interest rate regimes in some developed markets have 
attracted foreign currency deposits into the South African banking sector because of 
the favourable returns in the South African environment. For example, according to 
the South African Reserve Bank data, foreign currency liabilities of the banking sector 
accelerated greatly in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 recording 87 per cent, 109 per cent, 
142 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. However, after the financial crisis, foreign 
currency liabilities grew at -11 per cent in 2009, -4 per cent in 2010 and 7 per cent in 
2011. Internally, there was an increase in the percentage of banking sector liabilities 
from institutional market funds and other large corporations during the build-up phase 
of the financial crisis, for example, 44 per cent in 2005, 39 per cent in 2006 and 41 per 





As discussed in the literature above, overreliance on wholesale funds can be 
detrimental to banks in the event of investors reversing their investment in the South 
African market to ‘safe haven’ destinations. There is also a possibility of central banks 
around the world abandoning quantitative easing in favour of normalising monetary 
policy. This might create a vacuum in emerging market countries such as South Africa. 
It is our finding that the composition and size of wholesale funds have created a 
significant source of finance for the banking sector and stimulated credit expansion in 
the economy. This finding is in line with bank literature around the world (Elekdag & 
Wu, 2011; Shin & Shin, 2011; Vazquez & Federico, 2015; De Haan, Van den End & 
Vermeulen, 2017) which suggests that the banking sector often relies on wholesale 
funds to finance the expansion of their balance sheets.  
 
A negative shock on wholesale funding also has a positive impact on rapid credit 
growth, however insignificant. It is possible that a negative shock on wholesale funding 
compels the banking sector to relook at their strategies of mobilising domestic 
deposits. We recall that the financial crisis of 2007-09 exposed the level of fragility of 
wholesale funds markets. At their peak, offshore funding markets became very illiquid 
with funding costs increasing significantly. During this period, banks suddenly 
increased their appetite for domestic funding. Pressure is exacted on banks to build 
resilient funding profiles by prioritising stable finance sources such as deposit funding. 
 
In the long run, a positive shock to retail deposits has a positive and significant (1 per 
cent level of significance) impact on rapid credit growth in South Africa. Although the 
negative shock on retail deposits has a negative impact, it is insignificant. This finding 
shows that in the long run, a positive shock to retail deposits stimulates credit 
expansion through a more stable source of finance than wholesale funds. The 
negative shock to retail deposits would actually have a negative impact on the growth 
of credit to the private sector. Statistics show that deposits significantly contribute to 
the South African banking assets, hence it is expected that a negative shock on the 
growth of deposits would have a knock-on effect on credit growth and ultimately on 
the banking assets.  Drawing on this finding, we urge the local banking sector to devise 




should include the possibility of increasing interest rates offered to depositors to attract 
a large pool of deposits. Indeed, the financial crisis exposed the level of fragility of 
wholesale funds markets. At their peak, wholesale funding markets became highly 
illiquid with funding costs increasing significantly. During this period, banking 
institutions suddenly increased their appetite for domestic funding. Regulatory 
authorities should encourage the banking sector to build resilient funding profiles by 
prioritising stable funding sources such as retail deposit finance. From a policy point 
of view, the government should introduce policy measures that incentivise households 
and firms to save, while at the same time boosting economic performance which 
ultimately increases households’ level of wealth.  
 
5.4.3.2.2 Short run 
A negative shock in wholesale funds is negatively related to rapid credit growth in the 
very short term (lag 0) (negative and significant coefficient of -10.124), which suggests 
that negative developments in the wholesale funds market reduce rapid credit growth 
in the short run. This understanding is important for the banking sector in guarding 
against overdependence on wholesale funds to bridge their finance gaps. The banking 
sector will need to attract or source other short-term funds to avoid liquidity challenges. 
 
Importantly, in the very short term (lag 0), we find a positive shock in wholesale funds 
positively impacts rapid credit growth (positive and significant coefficient of 11.600). 
This finding suggests that positive developments in the wholesale funds market quickly 
find their way into the banking system in the form of loans to the private sector. This 
is not surprising, given that developments in the financial markets have a bearing on 
the performance of the local market. This finding reinforces the idea that wholesale 
funds are heavily influenced by international developments, which are in most cases 
beyond the control of local banks.  
 
However, we find that positive shocks in wholesale funds at lags 1 and 2 (-9.720 and 




suggest that previous years’ positive shocks yield a negative impact on the ability of 
banks to increase borrowing in the following period.  
 
A positive shock in retail deposits has a positive impact on rapid credit growth in the 
very short term (positive and significant coefficient of 5.920). In addition, positive 
shocks in retail deposits at lags 1 and 2 (5.311 and 3.940 respectively) have a positive 
impact on rapid credit growth. This is true, given the fact that retail deposits are a major 
source of finance in South Africa. Positive developments in retail deposits present an 
opportunity for banks to build up more stable funds to lend out to borrowers. 
  
However, negative shocks in retail deposits in previous periods (at lag 1, coefficient of 
2.248 and, at lag 2, coefficient of -0.793) have a negative impact on rapid credit growth. 
This means that banks’ ability to increase credit allocation in the following period is 
negatively impacted by the previous period’s retail deposits. As discussed by Shin and 
Shin (2011), and Lozano and Guarín (2014), bank deposits are the most dominant 
source of funding for banks, and, as such, any negative short-term developments will 
impact negatively on the ability of banks to increase credit provisions. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Chapter Five, we empirically explored the relationship between credit booms, 
banking sector finance sources and their implications for financial stability in South 
Africa using time series data from 1992 to 2017. We applied the robust nonlinear ARDL 
model of Shin et al. (2014) which enabled us to test the symmetric or asymmetric 
relationship of variables in both the short and long run. Statistical evidence showed 
that the ratio of credit to domestic deposits (financial intermediation ratio) in South 
Africa is currently above 100 per cent, an indication that South African banks indeed 
use other funding sources to fund excess credit demand in South Africa. 
 
Econometric results strongly supported the presence of an asymmetric cointegration 




showed that positive shocks on wholesale funds had a positive impact on the ability of 
the banking sector to satisfy growing credit demand. In the short run, negative shocks 
in wholesale funding yield a negative impact on credit booms. Our long- and short-run 
results on wholesale funding are consistent with international literature on bank 
funding sources (Shin, 2009; Huang & Ratnovski, 2011; Hahm et al., 2013; 
Georgescu, 2015) that support the notion that overreliance on wholesale funds poses 
a serious risk to financial stability as experienced during the financial crisis. It is also 
worth noting that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is of the view that 
banks should be penalised by regulatory authorities for failure to maintain a stable 
funding ratio that minimises the exposure to liquidity risk.  
 
The increasing use of wholesale funds is evident in South Africa and suggests that the 
banking sector is increasingly becoming dependent on these less stable funds to 
sustain rising domestic credit levels. From a policy point of view, our study supports 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s key ‘Basel III regulatory framework’ 
reforms to facilitate more resilient banking systems around the world by proposing that 
regulatory authorities penalise banks that are in breach of the net stable funding ratio.  
 
Such a move is likely to reduce the level of systemic contagion in both the banking 
sector and the entire financial system. This is important in managing the role played 
by wholesale funds in propagating systemic risk in financial markets. We argue for the 
South African Reserve Bank to fully monitor and identify all banks that are in breach 
of their directive issued in line with section 6(6) of the Banks Act, 1990, which came 
into effect on 1 January 2018.  
 
The interaction between domestic deposit and credit booms also presents interesting 
asymmetric findings. In the long run, positive shocks in domestic deposits have a 
positive and significant impact on credit booms in South Africa. However, negative 
shocks on domestic deposits yield a negative but insignificant impact. The finding on 
the effect of positive shocks on credit booms is well supported in the literature (Kim et 
al., 2003; Demirgüç-Kunt, 2010; Jung & Kim, 2015). It should be noted that the 




independence in 1994 attracted a greater proportion of the previously excluded and 
unbanked population into mainstream banking. All these programmes coupled with 
strong economic growth increased the pool of deposits in the economy. 
 
In the short run, indeed, positive shocks on domestic deposits have a positive impact 
on credit booms. This short-run finding is not surprising since domestic deposits 
anchor credit growth in South Africa and the rest of the world. However, negative 
shocks in domestic deposits in previous years have had a negative impact on credit 
booms. As discussed in the literature, deposits are highly susceptible to sudden 
withdrawals as witnessed between 2007 and 2009 (see Figure 5.6). Indeed, such 
negative shocks affect the ability of banks to provide credit to the private sector.  
 
On the policy front, while most studies use the credit-to-GDP ratio as an informative 
signal on banking and financial fragility in the economy, we propose the use of non-
core banking sector liabilities as a complementary measure to estimate the stage of 
the financial cycle and the potential build-up of financial risk in the South African 
economy. We suggest that the regulatory authorities in South Africa should consider 
pressurising banks to build more resilient funding profiles by lessening their 
dependence on unstable funding sources to improve their net stable funding ratio. 
Therefore, we propose the speedy and full implementation of BCBS’s proposals for 
strict penalties for banks in breach of the net stable funding ratio. Furthermore, 
Government and regulatory authorities must encourage a culture of savings at a 
domestic level to boost banks’ efforts in mobilising deposits in the economy. Lastly, 
South African banks should develop promotional strategies in deposit mobilisation 
through the use of information technology, market segmentation, pricing strategies, et 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1   INTRODUCTION 
This study has examined the relationship between credit booms and bank fragility in 
South Africa. Banking literature shows that credit booms are generally associated with 
banking crises around the world. The principal setting of the study was influenced 
mainly by the following key motivations: (1) rapid credit growth over the past few years 
compared to other regions, with credit ratio peaking at 192 per cent in 2007 and 
remaining above 178% from 2008; (2) the costs associated with financial system 
failures would have dire consequences in South Africa given the huge fiscal deficit and 
the three problems (i.e. unemployment, poverty and inequality) that the government is 
busy addressing; (3) high levels of indebtedness over the past 10-12 years; (4) the 
banking sector in South Africa accounts for 20 per cent of GDP and is a major 
employer in the country, and its failure will have dire consequences for the economy 
and therefore it must be closely guarded. Theoretical and empirical literature reviewed 
in this study shows that the banking sector is one of the most fragile in the economy 
and its fragility may lead to a fully-fledged financial crisis, with the result that it must 
be closely monitored to ensure its stability. The majority of the data used in this study 
covers the period 1990 to 2017 and was obtained from Statistics South Africa and the 
South African Reserve Bank. 
  
To understand the behaviour of credit in South Africa, and the extent of the problem, 
we analysed domestic credit trends in the country and also compared it with other 
regions and countries. In particular, we analysed credit growth in relation to economic 
growth, types of loans, the financial intermediation ratio, composition of credit by 
economic sector, debt-to-income ratio, total asset structure of the banking sector, bank 





First, using the Pesaran et al. (2001) autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
econometric model, we modelled the drivers of credit booms in South Africa using data 
from 1970 to 2016. This was important in order to help policymakers and regulatory 
authorities to predict, reduce or even avoid these credit booms that are not associated 
with investment or consumption booms, especially given the potential dangers and 
costs associated with booms and busts.  
 
 Second, we proceeded to test whether these credit booms signal future vulnerabilities 
in the South African banking sector (growth-risk nexus in bank lending) using the 
ARDL and Shin et al. (2014) nonlinear ARDL (NARDL) methodology. Understanding 
this nexus was important since loans represented the biggest asset in the South 
African banking sector and the fact that loans are the biggest and the most obvious 
source of credit risk faced by banks around the world; South Africa with its rapid credit 
growth is no exception. Therefore, the empirical analysis of credit risk in relation to 
credit booms is important since it reveals alarm signals when the banking sector is 
vulnerable to shocks. 
 
Third, using the ARDL methodology we investigated the relationship between credit 
booms, banking sector finance sources and their implications for financial stability in 
South Africa. In this case, we found burgeoning literature (Adrian & Shin, 2010; 
Elekdag & Wu, 2011; Huang & Ratnosvski, 2011; Jung & Kim, 2015) that suggested 
that banking sector sources of finance were significantly associated with the credit 
cycle, liquidity shocks and financial stability. This study was important for South Africa 
given that the financial intermediation ratio has remained above the 100 per cent mark: 
an indication that credit provision exceeds the levels of funds mobilised through bank 
deposits. The use of wholesale funds has become very popular in South Africa over 
the years given the rapid growth in credit. Therefore, identifying the sensitivity of the 





6.2   SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
First, statistical evidence reveals a strong persistent pattern of rapid credit growth in 
South Africa, specifically around the early 1990s to mid-2000s, accompanied by an 
increase in private sector appetite for credit. Furthermore, we found evidence of 
procyclical credit provision in South Africa. This was confirmed by other studies on 
South Africa for example, Akinboade and Makina, 2009, Fourie et al. (2011) and 
Akinsola and Ikhide (2018). The presence of credit booms in South Africa was 
identified and confirmed by previous panel studies of Mendoza and Terrones (2008, 
2012), Gozgor (2014) and Arena et al. (2015) during the past two decades. The study 
also established that episodes of credit booms were linked with increased levels of 
debt in South Africa, especially at the household level. 
 
 Second, empirical evidence from the econometric models revealed that factors such 
as foreign capital inflows, stock market prices, mortgage loans, real interest rates, and 
GDP per capita were the main triggers of credit booms in South Africa. As confirmed 
by country studies (Aisen & Franken, 2010; Bakker & Gulde, 2010; Mendoza & 
Terrones, 2012), foreign capital inflows have been for some time the biggest driver of 
credit growth in countries that have experienced credit booms.  
 
Third, the study found evidence of backward-looking credit risk management models 
in South Africa, in spite of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel III 
accord) recommendations that banks should move towards countercyclical credit risk 
models. Our findings on credit risk management in South Africa are in line with 
previous studies of Ikhide (2003), Akinboade and Makina (2009), Havrylchyk (2010) 
and Ozili and Outa (2017) on South Africa. The study also established that credit 
booms and business cycles were important drivers of credit risk in South Africa. 
Importantly, the study established that rapid domestic credit growth yielded higher 






Fourth, the study established that, like all other banks around the world, the South 
Africa banking sector also relied upon and consistently used wholesale funds to 
supplement domestic deposits in order to satisfy growing credit demand. The 
econometric model, in this case, revealed a strong presence of an asymmetric 
relationship between credit booms and banking sector funding sources. Specifically, 
the study revealed that, in the long run, positive developments in the wholesale funds 
market have a positive effect on the ability of the banking sector to satisfy credit 
demand. The study established that, in the long run, positive developments in the 
domestic deposit market have positive effects on credit booms, while in the short-run 
positive developments also have a positive effect on credit booms. The study also 
found that negative shocks in domestic deposits in previous years have had negative 
effects on credit booms.  
 
Based on the above, two sets of conclusions regarding credit booms pose a dilemma 
to policymakers when designing financial development strategies, especially for 
emerging and developing countries. Credit booms and financial stability both have an 
impact on overall macroeconomic outcomes. In this study, literature demonstrated that 
credit booms can promote economic growth but at the same time can trigger financial 
crisis. Another dilemma for policymakers is the task of isolating good booms from bad 
booms. Unhealthy excessive levels of credit are difficult to differentiate from healthy 
ones. Healthy credit booms are often underpinned by strong investment and 
consumption growth and contribute significantly to financial and economic 
development as confirmed by business cycle theories reviewed in this study.  
 
6.3  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings contained in this study point to important policy implications for South 
Africa. First, the identification of the triggers of credit booms is important for 
policymakers in order to gauge and formulate appropriate strategies to reduce the risk 
of a crisis or, at least, limit its consequences in the economy. We argue policymakers 
to increase their surveillance of the banking sector, given the social and economic 




indicators to distinguish between good and good booms. In conclusion, we argue that 
regulatory authorities should not take a ‘wait-and-see’ approach in dealing with the 
credit booms, given the dilemma these present. South Africa needs to adopt a 
proactive macroprudential regulation to build buffers for use during credit busts.  
 
Second, while overcoming credit booms is important for minimising systemic risk, 
regulatory authorities and policymakers should be mindful of the role played by bank 
credit in a country such as South Africa still suffering from high levels of 
unemployment, poverty and inequality. The banking sector should adopt sophisticated 
methods of credit risk measurement through quantitative credit models which make it 
possible to quantify credit risk accurately. South African authorities should move with 
speed in the implementation of BCBS countercyclical capital buffer recommendations 
in full. While Government and regulatory bodies should discourage credit booms not 
related to consumption and investment booms in South Africa, we propose that forums 
should be established through relevant institutions to preach and encourage a culture 
of building up savings compared to overreliance on credit to fund day-to-day 
consumption. Lastly, we recommend strict penalties for credit providers found guilty of 
reckless lending in South Africa. 
 
Concerning banking sector sources of finance, while most studies use the credit-to-
GDP ratio as an informative signal on banking and financial fragility in the economy, 
we propose the use of non-core banking sector liabilities as a complementary measure 
to estimate the stage of the financial cycle and the potential build-up of financial risk 
in the South African economy. We suggest that the regulatory authorities in South 
Africa should consider pressurising banks to build more resilient funding profiles by 
lessening their dependence on unstable funding sources to improve their net stable 
funding ratio. Therefore, we propose the speedy and full implementation of BCBS’s 
proposals for strict penalties for banks in breach of the net stable funding ratio. 
Furthermore, Government and regulatory authorities must encourage a culture of 
savings at a domestic level to boost banks’ efforts in mobilising deposits in the 




deposit mobilisation through the use of information technology, market segmentation, 
pricing strategies, et cetera, in order to maximise their pool of stable funds. 
 
In summary, we believe that credit booms are too risky to be left alone, and appropriate 
monetary and fiscal policy is in principle a major instrument that is capable of curbing 
credit booms and limiting over-indebtedness. It is important for authorities to 
understand that fiscal discipline is required during the upswing since credit booms not 
only flatter the balance sheets of banks and consumers they extend credit to, they also 
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